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| 21. The Making of Economic Society (11th Edition) by Robert L Heilbroner, William Milberg | |
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Book Description Reviews (3)
The author points out that any society must have a coherent system for producing useful goods and services and then distributing them in a manner sufficient for society's perpetuation. Man has relied upon combinations of tradition, command, and markets to solve those production and distribution problems. Tradition uses time-honored methods of work, "allocated by heredity," which are reinforced by "law, custom, and belief." Change and competitiveness are not tolerated. Command is authoritarian control of economies and is mostly associated with economies operating in rapid catch-up mode, such as the Soviet Union. However, even democracies use elements of command during periods of crisis. In market societies, the aggregation of supply and demand guide economic functioning with no distinct center of control or allegiance to past practices. Manorial estates and the guilds dominated life in the Middle Ages along with the Church, but the author points to small beginnings of a more commercial world. Itinerant merchants established a small niche for commercial activity in some urban areas. The more successful of them came to be key financiers of monarchs keen on expanding their authority. The gold and silver realized from 16th century New World expeditions stimulated commercial activity. Calvinism, in contrast to the Catholic Church, sanctified hard work and the accumulation of wealth as an indicator of spiritual worthiness. Gradually, feudal society became more reliant upon money as a basis of social exchange. No longer were manorial lords obligated for the overall well being of serfs. The displacement of peasants by the enclosure movements was justified by the opportunities for the landed aristocracy to use their estates as sources of cash revenue. The author identifies several changes that are necessary for a market economy to emerge. Virtually every task, good, or service has a monetary reward. The anticipation of financial reward guides such decisions as where to labor or what to produce. A society of contracts supercedes a society of status and traditional social bonds. With those changes, a certain amount of social uncertainty is introduced. Yet a market society is not without its own forms of control. The competitions of seller versus seller and buyer versus seller are constraining forces on economic behavior. Generally it takes a market economy to substantially change the material well being of an entire society. In the first place, traditional societies are not unhappy with the status quo. What is needed are investments in capital goods, or "tools, equipment, machines, and buildings," to increase human productivity leading to higher living standards. And it is the hope for profits or higher wages that spurs investment of money and labor in those goods. But investment implies savings, which, in turn, generally requires a sacrifice in consumption and lower wages. The author suggests that the growing pains of industrialization, mostly on the backs of the working class with the "forced emigration of the peasantry by enclosure and heavy-handed exploitation," could not have been avoided. He undercuts that argument slightly by acknowledging that the forces of democracy in the 19th century ameliorated conditions for the working class. Scientific and technological advances are often large factors in the development of capital goods and increased productivity. English industrial production literally exploded based on the inventions of such men as Wilkinson, Watt, and Arkwright. The factory system came to dominate English life. New technologies have often literally transformed market societies. The automobile, for example, drastically changed residential patterns, facilitated social independence, and was a massive generator of employment. Can anyone doubt the impacts of electricity, airplanes, television, and computers? However, the author points out that market societies do not necessarily operate according to the basic theory. "Consumer power" is a first principle of classical economists; according to that notion, consumers force products to be sold "at the lowest price compatible with continued production." But market societies invariably tend to be dominated by a few large firms, where economic efficiencies can be attained. These large enterprises often agree among themselves to set pricing above truly competitive levels. In addition, because much of what is produced in modern economies is non essential, consistency of demand must be created through advertising. While large firms may be needed, consumer sovereignty is mostly a fiction. Stable market economies must maintain the balances between production and purchasing and savings and investment. Workers' purchasing power must be consistent with production volumes. In addition, savings ought to be converted into investment, or capital formation. The Great Depression was brought about by workers being underpaid and capital investments not being made. The Great Depression and WWII established that government must intervene in a market economy through fiscal and monetary policies to bolster economic stability. The author emphasizes that basic instabilities remain in market societies. In a market economy, it remains the anticipation of profit on the part of businesses and entrepreneurs that motivates most investment and growth. Technological displacement and unemployment continue to undermine purchasing power. And the author wrote in an era before the evisceration of large "countervailing" unions, the forces of globalization, and a resurgence of rightist, anti-government ideologies. Those developments could have only added to the author's concerns of instabilities. The book is hurt by not being able to contend with the tremendous changes of the last forty years, though the cautions remain relevant today. It is, however, an excellent guide for understanding the economic and societal changes from the Middle Ages to the era of science and capitalism. Try Charles Lindblom's "The Market System."
There are good summaries of key terms and good discussion questions at the end of each chapter to stimulate classroom discussion; organizationally the book is very good and production values are quite high - very few typesetting errors, good paper, nice ink. Robert Heilbroner is not, however, the best equipped author to be writing on this subject, as his cynical, Hobbesian view of human nature comes to the surface in numerous remarks whose cumulative effect is a high degree of skepticism about free enterprise and unregulated markets - a skepticism that is not backed by evidence and argument, but more by fears of "bigness" and "unscrupulousness" of business and businesspeople. (Review based on the Tenth edition of this book)
The main disappointment is that the nineteenth century--which was full of economic, social, and political change--is basically ignored. The content jumps from the Industrial Revolution to the beginning of the twentieth century. The traditional Euro-American egocentrism is also present. ... Read more | |
| 22. A Concise Economic History of the World: From Paleolithic Times to the Present by Rondo Cameron, Larry Neal | |
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Book Description Reviews (4)
Nevertheless, the book is quite interesting, as it progresses from the dawn of human civilization with very concise and brief summaries well in to the twentieth century becoming more desciptive and detailed. If you are interested in how the world economy arrived to its current level, then I would suggest that this book is a good read and worth your while. Since this edition was published in 1997, it is excusable for the author to omit the economic consequences of the Euro, the rise of China and the rest of Asia, and the economic implications of Septemer 11. The author also refuses to offer his speculative view on the future of the world economies, thereby leaving the reader to do his or her on guess work. Although the introduction of the book, on the current inequality of world economies, is quite interesting, it is not elaborated upon towards the end of the book, and causes a lack of continuity. If you wish to understand better the world economy, you would be better off reading the encyclopedia, Lonely Planet travel guides, or perhaps even better, (what I have done) which is to travel and see these countries for yourself with your own eyes.
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| 23. Maestro: Greenspan's Fed And The American Boom by Bob Woodward | |
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Amazon.com More profoundly, Greenspan is a maestro, a conductor, exquisitely attuned to every instrument in the political and economic orchestra. He rules by consensus, but with a firm hand and notoriously inscrutable words. Marvelously, Woodward relates that Greenspan had to propose twice to his wife, the violinist-turned-TV news star Andrea Mitchell, before she understood: "His verbal obscurity and caution were so ingrained that Mitchell didn't even know that he had asked her to marry him." Woodward gives us the inside story of what Greenspan really thinks and how he outmaneuvered the most ruthless politicians on earth in some of the hairiest times imaginable, from the 1987 stock market crash to the 1994-95 Mexican crisis to the stomach-churning turn of the century. It turns out that for all his awesome knowledge of monetary minutiae, the Fed chief literally relies on "a pain in the pit of my stomach" to make decisions. "At times, he found his body sensed danger before his head," writes Woodward. The Fed chief also adapts Einstein's technique to economics, hunting for discrepancies as keys to deeper theories. Einstein made breakthroughs out of bent light; Greenspan deduced productivity gains that government statisticians had overlooked for years. (The gains appeared when Greenspan made the statisticians calculate productivity by business sector, the way it's done in the real world.) Woodward's prose is cool and rational, not exuberant. But if you're into economics and politics, you'll find a rich gossip trove here. Who knew Reagan had a draft of a presidential order to shut down Wall Street trading at hand in 1987? Scary! Reading Maestro is better than sitting with Greenspan in his famous tub as he charts your future--it's like being right there inside his head. --Tim Appelo Reviews (71)
Unfortunately, the history (and economics) is a bit more complex than Woodward would have us believe. To take the most obvious example, it is not clear that the U.S. economy is presently the bright shining star that Woodward assumes. The low unemployment, rapid economic growth, and low inflation are all good news, but there are serious clouds on the horizon. Specifically, the over-valued stock market and the over-valued dollar threaten the economy with a double whammy which could leave the economy reeling for years to come. Even with the recent decline in the stock market, price to earnings ratios are still close to double their historic average. The Congressional Budget Office (the agency that makes all the projections for the budget that everyone uses in political debates) projects that real corporate profits will actually shrink by about 10 percent over the next decade. This implies that the market is over-valued by 100 percent, or more. A decline of this magnitude would destroy approximately $10 trillion in wealth, or $70,000 for an average family. Similarly, the United States is running a huge trade deficit which is leading it to borrow $450 billion a year from abroad. A trade deficit of this magnitude is no more sustainable than a budget deficit of $450 billion, as Alan Greenspan and every other economist knows. Reversing this deficit will inevitably require a large drop in the value of the dollar, perhaps by as much as 30 percent. A decline in the dollar of this magnitude will crimp living standards in the United States, as the price of imported goods rise, and also lead to more inflation. While the fault for the over-valuation of the stock market and the dollar may not lie entirely at Greenspan's feet, he does bear a large share of the responsibility. Back at the end of 1996 (when the market was about half its recent highs), Greenspan did warn about the possibility that irrational exuberance had overtaken the stock market. But most of his subsequent comments were more oblique, leaving open the possibility that stock prices could make sense. Given the seriousness of the problem, it would have been entirely appropriate for Greenspan to use his bully pulpit at the Fed to warn of the consequences of a seriously over-valued stock market. He could have presented lectures on this topic in his Congressional testimony, in the same way that he has lectured about the dangers of budget deficits on numerous occasions. Given Mr. Greenspan's standing in financial circles, it is hard to believe that such lectures would not have had an effect. The same applies to the over-valuation of the dollar. Woodward is almost completely oblivious to this set of issues. While the possibility of a stock bubble is mentioned at several points, it is never treated as though it were a serious problem. The history of the Great Depression and the current example of a Japanese economy left to stagnate for a decade after the collapse of its bubble in 1989 should have been sufficient to get Woodward's attention. Similarly, Greenspan gets the final, and often only, word on the disputes of the past. For example, we get the account of his decision to raise interest rates in 1994-5 to head off inflation. Woodward tells us about the objections raised within the Clinton Administration to a policy which slowed the economy and cost jobs. However, at the end of the day, Woodward tells us that inflation remained under control, and the unemployment rate eventually fell to its current levels of close to 4.0 percent. Woodward seems to feel that this history vindicated Greenspan's rate hikes, when the reality is the opposite. Greenspan raised interest rates because he accepted the prevailing view within the economics profession at the time, that unemployment rates below 6.0 percent would lead to higher inflation. The subsequent history showed that there was no necessary link between the unemployment rate and inflation, and that the unemployment rate could fall far below 6.0 percent without triggering inflation. Had Greenspan not raised interest rates in 1994 and 1995, the economy would have grown faster in these years and the unemployment rate would have dropped more quickly. Millions of people needlessly went unemployed in these years, and the economy lost more than $100 billion in output. History has shown that Alan Greenspan was wrong. There are many other places where Woodward's naive hero worship and ignorance of economics lead him to go astray. The Greenspan story is certainly an interesting one which deserves to be told. It is unfortunate that this book could not have been written by someone with more understanding of the subject matter and a more open mind on the subject.
Maestro starts off with Alan Greenspan assuming the Fed Chairman levers of power from Paul Volcker in 1987, shortly before the "Black Monday" meltdown, and takes us through his unprecedented appointment to a fourth term in early 2000 by a most unlikely soul mate, President Bill Clinton. With Maestro, author Bob Woodward continues to fill the literary niche that he has for his past several books: writing about subjects and events that are too topical and recent to be seen in a fully objective historical context, yet producing a volume that has much more depth and substance than day-to-day journalistic coverage. Woodward's access to the Washington elite is unrivaled, and this book, as many of his previous ones, relies heavily on the journalistic tradition of the unnamed source. Maestro takes us into the meetings of both the FOMC, and the Fed Board of Governors. Woodward lets us be a "fly on the wall" in those meetings, and allows us to hear the discussion, interchange, and debate about the national and international economy that precedes a change in the Fed funds rate or discount rate. We see the Board of Governors, and Greenspan himself, as brilliant but fallible human beings who, like the rest of us, see their jobs and obligations through the prism of their own political viewpoints. Additionally, though, Woodward takes us into minds of the individual members, through what certainly were many off-the-record interviews, to see how the Governors feel about the process, and about Chairman Greenspan himself. Viewpoints range from admiration and deference to jealousy and envy, and Woodward lays it all down for us. In one scene, Woodward shares with us a somewhat frustrated President Clinton venting his emotions through an impersonation of the Fed Chairman, right in the Oval Office, to the side-splitting laughter of the President's advisors. Granted, this doesn't have the national importance of "seventeen minutes of missing tape," but it does make for good reading. Woodward, as usual, maintains a laser focus on his subject, refusing to be diverted for more than a minute by the Clinton-Lewinsky fiasco, or even by areas of Greenspan's life that he doesn't deem as relevant. At first, I found myself hungry for more details about Greenspan as a person: what does he like to do in his spare time? What kind of a neighbor would he be? It doesn't take long to realize, however, that with Greenspan, the professional is the personal. He has no children that we know of, just married his longtime sweetheart (NBC correspondent Andrea Mitchell) in 1997, takes only one brief vacation a year, and has been absorbed in studying economic data since 1948. Greenspan truly exhibits the meaning of the old saying, "Do what you love and you'll never work another day in your life." You don't need an MBA or a PhD in Economics to understand and appreciate this book. Woodward includes a helpful glossary in the back that I, even as the possessor of one of the two above-noted degrees, found myself referring to with some frequency. Not only does one not need vast empirical economic knowledge to appreciate this book, the reader may even get more out of this book without it. The most significant drawback of this book is the lack of a sense of completion. Greenspan's story is a work in progress, and this book with undoubtedly be regarded in the future as perhaps an interim analysis of his accomplishments. The book ends just when the tech stock slide is beginning. The most relevant questions are yet to be answered: how have perceptions of Greenspan been altered by the slowing economy? Will President Bush reappoint Greenspan to a fifth term in 2004? If not, how will the President replace the man that has become synonymous with the Chairmanship itself? Is any succession planning underway? One can only hope that Woodward stays in contact with his spiderweb of sources, and shares that information with us in a future work.
Woodward has already been blessed with his 15 minutes of fame. His latest work, "Maestro: Greenspan's Fed and the American Boom," represents neither earth-shattering importance nor an erudite treatment of his subject, Alan Greenspan and his reign over the Federal Reserve. To its merit, "Maestro" does shed a surprising amount of light on a once mysterious and self-consciously secretive organization. The inner-workings of the Fed and its policy-making are depicted with excellent detail, as Woodward takes the reader through the bumpy rides of setting interest rates from 1987-2000. And for non-economic types, Woodward does a pretty decent job explaining how monetary policy works and what the implications are for increasing interest rates or expanding the money supply. Yet it is a shame Woodward is not an economist himself because his book suffers from a lack of depth on certain issues. The work's treatment of developments over the last decade, including the savings and loan scandals of the late '80s and the Asian financial crises of the '90s, is rather superficial. What is most bothersome about Woodward's work is its failure to point out many of the negative conclusions the details of the work might necessitate. The author's editorial on his subject is one of pure praise, as he attempts to elevate the status of Greenspan to that of a modern hero. The truth is far more complicated than the rose-colored picture Woodward would like to paint. One of the scariest points Woodward's book fails to make is that the position of chairman of the Federal Open Market Committee is perhaps the most powerful seat of economic policymaking in the United States. Many students of the Fed's operations grow up believing that interest rates are set by the democratic vote of a committee of economists. In reality, the monetary power of the last 13 years has rested in the judgement of one man. Greenspan's career epitomized the struggle to push the envelope on limitations to power. The chairman was the master of the FOMC, and before each meeting, he polled and called every member to figure out each one's stance on whether to raise or lower interest rates. Since the chairman always speaks last at an FOMC meeting, Greenspan often could plea for the universal support of his decisions, and his careful rhetoric frequently was enough to achieve the policy outcomes he desired. There were even times from 1988-1999, when the committee voted to allow Greenspan to make minor adjustments in the Fed Funds rate between meetings, giving him complete monetary control. We are all lucky that Greenspan has handled the responsibility of his power with such sobriety. What if Greenspan had not been so judicious? An America where the sovereign economic policymaker was a bumbling idiot would resemble the despair of 1929, when interest rates were raised even after the stock markets crashed. The very idea that determining the Fed Funds rate could rest in the hands of a moron is a scary thought. Another frightening notion Woodward doesn't elucidate is the number of problems with the way our system allocates its human capital. Many of those on the FOMC were there simply because they had political ties and connections. If Greenspan were to resign tomorrow, party friendships and political allies could influence the new appointment. Often when economic policymaking is submerged in politics, short-run prosperity is prioritized, and little thought is given to where things will head five or 10 years down the road. If we had a Fed chairman who - because he was a pawn of politics - strove for break-neck growth without regard to price stability, disaster could occur. Woodward strives to make the point that Greenspan always has tried to put his job above factionalism, but Woodward fails to recognize that future Fed chairmen may not behave the same way. Overall, Woodward's "Maestro" gives a decent overview of the history of economic developments and monetary policy in the last decade. The book's flaws lie not in the display of facts but rather in its pure, unquestioning praise of its central figure, Alan Greenspan. I would not disagree with statements that Greenspan has done his job especially well. He, however, has been fortunate, as circumstances beyond his control contributed to the record expansion of our economy and our subsequent prosperity. Greenspan's ability as Fed chairman surely will be tested as our economy slows, and whether we continue to prosper will determine if he really has, as Woodward says, a "mastery of process."
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| 24. Growth and Empowerment : Making Development Happen (Munich Lectures) by Nicholas Stern, Jean-Jacques Dethier, F. Halsey Rogers | |
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| 25. Social Problems: Globalization in the 21st Century by R. Dean Peterson, Delores F. Wunder, Harlan L. Mueller | |
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| 26. Irrational Exuberance by ROBERT J. SHILLER | |
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Reviews (57)
Shiller rebuts the Efficient Market Hypothesis. He has analyzed many U.S. stock market crashes. In each case, he did not find information absorbed by institutional and individual investors that justified the market downturns. In all cases, it appears the investors were "aware" of the reasons for the market downturn as explained by the financial press after the downturn occurred. For Shiller, this means that the reasons were false, and that investors do not digest information in such an efficient and immediate way as stated in the Efficient Market Hypothesis. Shiller believes investors are irrational, and trade based on certain premises such as herd instinct, momentum, belief that stocks always go up. These beliefs are reinforced by the media. The resulting market valuation at the time the book was published (first quarter 2000, the market's peak) was far above its intrinsic value. As they say, the rest is history. Shiller's timing was perfect. We have been in a Bear market ever since.
Discordant factors produced the disreputable herd mentality/behavior that Shiller dissects, striving to overthrow the Efficient Market Theory, which invites debunking. Shiller decidedly reasons the opposite of the Efficient Market Theory. It's unimaginable for persons to actually oppose Shiller's precognition, not because bears the world over were vindicated by equities' bleak performance, but because stocks' P/E ratios are calculated for precisely the reason Shiller alerted: to regulate stocks' unwarranted racketeering. It's fact, that at the bubble's start, techs in the networking and chip sectors were probably outperforming their "old-economy" peers, relating to earnings. Yet since most investors are miserably prepared, they were harshly ensnared by the lax press to pile on to those initially moderate rewards for stocks, to abuse those gains in overstepping ways. Likewise, one could argue that when the Bubble burst-and additional factors like 9/11 and corporate scandals contributing-those same feebly swayed "investors" sold the markets off nightmarishly worse than what was due. Again, because their paranoid nervousness took over their rationale in deciding how to approach markets. I retrospect with ghoulish HORROR, the relentlessness of wrongdoings that Wall Street, the collective body, committed in hazardously presaging themselves for the hardest bear ever. CNBC, fund managers, analysts blindingly had the blameworthiest ulterior motives to exploit undereducated soccer moms, Sunday investors. Roughly analyzing, the more people CNBC guilefully suckered into longing dangerous techs, the more ratings they'd get, intensifying on-air "personalities"' payoffs, including CNBC's anchors' OWN holdings in various funds they'd get under GE. The more bait fund managers could lure to invest in their funds, the more they'd be compensated for escalating their funds' values. Ever-notorious ANALysts' ulterior motives laid not in the public's response, but in companies' stocks that they covered. Some were paid kickbacks for their suspiciously nothing-but-buy ratings. This triad of terror is accountable for falsely justifying the market's overreaching excesses beyond their, initially, reasonable beginnings. The drone public was simply mistaught that internet stocks' repugnant absence of income would materialize soon enough, networking high-fliers like CSCO and JNPR were said to "never suffer" from lack of business because of ever-expanding business that the growing internet would provide, and that the zombie public could expect profane, double-digit returns for years to come, laxly based on one year's (1999) fluke growth of speculative tech stocks which were preyed upon as a fad. Also contributing to mania were factors that people mistook to maltreat as reasons for entering markets in a buy-and-hold savagery. As baby-boomers aged, they were unquestionably snared by CNBC's falsenesses to expose themselves supplementary more to equities which were on teetering foundations. The same's true of mutual funds' elevating popularity, as innumerable people were misdirected to blindly trap themselves in funds where they'd never monitor its performance for lengthy times. Other factors were also involved in this worst bear market in 100 years, constituents like 9/11, corporate improprieties, personal bankruptcies-the plausible, defining trigger that blew the markets up (particularly NASDAQ) was people overstretching their margins, thus being extorted to sell automatically. These are hallmark characteristics of hype markets' speculators being so overextended on long sides that when savvy investors decide to take their respective gains from months of abominable gains, selling significantly, margin calls are consequently called in on many accounts. This leads additionally bleakly into the domino effect of tumbling decks of cards. It's pronounced message still corresponds to today's markets. CNBC's-ONCE AGAIN!!!!-restarting their impenitent Jihad of superficially, abusively embellishing the mediocre point the economy's currently at. Respecting historical bear cycles, we're indisputably in the 4th secular bear since the 20th century, convincingly proven by the damaging downfall of 2000-2002, arduously worse than any declines in the last century, especially the NASDAQ. There may definitively portend 18 years more of this feral bear, from 2000 levels. The shiest estimate of S&P 500's P/E's still sinfully extreme at 30-you'll pay 30 bucks to one dollar of what it's licitly worth, for vast majorities of stocks. Companies repeat slashing jobs-no small part thanks to the newest scourge of outsourcing-at record, breakneck furiousness, with probability of jobs returning to levels markedly improved from the -400 000 that impend awful growth to increments which would traditionally support prosperous GDP higher than 4% ascendingly unlikely. Through this purgatory, and ruthlessly mediocre to pessimistic economic numbers up to the present, aggressively hardened CNBC is unapologetically unlearning from its breaches and refusing to revere their costly errancies. CNBC persists on solely rigging the most obdurate perma-bulls (Angiletas, Leones) and loathsomely irrelevant, corporate Bush Admin. pushers (Kudlow, Cramer) to comment on the last half-year's markets. Those same schemingly prejudiced perma-bulls are seizing control of current market conditions to exaggerate them furiously and depravedly. The increasingly intolerably wretched CNBC "personalities" are debauching to vile, hypocritically "happy" guises while on air, further tyrannizing an air of "great market returns". They're willfully relapsing to 1999-2000's embezzlement, and need to be spurned as Contrarians!!!!
Having said that I think it is not necessary to be an expert to read and appreciate the book. In fact the book uses a lot of common sense in its presentation of market data and the discussions of the data and the markets. The most striking thing to me about the book is the description and summary concerning macro trends or cycles in the market. These cycles can extend decades. For example since approximately the late 1800's there have been five or six speculative bull runs to high market P/E values. The exact reason is different for each run up. We have seen run-ups due to the companies involved with railway stocks a century ago, the telephone as an investment tool in the 1920's, and then the new internet companies and trading electronically in the 1990's. The way stocks are bought and are sold and the financial instruments vary with the year or era. But these cycles repeat themselves every decade or two. In almost every case investors participating in the speculative market spike or bull-run gets carried away and thinks this time, in this era, whether it was the 1920's or the 1990's that investing is now "different". The rules have changed. The high P/E ratios are now the norm. It is a "new era" and the old rules do not apply. Sound all too familiar? But in each and at every peak in the S&P or Dow, reality eventually sinks in, the investors pull back, and the market drops back to its historical average levels. That average level is a P/E ratio for the large cap or S&P 500 companies having an average P/E ratio in the general range of 10 to 20 or 25 maximum. For some people foolish enough to invest near the market highs, and then who ride the market down have had to wait 20 years to see their stocks return to the same value at which they were purchased. Some stocks and companies do not survive the downturn and the investment vanishes. Now in our time one can only speculate on how many years or decades it will take for the NASDAQ to return to the 5000 to 5500 level. This is sobering book, and it rates 5 stars for a short but excellent read and education. Jack in Toronto
Perhaps this is why under the subject of what role government might play in cooling down irrationality before it becomes destructive, I did not notice any reference to the FRB's role of setting margin rates on stock purchases. This power (Reg T) was created precisely to cool down speculative markets when they get too hot. Greenspan, for whatever reason, chose not to invoke this tool during the boom. | |
| 27. Cowboy Capitalism: European Myths, American Reality by Olaf Gersemann | |
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| 28. Financial Reckoning Day: Surviving the Soft Depression of the 21st Century by William Bonner, Addison Wiggin | |
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Book Description Advanced praise from bestselling authors "An investment book that will not only enlarge your investment horizon, but also make you laugh and thoroughly entertain you for a few hours." "Financial Reckoning Day is . . . in the category of scintillating sex or good vision, something to be savored and enjoyedbefore it is too late." "A powerful and insightful vision . . . each paragraph stimulates a new rush of thoughts that fills in gaping holes in the investors understanding of what has happened to their dreams . . . while prepping them to confront any new confusion that may arrive." Reviews (43)
This is an excellent book for investors of all kinds to read, even for people just interested in our economy. To those people who believe that the 'buy and hold' stategy for stock ownership is the best way to make money in the stock market, and they anticipate making back the loses that they may have incurred over that last three years, they may be very mistaken.
This book is a brilliant expose of the "new economy", the irrational behavior of crowds and its malaise of overvalued stock and asset prices that cannot be sustained. Even the Nobel prize winning theory of efficient markets fails to describe the phenomenon in US markets during the last decade of the twentieth century. Irrational exuberance cannot be explained by rational theories. The book opens with an analysis of the new economy driven by Information technology, and blasts the myth of the new found prosperity. The new economy was supposed to signal the end of history by shortsighted economists during the days of irrational exuberance. The internet in fact amplified the behavior of crowds across continents and created bubbles that were larger than ever. Companies without any revenue, leave alone profits, were busy making money through IPOs and engaged in the most innovative forms of financial engineering to drive their stock prices north. Who cares as long as it makes us rich. But then, history has taught us that reality will catch up and so it did. There was a time in the seventeenth century when the infamous John Law ( he was mostly on the opposite side of his second name) created the concept of paper money and central banking that ultimately brought his country on its knees. Using this example, the book attacks monetarists for the unbridled expansion of liquidity in a system that temporarily believes that paper money is real. Modern day economists tend to treat the economy as a machine that can be manipulated by driving some screws and made to run a little faster. The problem , the authors feel, is that soon they will be left with no screws and also run the risk of tampering with the wrong ones. Printing more money at regular intervals, is considered a panacea for all economic ills by these pundits of prosperity. Economic lessons from Japan are described in a separate chapter and quoted in most other chapters of the book. The chapter devoted to "The Hard Math of Demography" is excellent and the topic of an aging America and its economic implications is discussed with accurate statistics and analysis to back the conclusions. Finally one gets the big picture of the big bubble. Americans are spending and the Fed is encouraging them to spend borrowed money. To make things easier, the interest raters are lowered and more money is printed. Savings rates in the US have reached an all time low close to zero while private sector debt is three times the GDP. US is now the biggest borrower and foreigners till now have believed that the paper money printed by Fed is a safe currency. This illusion may not continue. The party will soon be over, and a massive hangover is imminent. Currency that is not backed by gold or equivalent assets is nothing but what it is made of - paper. History tells us that forbearance and thrift and not profligacy lead to prosperity. Text books on history a few decades from now will probably carry a chapter on what went wrong with the worlds' once most powerful nation.
Most of the writing in the book, seems to have been taken from their web site. So if you've read most of their newsletters from the past few years, you will have already read and gotten their most important information. If you are new to the Daily Reckoning team, then the book may be a good way for you to 'catch up' & get current with their viewpoint. Also, If you are an avid history buff, then their lessons will undoubtedly delight you. But think twice before buying this book, if you find long-winded accounts of history boring.
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| 29. Rethinking Globalization: Teaching for Justice in an Unjust World | |
![]() | list price: $18.95
our price: $16.11 (price subject to change: see help) Asin: 0942961285 Catlog: Book (2002-03) Publisher: Rethinking Schools Ltd Sales Rank: 201568 Average Customer Review: US | Canada | United Kingdom | Germany | France | Japan |
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Book Description Reviews (1)
Bigelow and Peterson teach high school and fifth grade, and the anthology was clearly born from their desire to dialogue with their own students about globalization. But the anthology isn't limited to teenagers. It's actually a quite sophisticated and close-to-comprehensive collection that I intend to use in one of my own college classes on peace and justice. It fits a number of audiences nicely--high school, undergraduate college, lay reading. Highly recommended! It would make a great post-Christmas, anti-consumerism gift. ... Read more | |
| 30. World Regional Geography: A Development Approach, Eighth Edition by David L. Clawson, James Fisher, Samuel Aryeetey-Attoh, Roger Theide, Jack F. Williams, Merrill L. Johnson, Douglas L. Johnson, Christopher A. Airriess, Terry G. Jordan-Bychkov, Bella Bychkova Jordan, Ellen Hamilton, Beth Mitchneck | |
![]() | list price: $103.00
our price: $103.00 (price subject to change: see help) Asin: 013101532X Catlog: Book (2003-08-15) Publisher: Prentice Hall Sales Rank: 416363 Average Customer Review: US | Canada | United Kingdom | Germany | France | Japan |
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Book Description Reviews (2)
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| 31. Wealth and Democracy: A Political History of the American Rich by KEVIN PHILLIPS | |
![]() | list price: $29.95
(price subject to change: see help) Asin: 0767905334 Catlog: Book (2002-05-14) Publisher: Broadway Sales Rank: 81223 Average Customer Review: US | Canada | United Kingdom | Germany | France | Japan |
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Amazon.com Reviews (122)
I think it's time to shake up America and history has shown that Kevin Phillips is the man who can do that. So c'mon Mr. Phillips. Why not write a book and expose the great social security scandal that is going on in this great country. Expose these politicians who talk out of both sides of their mouths. Expose these Senators and Congressmen who claim they are working for the common good but could care less about anybody but themselves. Do a book on social security before it truly does become social insecurity and leaves millions of Americans, our elderly pennyless and possibly homeless as well. Great job on Wealth & Democracy. I have read it several times.
At the time of this writing, July 2004, it is better now than when it was published - Conservatives ought to read it, and take heart - for soon their self-serving minions shall be out of power, banished to the nether regions of the Bermuda triangle.
The other thing that ticked me off is that Phillips again conveniently forgets to mention that the Asians have achieved great wealth in terms of net worth by saving 30% of their income while Americans save less than 5% even though their incomes are higher than the Asians. Could this be part of the problem why so many Americans are falling behind? The wealthy also save or invest a major portion of their income. I know some broke people who always say; "Well if I was rich, I would save or invest too!" I don't know about that! What I see is more and more people spending money on their extravagant lifestyles, living beyond their means. If they made more, they would spend more. Why 2 stars? Phillips did I believe an above average job of researching historical data for this tome and is a good writer. However, he sends out the wrong message and leaves out way too much fact. He even takes a poke at the still best selling book "The Millionaire Next Door." Interesting is that the people covered in that book became millionaires in the same country and under the same conditions that Phillips insists only benefits the ultra wealthy. Well, once again, these people, just like the ultra wealthy, became rich by taking advantage of the opportunities available in America. Also interesting is that one of the top producers of millionaires in the late 80's and early 90's was dry cleaning! I couldn't think of a more dull business to start but now wish I had! People should walk away from Wealth & Democracy (and any other book by Phillips) and read quality, fact filled books on building wealth like The Millionaire Next Door, The Automatic Millionaire, The Millionaire Mind and Rich Dad Poor Dad. I also found it interesting that while Kevin Phillips was promoting this book, he was on late nite tv talk shows that were aired right beside the "get rich quick" informercials. The only difference between Phillips and those get rich quick informercial guru's is that occasionally somebody makes money on one of those get rich quick schemes. I have yet to hear of anyone who has made any money (save book distributors) following Kevin Phillips. Democrats will probably like this book, but then again, look at their track record. Sen John Kerry says he has a plan to help social security but refuses to contribute to it himself. Instead he gets one of these super retirement plans that will pay him a million dollars even though he doesn't have to contribute a dime to it. No senators or congressman do. Meanwhile average people like you and I have to contribute to social security, will get a small smidget of a return (if it is still around) while these guys get a million dollar gift and pay nothing! Now there is an issue about inequality that Phillips should address.
Interesting is that 12 years ago Phillips wrote a book predicting doom and gloom and a stock market crash that would exceed the 1987 crash called "Profits and Politics." FACT: That very year the markets rebounded (thanks to Ronald Reagan and George H. Bush) and the economy picked up. Phillips wrote Wealth & Democracy in 2001 (was released in early 2002) Didn't we see exactly the say thing in the economy and in the stock market right after this book came out? Didn't we see the stock market SOAR, unemployment DROP and the CLINTON RECESSION come to an end? As usual Phillips doom and gloom was way off. And as if this garbage wasn't enough, earlier this year, Phillips came out without another worthless tome attacking the Bush's which just like Wealth & Democracy and all of Phillips other books, came out of the gate strong and fell fast and hard. Personally, I think this guy should just go away or relabel his work as fiction. He isn't do anybody any good...except himself. I am sure Phillips bank account has gotten larger.
It tastes sweet like a candy bar. MAke you feel better to think that the wealthy are corrupt. Makes a strong case to raise taxes on the rich (did anybody listen to Ronald Reagans speecehes that aired the week following his death?) and attack our current President who has almost miraculously taken this country out of the recession brought on by his predecessor (who instituted the biggest tax hike in history by the way) and has taken a strong stannd against terrorism (anybody catch the news clip on CNN on Friday stating that a anti-Bush movie, directed by a overweight American and noted Bush basher is being subsidized by Terrorists? Hello??) This is like candy for the brain. It may make you feel a little better, but the long term results are a rotted brain, and permanent mental malnutrition. Think I'm kidding? Just look at the five star reviews. Hello?? ... Read more | |
| 32. International Relations and World Politics: Security, Economy, Identity (2nd Edition) by Paul R. Viotti, Mark V. Kauppi | |
![]() | list price: $77.33
our price: $77.33 (price subject to change: see help) Asin: 0130172774 Catlog: Book (2000-12-19) Publisher: Prentice Hall Sales Rank: 336605 US | Canada | United Kingdom | Germany | France | Japan |
| 33. Economic Issues for Consumers (with InfoTrac) by Roger LeRoy Miller, Alan D. Stafford | |
![]() | list price: $114.95
our price: $114.95 (price subject to change: see help) Asin: 0534628524 Catlog: Book (2003-10-22) Publisher: Wadsworth Publishing Sales Rank: 487776 US | Canada | United Kingdom | Germany | France | Japan |
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Book Description | |
| 34. Understanding the Digital Economy: Data, Tools, and Research | |
![]() | list price: $70.00
our price: $60.20 (price subject to change: see help) Asin: 0262024748 Catlog: Book (2000-10-16) Publisher: The MIT Press Sales Rank: 631608 Average Customer Review: US | Canada | United Kingdom | Germany | France | Japan |
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Book Description
Reviews (3)
We need more research like this.
Anyone interested in seriously understanding the "new" economy needs to read this book. ... Read more | |