| UK | Germany |
| Home - Books - Business & Investing - Biographies & Primers - Company Histories | Help | |
| 181-200 of 200 Back 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 |
click price to see details click image to enlarge click link to go to the store
| 181. Fools Rush In : Steve Case, Jerry Levin, and the Unmaking of AOL Time Warner by Nina Munk | |
![]() | list price: $26.95
our price: $17.79 (price subject to change: see help) Asin: 0060540346 Catlog: Book (2004-01-01) Publisher: HarperBusiness Sales Rank: 64594 Average Customer Review: US | Canada | United Kingdom | Germany | France | Japan |
|
Book Description On Monday, January 10, 2000, America Online announced that it was buying Time Warner for $163 billion. The news was crazy, incredible. The biggest merger ever, it was, according to the media, an "awesome megadeal" and "a fusion of guts and glory." It was "the deal of the century" and "a mega-marriage of earth and cyberspace." An Internet upstart, AOL was buying the world's most powerful media and entertainment company. "A company that isn't old enough to buy beer," marveled the Wall Street Journal, "has essentially swallowed an ancien régime media conglomerate that took most of a century to construct." Two years later, after the smoke had cleared, $200 billion of shareholder value had vanished into cyberspace. On the trail of possible fraud, the SEC and the Justice Department started investigating AOL Time Warner's accounting practices. Meanwhile, a civil war had broken out inside the company, complete with backstabbing and personal betrayals. Before long, almost every major player was out of the company, discredited, and humiliated. Jerry Levin, Time Warner's "resident genius," lost his job, lost his reputation, and, in the view of some people, simply "lost it." Steve Case, the visionary leader of AOL, was forced out of the company he had created. Gone too was the telegenic wonder-boy Bob Pittman, and his gang of fast-talking salesmen. As for Ted Turner, he resigned from his post as vice-chairman of AOL Time Warner in early 2003, bitter, wiser, and $8.5 billion poorer. Fools Rush In is the definitive account of one of the greatest fiascos in the history of corporate America. In a narrative fraught with drama, Nina Munk reveals the overweening ambition and moral posturing that brought down the Deal of the Century. With painstaking reporting and the remarkable eye for detail she's known for, Munk lays out, step by step, the anatomy of a debacle. Irreverent, witty, and iconoclastic, she sees through it all brilliantly. "As in all great Greek tragedies, you knew the plot before it played out," one perceptive insider told Munk on the subject of the AOL Time Warner deal; "you knew who'd be sacrificed at the altar." Here's what we discover in Fools Rush In: In their single-minded quest for power, Steve Case and Jerry Levin were at each other's throats even before the deal was announced. Bob Pittman was regarded as a "windup CEO" by Case, and viewed as a hustler by just about everyone at Time Warner. Ted Turner underestimated Jerry Levin's ruthlessness badly. And Levin himself, convinced he was creating a great legacy comparable to that of Time Inc.'s founder, Henry Luce, refused to acknowledge the obvious: that, with a remarkable sense of timing, Steve Case had used grossly inflated Internet paper to buy Time Warner. Reviews (20)
But this story isn't just about AOL Time Warner but about corporate America in general, about how merger mania and golden parachuted moguls can play fast and loose with our money, our livelihood, our country, and our future. It's about the collateral damage, the megalomania, the broken hearts and the evaporated portfolios. It's about the mentality of corporate CEOs like Levin who as he turned sixty wanted to be remembered for something other than the bottom line, "for integrity...high moral principles; and wisdom." (p. 133) Ah, yes, a lifetime of chasing money and power and now True Religion. One is reminded of Bill Gates with the very demanding problem of how to distribute all that money wisely before he dies. Munk knows these people. How she got them to be so carelessly candid at times amazes me, especially her work with Levin. She understands their psychology and to some significant extent, their business. She had to, to write this book and make it work. She packs the text with spiffy and sometimes all too revealing quotes. She has the heart of a baggy-eyed scholar and the soul of a muckraker. The almost surrealistic give and take between Case and Levin as they cooked The Deal reads like something out of a Hollywood movie. Whose ego, whose sense of personal power, and imagined historical accomplishment and brilliance needed massaging the most by whom? And who would steal more from the other? And the ease with which Salomon Smith Barney and Morgan Stanley each got $60-million for their part in the deal reads like tales of manna falling from heaven. There are some black and white photos in the middle of the book. The test is exquisitely edited and proofed, and the book handsomely designed. Munk ends this "morality play," as she calls it, with a curtain call of the cast of characters in an epilogue and brings us up to date on what has happened to them and what they're doing now. Incidentally, my subject-line quote about a "mess of porridge" is from Robert Murdoch, no doubt licking his chops. (p. 280) Bottom line: you will be kept up at night reading this page turner. Better yet take it on that trip to Singapore. It's a jet-lag killer.
Munk quickly traces the early history of Time, Inc. through the attitudes and accomplishments of its founder, Henry Luce. Then, using the biographical methodology she will employ throughout, she introduces the most fascinating of the drama's players, Gerald Levin, and exploits his early career to bring the story through Time's 1989 merger with Warner Communications. Along the way, other key characters such as Steve Ross (Warner's builder and CEO) and Ted Turner are profiled using Munk's by now standard technique. (I began to be surprised if a new player was introduced without my finding out what his or her father had done for a living.) A parallel section on AOL and its founder, Steve Case, follows. Then "The Big Deal" itself and its aftermath are examined in sections that are rich in personality-conflict, jealousy, culture-clash. But don't expect that detail to provide any great depth on the business/economic/strategic issues involved, although these are given some necessary attention. As explanatory factors, they are persuasively made subsidiary to the personalities of Levin, Case, and their cronies. It is not news that many corporations both large and small are run as fiefdoms subservient to the whims of their chief executive. But if further proof is needed that "responsibility to shareholders" has become an American myth, this book can provide it. Case and Levin enjoyed spectacular early successes. At no point in Munk's account does either ask how much of a role good luck or the confluence of favorable circumstances may have played in those successes. To both principals (and to most of the others portrayed here), their success proved their own genius and assured future triumphs. As evidence to the contrary began to mount, they each forged ahead with no deviation in their individual and increasingly incongruous plans. Munk details the hubris, but she only hints at alternative or larger explanations of how events unfolded. She does place a significant spotlight on the role of advertising revenues. At AOL, the need for this category of income slowly undermines Steve Case's avowed idealism -- of creating something profound that will benefit society. A similar, though less intense, history unfolds at Time, Inc. This suggests a way of looking at the history of media in general. A promising new medium (radio, publishing, television, the Web) is established and its prime mover is motivated by the desire to do social good, to change the way people think or interact. But then economic realities intrude, causing a greater and greater focus on publicity, marketing, and promotion instead of content. Advertising departments come to dominate decision-making, corrupting and degrading the medium, thus draining it of all social value. Somebody - perhaps one of Vance Packard's descendants -- should write a book about that!
This tale of AOL's disasterous purchase of Time-Warner also offers the sickly pleasure of watching billionaires act as though we should feel sorry for them, better yet, admire them, because they are actually altruists and gurus. Seriously. That's how they want to see themselves. It's a strangely detached reading experience, since 98% of us aren't likely to be involved in such a big deal in our lives. Let alone see it blow up in our face. Yet the book is a compelling and compulsive read. See the CEOs run straight into a wall! Hear the ticking clock as the hopeless deal runs out of air...and then violently deflates. Time Warner comes off a lot better than AOL, which makes me glad I switched services, but may also be because Munk So this deal is going to go down in history as a billion-dollar boondoggle. But man, it makes interesting reading--and it lets me use the word "boondoggle."
Part One "Resident Genius" covers a period from Time Inc. to Time Warner, 1923-1998. Munk provides essential background information which includes a penetrating analysis of Henry Luce. Part Two Enter the Internet Cowboys: AOL, 1985-1999. Of special interest to me was Munk's analysis of the working relationship of an odd couple indeed, Steve Case and Robert Pittman. Part Three The Big Deal: AOL and Time Warner, 1999-2000. Step-by-step, Munk traces the process which eventually resulted in "the biggest train wreck in the history of corporate America." I was fascinated to learn about the nature and extent of Ted Turner's involvement amidst corporate intrigues which would have made the Medici envious. Part Four "Surviving Is Winning": AOL Time Warner 2003-2003. The material which Munk presents offers still another illustration of the fact that success has many parents but failure is an orphan. "Glued together on January 11, 2001, the company known as AOL Time Warner lasted two years, nine months, and five days before it fell apart....In late 2003, [renamed] Time Warner's stock hovered around $16, down 70% from January, 2001, when the AOL Time Warner deal closed." After reading these four Parts, I proceeded to the Epilogue in which Munk provides an update on several of the "train wreckers." Meyer Berlow "has found a new vocation: he's a wood turner who spends eight hours a day at a lathe, making wooden bowls and other vessels in his workshop in Williamsburg, Brooklyn." Jeff Bewes and Don Logan are now the two most powerful executives at Time Warner, after Dick Parsons. What about Case? In January 2003, he resigned as chairman of the company. "In late 2003, [he] opened an office on Washington, D.C.'s K Street. From there he oversees his investments, which thus far have largely been restricted to Hawaii, his native state." For me, Levin is the most interesting. Since the train wreck, he "has distanced himself from his past yet again....[and] rarely communicates with former colleagues or associates. 'I'm not in the Hollywood community, I'm not in the media community. That's not where I'm looking for my sustenance.'" Then where is he? According to Munk, Levin has a new life. "He also has a new vocation: the healing arts. Together with his fiancee, Laurie Perlman, a psychologist, Levin is helping to create a holistic mental health institute in Los Angeles, California." Fools Rush In: Steve Case, Jerry Levin, and the Unmaking of AOL Time Warner is first-rate in all respects. Hopefully those who read this brief commentary will be encouraged to read other recently published books which also examine "the culture of corporate America and Wall Street in the late 1900s." My own recommendations include the aforementioned Smartest Guys in the Room as well as Kara Swisher's There Must Be a Pony in Here Somewhere, Alec Klein's Stealing Time : Steve Case, Jerry Levin, and the Collapse of AOL Time Warner, Jo Johnson and Martine Orange's The Man Who Tried to Buy the World: Jean-Marie Messier and Vivendi Universal, and Rebecca Smith and John R. Emshwiller's 24 Days: How Two Wall Street Journal Reporters Uncovered the Lies that Destroyed Faith in Corporate America. ... Read more | |
| 182. Kings of Texas : The 150-Year Saga of an American Ranching Empire by DonGraham | |
![]() | list price: $24.95
our price: $16.47 (price subject to change: see help) Asin: 0471394513 Catlog: Book (2002-12-13) Publisher: Wiley Sales Rank: 37816 Average Customer Review: US | Canada | United Kingdom | Germany | France | Japan |
|
Book Description "Kings of Texas is a fresh and very welcome history of the great King Ranch. Its concise but thorough, crisply written, meticulous, and very readable. It should find a wide audience." "This book is about the King Ranch, but it is about much more than that. A compelling chronicle of war, peace, love, betrayal, birth, and death in the region where the Texas-Mexico border blurs in the haze of the Wild Horse Desert, it is also an intriguing detective story with links to the presentand a first-rate read." Reviews (10)
However, I did like this book. Its well-written and easy to read. One really gets a sense of what life was like in the late 1800's in South Texas. The later part of the book deals with the impending lawsuit against the King Ranch. Did Richard King swindle his partner's widow out of what was rightfully her's? (about 7,000 acres of prime real estate). The widow's descendants sure think so. Can they win their claim over the power King Ranch? This is a complicated question to answer but the author digs deep into the story. The only bad part is that the case has not yet been settled, so there is no resolution to the engaging battel for money and land. If you like Texas or western history, you should read this book.
However, this work by Don Graham, whose work I often read in "Texas Monthly Magazine", which centers more on Kleberg than on the later years and workings, is quite interesting. I couldn't put it down until the end. And after yakking it up to my husband, he finally indulged himself in the read. We both recommend it for anyone fascinated by the legends of this gigantic property and its landlords.
| |
| 183. Nature's Keepers : The Remarkable Story of How the Nature Conservancy Became the Largest Environmental Group in the World by BillBirchard | |
![]() | list price: $24.95
our price: $16.47 (price subject to change: see help) Asin: 0787971588 Catlog: Book (2005-03-04) Publisher: Jossey-Bass Sales Rank: 22034 Average Customer Review: US | Canada | United Kingdom | Germany | France | Japan |
|
Book Description Reviews (3)
| |
| 184. Organizations by James G. March, Herbert A. Simon | |
![]() | list price: $39.95
our price: $39.95 (price subject to change: see help) Asin: 063118631X Catlog: Book (1993-06-01) Publisher: Blackwell Publishers Sales Rank: 203932 US | Canada | United Kingdom | Germany | France | Japan |
|
Book Description | |
| 185. Searching for a Corporate Savior: The Irrational Quest for Charismatic CEOs by Rakesh Khurana | |
![]() | list price: $45.00
our price: $38.79 (price subject to change: see help) Asin: 0691074372 Catlog: Book (2002-08-19) Publisher: Princeton University Press Sales Rank: 401012 Average Customer Review: US | Canada | United Kingdom | Germany | France | Japan |
|
Book Description Corporate CEOs are headline news. Stock prices rise and fall at word of their hiring and firing. Business media debate their merits and defects as if individual leaders determined the health of the economy. Yet we know surprisingly little about how CEOs are selected and dismissed or about their true power. This is the first book to take us into the often secretive world of the CEO selection process. Rakesh Khurana's findings are surprising and disturbing. In recent years, he shows, corporations have increasingly sought CEOs who are above all else charismatic, whose fame and force of personality impress analysts and the business media, but whose experience and abilities are not necessarily right for companies' specific needs. The labor market for CEOs, Khurana concludes, is far less rational than we might think. Khurana's findings are based on a study of the hiring and firing of CEOs at over 850 of America's largest companies and on extensive interviews with CEOs, corporate board members, and consultants at executive search firms. Written with exceptional clarity and verve, the book explains the basic mechanics of the selection process and how hiring priorities have changed with the rise of shareholder activism. Khurana argues that the market for CEOs, which we often assume runs on cool calculation and the impersonal forces of supply and demand, is culturally determined and too frequently inefficient. Its emphasis on charisma artificially limits the number of candidates considered, giving them extraordinary leverage to demand high salaries and power. It also raises expectations and increases the chance that a CEO will be fired for failing to meet shareholders' hopes. The result is corporate instability and too little attention to long-term strategy. The book is a major contribution to our understanding of corporate culture and the nature of markets and leadership in general. Reviews (8)
In the decade following McCoy's appointment as CEO, Chicago's Bank One Corporation acquired over 100 banks, moved from 37th largest bank to fourth, and stock increased 500%. In 1999 Bank One began to falter, the stock fell, integrating First Chicago was more difficult than expected, the conservative style clashed with the entrepreneurial culture and McCoy's management style, which was included in the Harvard Business School's required general management course, was seen to be a liability rather than an asset. A revolt gathered steam and a generous separation agreement was negotiated. Stock jumped 11% on the announcement but became volatile with media coverage of the high-profile search for the best person in the US to lead Bank One back to the top with the leadership as the overriding principle guiding the search. Dimon was top of the short list. "In late February, Dimon flew into Chicago to deliver a two-hour presentation to the Bank One search committee. By this time, he had decided he wanted the job. Dimon's presentation seemed to leave his audience breathless. He talked about his philosophy of management, covering such topics as his leadership style and the importance of clearly articulating to people their roles and responsibilities. He also spoke about the importance of instituting a more extensive stock-option plan to better align the incentives of the executives with those of the shareholders. Dimon's bluntness and self-confidence impressed the committee." He wasn't afraid to lead, he said all the right things, he had a plan, he was prepared to make the tough decisions that others wouldn't make. In one brief appearance that Dimon himself largely orchestrated he met Bank One's high standards of leadership.Dimon was appointed over insider Istock and stock soared 30%. Bank One's CEO succession process followed a familiar script with little emphasis on the company's strategic position and whether the candidate's background was appropriate. If the new CEO is unable to deliver quickly, the wisdom of the selection is questioned. This is the first thread of irrational behavior in what should be a carefully considered process. The leadership school believes that CEOs play a critical role in a firm's performance, while the constraint school believes that internal and external constraints limit the CEO's ability to affect performance. A third school suggests that the pertinent question to answer is 'When does leadership matter?' rather than 'Does leadership matter?' as the leader's impact is highly case-sensitive. "As the Bank One story illustrates, however, it is not only the criteria directors use in choosing a new CEO that calls into question the efficiency and overall rationality of the external CEO market. So do many other features of the search itself." Not only was the initial boost to the stock price short lived, but the board was questioned on its control over the CEO after five directors, including the internal candidate for CEO, "volunteered" to retire from the board after five months. Whether the benefits would be worth the price agreed by the board would remain an open question for an unforeseeable length of time. "How are we to account for these remarkable, ultimately disquieting features of the external CEO search: the overestimation of the CEO's role and the fixation on charisma; the somewhat Byzantine nature of the search process itself, simultaneously closed to many presumably qualified candidates and open to the influence of many external actors; and the questionable outcomes that this process often produces? This book is an attempt to answer this very question." Boards seriously underestimate the damage that outside succession entails and if the firm is already in trouble, hiring an outside CEO might threaten the survival of the organization itself. A remarkable feature of the Bank One search was that the board passed up an experienced, highly qualified executive who knew the company and its business well. The airplane interview technique in which the incumbent CEO conducts a surprise interview with successor candidates individually and asks who should lead the company assuming both are killed provides very interesting information about the chemistry of the group. Repeating the process three months later when candidates are better prepared but only the incumbent CEO is killed, provides further valuable information. All information is shared with those involved in the final decision. If the process is initiated early enough, the shortlisted candidates can be moved into testing situations that may help the final decision. Kurana, Assistant Professor of Organizational Behavior at the Harvard Business School wrote this book based on a study of hiring and firing of CEOs at over 850 of America's largest companies. Anyone who is involved in the selection process of a CEO would be wise to study his findings.
He finds that a pattern has begun repeating itself in such situations: Boards of directors don't usually take action until a company situation has been deteriorating for a while, so even when they begin the recruiting process, they are already under pressure to take bold and decisive action. This impels them to begin by rejecting any current inside candidates who are felt to be part of the problem, thus incapable of breathing new life into the organization. Underlying this "explanation" is the fear that the press, investors, and the media might not applaud a less-than-spectacular candidate such as any merely competent insider.Such lack of enthusiasm by all these onlookers mightwell lead to further erosion of stock which has probably already suffered. Thus the directors embark on a quest for some outside candidate who might possess the magic powers to provide salvation. The rejection of inside candidates and the quest for some superstar who can pull a rabbit from the hat are, Khurana asserts, the first steps down a slippery slope that frequently end in tragedy. The book describes the descent and how it has and will affect Americanbusiness. This is a fine book that presents a number of fresh insights about a critical issue in the world of large corporations.It is written cogently, with erudition, by an author who is rightfully passionate about his subject. Of the hundreds of management titles published in recent years, this description wouldn't apply to more than a handful. It is interesting to compare Khurana's findings with those described in the book, "Good to Great" by Jim Collins.Collins reports on a number of companies that outperformed their competitors by huge orders of magnitude.According to Collins the CEOs of these spectacularly performing companies (a) were, with one exception, recruited from within and (b) were definitely non-charismatic leaders, selected for their capabilities with no expectation that they would perform miracles or provide instant cures. These findings certainly lend support to Khurana's assertions.The fact that one of Collins "Good to Great" companies, Gillette, ended up as a Khurana case when its CEO was forced out of his position in 2000 suggests that any generalizations in this field must take into account the rapid changes in the world. In a final chapter, Khurana attempts a description of some possible solutions to the problems he has identified. His main prescriptions are that the CEO job market be opened up and that some more professional recruiting and evaluation processes be created for CEOs.These are rather weak palliatives for the seemingly intractable trends Khurana has described. The book's strengths lie in its portrayal of the way the CEO labor market is operating, the insights into why it is working that way and its portrayal of implications for the future of large American corporations if the trends continue. Moreover his findings raise two fundamental issues which, though clearly beyond the scope of this book, must be dealt with in any quest for amelioration. The second issue -- again assuming that the risks in CEO recruiting will continue to be unacceptably high -- concerns a board's responsibility for making certain that they are never forced to undertake the impossible search. Instead of focusing on what boards have to do to improve their techniques for replacing the CEO, it might be more useful to ask whether it shouldn't be a responsibility of boards to ensure this doesn't happen. What mechanisms need to be built in for boards to assess managerial performance on an ongoing basis and to take prompt action when performance is not satisfactory.
For example, as a former banker I appreciated the point he made that big NYC bankers tend to be investment bankers, which is different than commercial banking,which is different than retail banking.It may seem like inside baseball to outsiders, but that's exactly the point: if you don't know the difference, you shouldn't be a bank director.Thus my conclusion would be that instead of telling current board members to be less foolish, it would be more practical to focus on reforming the way board members are chosen.In my experience, most bank board members were absolutely incapable of judging competence on the essential technical issues to sound banking (eg, how credit quality, spread, and volume are related), and choosing board members based on some objective criteria would seem to advance the search for a good CEO better than telling the current board members to not fall for the next empty suit. But more broadly, is the flawed method of picking a CEO worse than before?Khurana's own data suggests that new CEOs don't matter much, which mean they aren't worse either.And the issue of arbitrariness is somewhat overstated, compared to a platonic ideal that has never existed.Picking any manager, such as a head of IT, raises the same example of cliquish, suboptimal groupthink.The same could be said for how collectives choose politicians, pundits or professors.In the words of Flaubert, "our ignorance of history makes us libel our own times. People have always been like this." Lastly, he relies a lot on outdated sociological treatises (C Wright Mills, Weber, Whyte), and the idea of a WASP closed society. For example, at one point he mentions that in 1950 most CEOs where white, male, and Protestant, and the same is true today.But as pointed out it in Brook's Bobos in Paradise, you would be remiss not to mention the dramatic change over the past 50 years.For example, back then the Kennedy family were considered outside the establishment.Jews are now around 20% of Harvard's undergrad, and 13% of the Fortune 500 CEOs, even though 3% of the US population.The WASP elite have given way to a much more meritocratic elite, and the fact that it extends to the boardroom is partially a result of the new process for choosing CEOs.In predictable sociological fashion his straw man argument is the dopey institution-free economist, that conventional wisdom that Keynes and Galbraith effectively invoked, but which is now a tired parody of current economic thinking.In the end, there is nothing really deep here, just a fun book highlighting the current foibles of specific group of people trying to deal with incomplete information and coalition building.
| |
| 186. Family Business by Ernesto J. Poza | |
![]() | list price: $91.95
our price: $91.95 (price subject to change: see help) Asin: 0324261519 Catlog: Book (2003-04-01) Publisher: South-Western College Pub Sales Rank: 360050 US | Canada | United Kingdom | Germany | France | Japan |
|
Book Description | |
| 187. Soap Opera : The Inside Story of Procter & Gamble by Alecia Swasy | |
![]() | list price: $19.00
our price: $19.00 (price subject to change: see help) Asin: 0671897810 Catlog: Book (1994-09-01) Publisher: Simon & Schuster Sales Rank: 283062 Average Customer Review: US | Canada | United Kingdom | Germany | France | Japan |
|
Book Description In this explosive expose, Wall Street Journal reporter Alecia Swasy tells the chilling story of life within P&G. Wonderfully readable, impeccably researched, Soap Opera is a sobering look at the price of success in American business. Reviews (10)
"The greatest evil is not now done in those sordid 'dens of crime' that Dickens loved to paint. It is not even done in concentration camps and labour camps. In those we see its final result. But it is conceived and ordered (moved, seconded, carried, and minuted) in clean, carpeted, warmed, and well-lighted offices, by quiet men with white collars and cut fingernails and smooth-shaven cheeks who do not need to raise their voices. Hence, naturally enough, my symbol for Hell is something like the bureaucracy of a police state or the offices of a thoroughly nasty business concern."
Does Swasy have it in for P&G? Yeah, but so would you if you were a journalist and your subject was breaking the law to trample on your rights while you tried to do your job. Things got so out of hand as P&G launched telephone record investigations and had ex-employees brought to Cincinnati police stations to explain why they were talking to a reporter, that the ensuing coverage sparked a national outcry. Pundits and cartoonists weighed in about the KGB tactics of people who make laundry detergent and toothpaste. When finally brought to heel by indignant shareholders, CEO Artzt shrugged and called it a mistake. "The only thing he regretted," Swasy writes, "was getting caught." Swasy was clearly embittered by her experience, and when her narrative flies into polemical flourishes, as in the Epilogue ("[Critics] refuse to buy the Ivory-pure image so carefully cultivated by P&G's years of marketing. We should all do the same"), the book is poorer for it. She does a great job describing, through the voices of mostly anonymous insiders, the noxious work environment of P&G for its employees (and you don't have to be a "Proctoid" to relate to the Dilbert-in-the-Death-Star picture she paints), then editorializes on how P&G advertising nurtures enduring cultural "myths" about a woman's place being in the home. Frankly, this latter angle comes up lame. P&G advertising reflected the culture for years, it sold product, and it has been adjusted to fit contemporary mores, as Swasy notes (just not enough for her liking.) I don't know whether it's so awful the role of the female was once rather more rigidly defined than it is now, but dumping much of the blame on P&G's doorstep seems excessive. Marketing to lesbian soccer Moms in the 1940s would probably have not helped P&G achieve its present level of success. Where Swasy's book is strongest is the account of Rely, the tampon whose ingredients could cause toxic shock, and were directly responsible for the deaths of several women in 1979-80. Despite the accumulation of evidence, P&G went forward with its marketing. As recounted in a chapter of the book "Guerrilla Marketing") that should be required reading in corporate ethics classes, CEO Smale even planned to roll out a deodorant version of Rely while his underlings worked to silence researchers (mostly successfully) with generous grant money. The chapter is particularly good when it recounts how one trial lawyer and a bereaved husband he represented forced P&G to pay ridiculously low damages and put needed heat on the effort to establish P&G's culpability. Never mind, though. Swasy reveals later on that P&G's lab boys were concurrently doping out how to add the same toxic chemical to diapers. There are other good chapters on P&G's arrogant practices overseas, its inept handling of domestic retailers (not just the small fry but WalMart, too!), and its stranglehold on a Florida community living around a river P&G polluted. Sometimes, as with the Florida case, Swasy seems too eager to embrace anything the critics dish out, and her noting the death of the P&G snack food Pringles [as of the book's publication in 1994] appears in retrospect to have been premature. But overall, "Soap Opera" is a solid addition to business journalism. Books like this one only make you look a little deeper than your coupon stash in thinking about what products you buy. And that's a good thing. ... Read more | |
| 188. Soros: The Life and Times of a Messianic Billionaire by MICHAEL T. KAUFMAN | |
![]() | list price: $27.50
our price: $18.70 (price subject to change: see help) Asin: 0375405852 Catlog: Book (2002-02-19) Publisher: Knopf Sales Rank: 105976 Average Customer Review: US | Canada | United Kingdom | Germany | France | Japan |
|
Amazon.com Like Intel chairman Andrew Grove, whose memoir Swimming Across touches on some of the same territory, Soros grew up as the scion of a Hungarian Jewish family, many of whose members did not survive the Holocaust. Inclined toward philosophy (a field in which he sometimes writes even today, though many philosophers wish he would not), Soros escaped to England, and later America, and put his sharp mind to work making a huge fortune. Not content to live a leisurely or unexamined life, Soros put more than $1 billion to use in bettering the lives of citizens of formerly totalitarian regimes--and even in hastening the end of dictatorships around the world. Former New York Times columnist Kaufman delivers a respectful account, closeted skeletons and all, of Soros's life and work, and his book will interest a wide range of readers. --Gregory McNamee Reviews (12)
What I found puzzling is how much of the text was spent on Soros' philanthropic activities. They deserve a significant portion of the text, but well over half of the text is devoted to this. I would have been interested, for example, in seeing some experts from Soros "Burden", and trying to understand a bit better what issues Soros was trying to describe in his own book, but could not. Having said all this, this was a well researched, well written, well referenced biography. This is not a trading book, and those seeking trading advice should look elsewhere.
As an observer, I came away with the portrait of a tragic figure. A man who has done what Freud termed "identification with the oppressor". Expelled from Hungary and humiliated there, the first country to received huge sums of his money was Hungary. Other countries with equally rich antisemitic pasts receieved no less. Another way explain this would be as what is termed in Anthropology, following Marcel Mause in the Spirit of the Gift, "inflicting gifts" or giving to humiliate. I kept thinking while reading the book that a man who made most of his money within walking distance from Harlem should look in his own backyard for noble causes first. And talking about his own back yard, isn't it pathetic that he never gave anything to his own people? And yet, the boyish smile of the man is endearing and heart warming and even heart breaking. And again, the writer, a pleasure to read.A minor technical detail: he should have given his manuscript to a native Hungarian speaker to edit the spelling and also to tighten some of the explanations which refer to the lnaguage or the culture or the country. (I am just being pedantic here, I know) Though not new, read it if you have not done so yet.
| |
| 189. Spooked: Espionage in Corporate America by Adam L. Penenberg, Marc Barry | |
![]() | list price: $16.00
(price subject to change: see help) Asin: 0738205931 Catlog: Book (2001-12) Publisher: Perseus Books Group Sales Rank: 45941 Average Customer Review: US | Canada | United Kingdom | Germany | France | Japan |
|
Book Description Imagine your main business competitor building a satellite-equipped "war room" to secretly monitor your new ventures. Imagine your classified product prototype mysteriously landing on the market under the brand name belonging to your archrival. Impossible? This isn't a story line from the latest spy thriller, it's modern-day corporate America. Spooked thrusts readers into a clandestine world-where business means war and information is worth stealing. Through narrative accounts of corporate spies within companies such as IBM, Microsoft, and Motorola, Spooked dramatically brings to life one of America's fastest-growing industries: Corporate Intelligence. In this page-burning exposé, Adam Penenberg and Marc Barry uncover and describe in thrilling detail the alarming regularity of espionage in industry. They offer an unsettling portrait of America's publicly traded companies, and unravel the truth and hypocrisy behind the multi-billion dollar corporate intelligence industry. Reviews (20)
Probably Barry's drug-bust type background, and profile as a risk addicted field ops guy is why he's so willing to lay it on the line about what's really going on out there. Comes across a bit like Robert Baer, the CIA guy who has been writing those books on the middle east. It's a classic schism between the guys in the home office and the guys risking their lives out in the field. The guys risking their necks tend to get a "f*** you" attitude pretty fast toward HQ. Book is worth reading, if a bit boring in it's detail at times. Reads like an article series that didn't get published. Some reviewers have said this book is a slander suit waiting to happen. Naah. First of all, it's printed, so it's libel. Second, I'll bet good money that Barry could trot out enough evidence in court to convince a jury he was telling the truth. So nobody is going to sue. Guys like Herring and the management of SCIP know better. Barry would cut them to ribbons, and then counter sue and set himself up for life. Besides, it's much more effective in the long run to freeze the guy out of his profession, quietly. Or just ignore it completely, because it doesn't matter.
Professional competitive intelligence professionals, especially those that are members of SCIP (the Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals), will learn nothing new here except to be aware of now NOT to collect intelligence. Computer hacking, information brokering and pretext are techniques that are used by companies with the "do whatever it takes to get the information" philosophy. Readers that want more detail and insight on the Avery Dennison/Four Pillars case are better served by reading "Sticky Fingers." Mark Robinson
| |
| 190. How To Incorporate and Start a Business in Virginia by J. W. Dicks | |
![]() | list price: $16.95
(price subject to change: see help) Asin: 1558507752 Catlog: Book (1997-03) Publisher: Adams Media Corporation Sales Rank: 848050 Average Customer Review: US | Canada | United Kingdom | Germany | France | Japan |
|
Book Description How to Incorporate and Start a Business in... covers every essential topic you need to understand to start a business right. Protect yourself and your business with expert knowledge provided in this book. The easy-to-follow steps and worksheets guide you through every aspect of incorporation and starting your own business. This book discusses in detail: Selecting an operating entity-which one is best for you? Learn the pros and cons of each type: The five necessary steps to incorporation-five essential moves you must know and follow: Raising Capital-Avoid costly mistakes and financing pitfalls that leave other business owners behind: Dealing with the law-Legal issues always come up, so be prepared: Preparing Contracts and Leases-Learn the tricks of the trade to save you time and money: Understanding copyrights, trademarks, and patents-How does this apply to you? Mastering your taxes-Save money by following advice outlined in this chapter: How to Incorporate and Start a Business in... will also each you how to hire the best employees, extend credit to your customer, acquire the proper insurance for your business, and maximize corporate and executive benefits. Don't be left out in the cold! How to Incorporate and Start a Business in... How to Incorporate and Start a Business in...will guide you past common snares and pitfalls that hamper the efforts of many new business owners. This book contains dozens of profit strategies engineered to maximize your profit and prevent common mistakes. Plus, this book outlines specific laws and procedures you need to be aware of to do business in your state. It's specifically designed for you. How to Incorporate and Start a Business in...is easy to read, informative, and will save your business both time and money. Use its expert advice to get you started and keep you business on the path to success! Reviews (1)
J.W. Dicks is an excellent writer, a real entrepneneur and a attorney so he offers a broad and unique background on business, corporations. What works and what doesn't work. Good book, especially for Virginians. ... Read more | |
| 191. The Rise and Fall of the Conglomerate Kings by Robert Sobel | |
![]() | list price: $34.95
our price: $34.95 (price subject to change: see help) Asin: 1893122476 Catlog: Book (1999-12-01) Publisher: Beard Books Sales Rank: 659590 US | Canada | United Kingdom | Germany | France | Japan |
|
Book Description | |
| 192. Catch! A Fishmonger's Guide to Greatness by Cyndi Crother, The Crew of World-Famous Pike Place Fish | |
![]() | list price: $19.95
our price: $13.57 (price subject to change: see help) Asin: 1576752542 Catlog: Book (2003-12) Publisher: Berrett-Koehler Publishers Sales Rank: 38097 Average Customer Review: US | Canada | United Kingdom | Germany | France | Japan |
|
Amazon.com These ideas of self-reliance, intention and language as reality are not new. Yet Crother gives them a fresh and practical application in the photos of individual fishmongers and in their words. Whether reading about Jeremy's ordeal of chemotherapy or Bugge's finessing the customer who was showered with ice from a flying fish, readers will find the most animated and instructive stories since Finding Nemo. --Barbara Mackoff Reviews (7)
The whole idea of the Pike Place Fish Market is inspirational. If you have ever been to the market in Seattle, you will be quite inspired and maybe even a happier person right away because if it. The people who work there are inspirational. They are succeeding personally and as part of a team. They are very happy to be working where they are. They have a formula for success that is really working, and working for ordinary people. This is why they sell tons of fish on the Internet. This is why they perform training programs all over the country. This is why they sell so many books and videos and T-shirts. If you do not check into this source of inspiriation you are losing out. I'm so glad I know about Fish!
| |
| 193. Big Bets Gone Bad : Derivatives and Bankruptcy in Orange County. The Largest Municipal Failure in U.S. History by Philippe Jorion, Academic Pr, Robert Roper | |
![]() | list price: $36.95
our price: $36.95 (price subject to change: see help) Asin: 0123903602 Catlog: Book (1995-09-18) Publisher: Academic Press Sales Rank: 391053 Average Customer Review: US | Canada | United Kingdom | Germany | France | Japan |
|
Book Description
Reviews (4)
The first part of the book introduces the problem quickly then proceeds to give the reader a crash course in risk management theory, explaining among other things the concept of Value-at-Risk (VaR). Many types of derivatives are described and their proper use explained. We are given a manager's working knowlege of finance. Jorion then moves to the Orange County debacle proper and his conclusion is frighteningly simple: the financial managers of Orange County, entrusted with billions, did not know what they were doing. They were ignorant of what we learned in the first few chapters. They were amateur money managers playing roulette. The book is still topical. The Basel II banking agreements mandate strict capital reserve requirements for a variety of risks, such as market and liquidity risk, so that understanding the concept of VaR is more important than ever. Most importantly however, Basel II requires preparation and reserves for operation risk, which most often has to do with the people side of finance rather than the mathematical vality of the models used. Jorion's book is thus also a good introduction to the human side of risk.
When the interest rates went through the roof (from 5,25% to 8% = + 52%), the value of the collateral (the bonds) for his position fell (with a factor 3). He got a margin call, but couldn't pay it. The biggest part of the investment (held by FBCS) was liquidated with a phenomenal loss. Only Merrill Lynch didn't cover their position. The author gives excellent explanations on some very specialized investments like reverse floaters and other high tech financial operations of which the value can only calculated by partial integrals. Food for investment bankers.
On the minus side, the book is not particularly well documented (in terms of, for example, the graphs and the sources of the data) and some chapters seem suspiciously like lecture notes, hastily adapted to a book format. Still, an enjoyable trip to the dark side of financial market.
From this book, we learn that Robert L. Citron was head of a large portfolio, had no oversight, and an inflated ego. His superiors and fellow investment participants (such as the county school district) knew full well what he was doing, but allowed him to continue unsupervised because of his past stellar performance- much of which was due to pure luck and favorable market conditions. We also learn that Citron, much like Nicholas Leeson, the orchestrator of the fall of Barings, was a financial neophyte. While on the one hand believing that he was fully invested in bonds, Citron had taken a heavily leverage | |