Book Description

Since 1965 an increasing preoccupation with money has resulted in the inversion of its role in higher education, from a practical means to an end that crowds out all others. No longer do students and parents choose the best education that "money can buy." Instead, they are faced with choosing which college or university will "buy them more money." This comes as no real surprise, as the cost of attending a four-year college has doubled since 1985. Yet the question persists: at what real cost are we sending our students to college?

Renowned educator James Engell and coauthor Anthony Dangerfield explore the answer to this question in Saving Higher Education in the Age of Money. They argue that the counterbalancing attitudes that used to temper a focus on money with other equally legitimate and more fundamental goals have steadily weakened, resulting in a new consensus that elevates money and the marketing of oneself and one's institution to the foremost ambitions of the intellectual world. This new minimization of higher education to the category of an investment to be repaid has damaged all disciplines not directly associated with money, particularly the humanities. Students often now are told they face a choice: between the practical sciences, business, and economic success, or the traditional liberal arts and sciences and expected poverty.

In their comprehensive analysis of admission practices, institutional rankings, salaries, hiring practices, scholarships, student attitudes, tuition costs, research programs, library budgets, and class barriers, Engell and Dangerfield expose the major changes that the Age of Money has wrought in higher education while also offering a practical method of understanding and prioritizing the various elements involved in choosing the right school. Focusing on liberal arts and sciences colleges, private research universities, and flagship public institutions, the authors provide an explicit and coherent model of what an academic institution should offer, while encouraging individual institutions to retain their unique identities.

Written for a general audience as well as for professionals, Saving Higher Education in the Age of Money will appeal to teachers and administrators, parents of students and prospective students, students and faculty in schools of higher education, and anyone interested in intellectual life. ... Read more

Amazon.com

With Fortune Favors the Bold: What We Must Do to Build a New and Lasting Global Prosperity, Lester Thurow follows on his bestsellers The Zero-Sum Society and The Future of Capitalism by addressing the path to globalization. Thurow--a Professor of Management and Economics at MIT's Sloan School--draws uncompromising conclusions: only a bold embrace of globalization will bring prosperity, and nations that fail to engage in global economics will fall behind the world's dominant powers.

He sees three simultaneous revolutions that fuel the rush to global business: the birth of knowledge-based industry, the creation of a global economy built on a worldwide information infrastructure, and the victory of capitalism. But Thurow is not naively optimistic about the prospects for prosperity in this new framework. The U.S. trade deficit, the Chinese export economy, the SARS epidemic, and the stagnating Japanese economy all offer real threats to short-term and long-term well-being.

Some readers will be frustrated that Fortune Favors the Bold does not deliver a detailed set of solutions to these impediments to global prosperity, despite Thurow's thorough research. The U.S. trade deficit, like the absence of international intellectual property rights, he labels a "dilemma": a problem that has no prescriptive answer. Crises will occur, he suggests. The challenge is to prepare for them and manage them well. Thurow urges the creation of new institutions to confront these dilemmas head on, notably the creation of a Chief Knowledge Officer (CKO) for governments and major corporations. The CKO will provide a central intelligence to steer nations and corporations through the difficulties of economic revolution. For Thurow, fortune will favor those leaders who boldly shape globalization and invest in emerging technologies. Those who stand by will be doomed to marginalization. --Patrick O'Kelley ... Read more

Reviews (26)

Thurow's mistake
Lester Thurow has some choice remarks to make about China in the new century. He is certainly right that if you extrapolate China's GDP, that country will still be small in 2100. But yes, he neglected to figure exchange rates fluctuations into the equation.

China's GDP in 2001 was $1.159 trillion - a mere 28% of Japan's $4.141 trillion. (Let's ignore purchasing power parity for the moment.) After two decades of China growing at 7% per year and Japan at 2% per year, China's nominal GDP will still be a mere $4.486 trillion, versus Japan's $6.153 trillion, in 2021. By contrast the US will be $20 trillion (at 3.5% a year), which is almost twice as big as Japan and China combined. Although China will still be the fourth largest economy in the world, after the EU, US and Japan (and EU must be counted as a unit by then), China will clearly still be a small fry - less than a quarter the size of America's economy!

In the meantime, however, it seems inconceivable that the Chinese currency will still be pegged to the dollar at 8.28 yuan. Most likely China's currency will rise gradually as the central government slowly loosens its grip on the trading band over the next 17 years. Should China's yuan be worth twice its present value by 2021, China's GDP, $4.486 trillion in 2001 dollars, should double to almost $9 trillion. While $9 trillion is still small compared to America's $20 trillion and EU's even larger economy, it is no chump change. To say therefore that China will still not be an economic powerhouse by 2200 - 79 years after 2021 - is a prognostication unworthy of a C+ student at Thurow's own MIT management school. After all, in 2003 Japan's economy is only 44% as big as America's, and though it's struggling to grow, it is nothing to sneeze at. China could grow to 45% America's size in less than two decades.

In short, my calculations show that in 2021 America could be worth $20 trillion, China as much as $9 trillion, and Japan over $6 trillion. The EU may end up bigger than America - or may not. (EU's path to grow lies more in bigger membership than in economic growth.) That means China will likely be the second or third largest economy in the world less than two decades from now, measured in nominal GDP at 2001 dollars.

For those of you who are surprised by this, consider that in 2005 China will surpass the UK in nominal GDP to be the fourth largest economy in the world after the US, Japan, and Germany. Jumping from 4th place to 3rd place from 2005 to 2021 (16 years!) is not exactly my idea of a spectacular improvement. (Some Africa states can leap - or in some cases tumble down - by ten places in a single year! There are 180 some countries, remember.) Can a CEO boast that his company's sales or market value miraculously went up by one Fortune 500 rank in 16 years?

The vagaries of currency rates mean that the PPP remains the single best, if unperfect, measure of comparing economies' sizes. The best forecasts show that China's economy will be worth $20 trillion in 2020 or 2021 - exactly equal to America's - given 7% growth for China and 3.5% for America. By THIS measure China could be the largest economy in the world in our lifetime.

In either case, China will be huge - like a hot air balloon blowing up before our eyes.

How big China will get by 2100 is anyone's guesses. I won't hazard an estimate if only because anything can happen 96 years from now. Thurow should not have gone into this fortune-telling business. Leave that to other "professionals."

I cannot believe a distinguished economist like Thurow could have made such an elementary error. British astronomer Martin Rees diffidently puts his money on the Big Bang Theory at "only" 98% chances of being correct, adding, "Astronomers are often in error but never in doubt." In fairness to Sir Martin, the record of economists is far worse. Mr. Thurow is over-confindent in his views, as this book shows.

How can one be wrong so much and still be called an expert?
It is so sad how wrong someone can be proven over and over again and still, he/she is rewarded, called a genius and is allowed to teach our youth. Here is a quote from the author: "Can economic command significantly... accelerate the growth process? The remarkable performance of the Soviet Union suggests that it can... Today the Soviet Union is a country whose economic achievements bear comparison with those of the United States." This was in 1989, just shortly before the Societ Union collapsed. Unfortunately, being this wrong in economics gives one awards and allows you to teach college students while being described a genius. Sad. Mr. Thurow may be a 'genius', but geniuses can be wrong too.

Infrastructure
One of the wildest claims in this book has to do with the question of infrastructure. Thurow claims India has better infrastructure than China. But today the chairman of GE, Jeff Immelt, told his audience in India that they would never catch up with China unless they improve their infrastructure. Immelt said India lagged behind China in health and in things like airports and roads. And this, he said, was a major reason why India was a "disappointing" market for GE.

Somebody must be wrong - either the GE chairman or the MIT professor. There are many other errors in this book, not only in facts and statistics, but also in analysis. (Another whopper, of the analysis variety: Thurow says that Confucianism and Communism combined to emphasize education in China, and that this is one reason why China is so highly educated for a developing country. I don't know about Confucianism, but I do know that for years Mao decimated higher education in China, so that at one point college students had the reading ability of a junior high student while junior high students could barely read.)

Logical and important.
A thorough and logical overview of economics and globalization, with predictions as well as prescriptions to manage potential problems. Although the predictions may or may not come true, the book is important because it allows readers the opportunity to understand in a clear, readable and factual manner, the issues we face as a "world economy".

If you want to read only one book which explains globalization, the rationale behind government run fiscal policies, the impact of trade deficits, and changing roles of governments and the world bank, this is a great one.

Fortune Favors the Bold : What We Must Do to Build a New and
Thurow's premise is that globalization will proceed at a rapid pace whether or not firms and nations choose to participate, that this process has created great challenges, and that the economic future of the world is at stake. Thurow (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and author of numerous books, e.g., Building Wealth, CH, Mar'00; Head to Head, CH, Sep'92; The Future of Capitalism, 1996) contends that the world is experiencing three simultaneous revolutions: new technologies producing the third industrial revolution; emerging communications technologies that make possible a global economy; and a worldwide movement toward capitalism. He compellingly argues that, although no firm or country is forced to participate in globalization, firms that choose not to will be driven out of business and nations will opt out of the development process. Thurow also analyzes threats to the globalization process, including a collapse of the dollar, the lack of international guarantees of intellectual property rights to stimulate technology development, and the lack of life-saving drugs necessary for development of the poorest nations. To be successful in the global economy, nations, like firms, need a technology strategy. Although no revolutionary ideas are presented, the analysis is thorough and the ideas thought-provoking. ... Read more

Book Description

Papua New Guinea is a complex, rapidly changing nation, where the economy has been profoundly affected by political change. Before independence the economy was largely based on agriculture; since 1975 it has focused on coal production. This book is the first to deal with these changes from an economic perspective. Coming at a time when interest in Southeast Asia is expanding rapidly, and containing a substantial amount of additional information on the controversial subject of Bourgainville, The Economy Of Papau New Guinea is an important addition to our well-received Growth Economies in Asia series. ... Read more

Book Description

Michael J. Mandel, chief economist of BusinessWeek, is the country's most passionate partisan for exuberant economic growth. In the mid-1990s, he was one of the first journalists to use the term "New Economy" to describe the fast-growing but volatile U.S. economy, supercharged by technology and finance. Mandel's understanding of the true underpinnings of the 1990s economy led to his prescient warning that the Internet bubble was about to burst, which he predicted in his book The Coming Internet Depression.

Now Mandel is issuing another warning. Without exuberant, technology-driven growth, the U.S. economy will lack the firepower to solve its social problems. Without breakthrough innovations like the internal combustion engine or the Internet, the U.S. economy simply can't create enough jobs or wealth to provide for its citizenry.

Yet exuberant growth is stigmatized as immoral by some and bad public policy by others. And economists, surprisingly enough, are the biggest enemies of innovative, transformative growth. Mandel, a Ph.D. in economics himself, believes his colleagues in the dismal profession are a big part of the problem. Focusing on what he labels the single biggest failure in modern economics, Mandel blames New York Times columnist Paul Krugman, Nobel laureate Milton Friedman, and Greg Mankiw, President Bush's head of the Council of Economic Advisers, for misleading generations of students and slanting public policy against scientific innovation.

Lively, opinionated, and controversial, Mandel's thinking will serve as a rallying cry for the creation of a new political coalition dedicated to economic growth. He calls on Silicon Valley to take their case to Washington, and to shift the debate from arguing about trade and budget deficits to solutions, such as more support for research, start-ups, and workforce training. Mandel is sure to kick-start that debate.

Reviews (8)

No wonder this book is a dud
Michael Mandel's book has laid an egg, but you can only understand why if you make the mistake of picking up this book and reading it. This same gent, who "predicted" the Internet depression (after it already happened) now seeks to burden us with the believe that all these hobgoblins out there are the "enemies of growth." But his arguments are unconvincing and poorly presented, in prose that is hackneyed and academic-dull.

I found the arguments unconvincing
This is a book where I agree with the main premise, but dislike many of the conclusions as well as the delivery. The main premise is that the periods of great technological change are times of great economic growth, which is something that is very hard to disagree with. From this, the author argues that all policies should favor the development of new technologies and takes a few shots at the people he thinks are opposed to such policies. Unfortunately, his arguments are shallow and unclear.
First and foremost, he neglects history. The onset of the industrial revolution was an era of great technological advancement and led to a dramatic increase in wealth. However, we cannot forget many of the consequences of this advancement. In England, it led to rapid loss of their forests and in the industrial regions, the air was so dirty from the smokestacks that people could barely see. I remember reading of an instance where a lengthy weather pattern that kept the pollution in an English city led to thousands of deaths. There is also a classic case in the United States where a river was so polluted that it actually caught fire. Therefore, some of those he classifies as enemies of growth are asking the very important questions that need to be asked concerning the consequences of technological improvements.
Mandel also derides those who preach against MASSIVE federal budget deficits. He quotes former secretary of commerce Peter Peterson, who said in 2003 "When such deficits are incurred in order to fund a rising transfer from young to old, they also constitute an injustice against further generations." Mandel's next sentence is "This is the language of morality, rather than economics. From this perspective, taking on debt is wrong because it reflects profligacy and wastefulness, and shows that the government is out of control." It is immoral to saddle the next generation with an enormous debt, so Mandel's statement is inappropriate in that area. I have listened to Pete Peterson argue against massive budget deficits for two decades and his point has always been in opposition to massive deficits that require large expenditures for interest payments and take capital away from the free markets, where it would be the most efficiently utilized.
Mandel then does a little bashing of former Senator William Proxmire, who regularly gave out Golden Fleece Awards for what he considered outrageous government spending. The classic example of the $600 toilet seat is mentioned. Mandel then states, "Unfortunately, this antiwaste, antidebt mind-set is inimical to innovation, which inevitably requires going down a lot of different dead-end roads before finding success. . . From the perspective of a deficit hawk, exuberant growth is intensely disturbing." This is simply not true, rapid economic growth does not disturb the deficit hawks, in fact they welcome it. What disturbs them is the unarguable fact that government spending is inherently wasteful. Mandel seems to believe that the only way new technologies develop is by throwing enormous amounts of money at them. The dot-com bubble and burst shows that this is nonsense. The Internet companies that survived the implosion were almost exclusively those that spent well within their means and were fairly conservative in their business plans. Also, many of the new technologies that are so highly praised in the book were developed on minimal budgets.
This book is little more than a collection of arguments in favor of massive federal budget deficits, cloaked in a nebulous mantra of "exuberant growth." I found very few of the arguments convincing, in many cases they deal with peoples beliefs taken out of context and inaccurately. To sum them up, his point is that if we are courageous enough to accept the right amount of debt, then enough new technologies will be developed to grow the economy into surplus. Mandel presents no conclusive evidence in support of this thesis, and extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. I was also unimpressed with the subtitle of the book, as quite frankly he silences no one and while many people will raise legitimate concerns, few are really enemies of economic growth.

Big Risks Big Rewards
Mandel's thesis is that economic progress and technological innovation are inextricably linked and the U.S. is uniquely positioned to take advantage of it. Like many good ideas the link seems intuitive, but as Mandel shows, many respected economists are skeptical of the contribution of technology to growth. This book clearly defines its case and argues forcefully for a change in the prevailing wisdom.

Mandel distinguishes "exuberant growth" exemplified by the internet boom of the last decade from the "cautious" growth of the U.S. in the 1970's or Europe and Japan today. Cautious growth, "suggestion box" growth, is marked by an emphasis on personal savings, fiscal conservatism, and gradualism. This is "capital fundamentalism". But there is little evidence to show that a high savings and investment rate without the jumpstart of technological discovery yields much growth. High savings rates in Japan and Europe have not placed these economies in the vanguard of economic progress. Nor has our historically low savings rate stalled our leadership.

Exuberant growth in the U.S. economy is supported by our "high performance" financial markets. The efficient way in which huge sums of capital are directed to new ideas by venture capital firms and the high-yield (junk) bond market make it possible for breakaway developments to bubble up through the economy. Stock options, maligned for their high profile abuse, serve an important funadmental role by securing the allegiance of valuable wage earners and making them partners in a risky enterprise.

A "hot" economy is a creative one fostering new technologies and economic progress. It is also a risky economy "pulsating" with the flow of capital to the Next Big Thing which may in the end be nothing more than a bubble. The internet has proven to be a disruptive innovation (Clayton Christensen's evocative phrase) creating jobs and wealth. Our efforts in Space and nuclear power have have been less successful. Areas that Mandel lists for possible breakthroughs include biotechnology, energy (e.g. fuel cells), wireless communications, and nanotechnology.

High octane economies make for risky markets. Mandel urges greater corporate transparency and multi-year income tax averaging to soften the tax burden of boom years and to cushion the lean ones. Implicit in all this is the need for a strong commitment to research and development in promising technologies.

Without technological innovation job markets stagnate, skill sets become commonplace and vulnerable to the cheapest provider (e.g. "offshoring"). Exuberant growth is not assured. Mandel is not shy about naming the economists he sees impeding the necessary support for technological initiatives that foster growth. For Mandel their blind spot is "the single biggest failure" of modern economics. This is a book intended to stimulate vigorous debate.

Thoughtful and Passionate
This thoughtful and passionate book by Business Week's Chief Economist aims to reshape the U.S. political debate about economic policy. Its central concern is to keep the U.S. economy on a path of "exuberant growth," led by innovation and technology. As Mandel reminds us, from one generation to the next, the prosperity of a nation depends on the rate of growth of its economy. He identifies two unique advantages of the United States in achieving rapid growth: a deep bench of scientific and engineering professionals to identify and commercialize technological breakthroughs, and a venture capital industry that will fund promising new technologies and products. But exuberant, technology-led growth comes at a cost, as it is accompanied by instability in financial markets and the real economy. Mandel worries that too many in public life - economists as well as politicians - see that instability solely as a problem without noticing that it is the natural byproduct of innovation and rapid growth. Taming financial and economic instability, he fears, would condemn the economy to stagnation. He calls on policy-makers instead to embrace exuberant growth by subsidizing science education and R&D, protecting investor confidence in financial markets through increased corporate financial disclosure, and ameliorating the costs of instability with a stronger social safety net. Mandel embraces a cause well worth fighting for, grounds his argument in an insightful analysis of the 21st Century U.S. economy, and provides a detailed policy road map for exuberant growth advocates.

An Important and Timely Book
As we head into the last stages of a presidential campaign where the economy is a top issue, this engaging book is a must-read. Mandel provides a robust critique of economic policy and lays out a road map for regaining exuberant growth. The key he argues lies in making "support for technology...central to economic policy," Yet, such a task is anything but easy. Mandel bemoans the fact that "unfortunately, technology rarely makes an appearance...in Washington economic policy discussions." As a result, while policy makers may talk about technology-driven growth, in Washington it's "the poor step-child, receiving a microscopic amount of time, energy and money from politicians." He's right.

Mandel goes on to "out" the enemies of exuberant growth, including naming names of economists who for all their claim to fame, actually neither understand nor support technologically-driven economic growth. Here's a Ph.D. economist saying that the emperor (the economics profession) has no clothes (they don't understand how the 21st century innovation economy works.

He goes on to lay out how its not just mainstream economists who don't get it, but that on "both on the left and the right, there is a profound discomfort with technological change." In spite of this, Mandel is optimistic about the future, given America's advantages in financial markets, entrepreneurship, and technology. Mandel got it right (albeit he was a bit premature) when he predicted "The Coming Internet Depression" (who besides Mandel had the foresight to buck conventional wisdom in early 2000 that the Internet economy was going to go through a big correction). I hope he has it right now when he predicts good economic times for the next decade at least. He lays out some interesting and useful policy proposals (although my only complaint with the book was that I wish he had gone into more detail on these) that could help spur growth in the future. All in all a great book and on top of that an enjoyable, "journalistic" read. I only hope economists take the time to read it. ... Read more

Book Description

Why do economies grow? What fixes the long-run rate of growth? These are some of the simplest, but also hardest, questions in economics. Growth of lack of it has huge consequences for a country's citizens. But for various reasons, growth theory has had long fallow patches. Happily, this is changing.

In 1956 Robert Solow developed what became the standard neo-classical model of economic growth. Counties grow, on this theory, by accumulating labour and capital. Adding either obeys diminishing returns: the more labour or capital you already have, the more you need for a further given jump in output. One consequence is that an economy with less capital ought to outgrow one with more. Generally, they do. Another is that growth should eventually drop to zero. Awkwardly, it stays positive. To save the theory, long-run growth was explained by an outside factor, technical innovation, which is not in the growth function itself--hence the label "exogenous" for the Solow family of models.

Partial as it was, the Solow model won wide acceptance and growth theory slumbered for three decades. Then came two changes. One was an attempt to add technical change and other factors to labour and capital within the growth function so that the model might predict long-run growth without leaning on outside "residuals"--the so-called "endogenous" approach. The other was a huge number of factual studies.

Barro and Sala-i-Martin explain all this and more with admirable clarity (and much demanding maths) in the first modern textbook devoted to growth theory. The main theories are examined. The stress throughout is on linking theory to fact. One of three chapters on empirical work suggests how much each of several possible factors would be needed to explain differing international growth rate--not an explanation itself, but an indispensable set of empirical benchmarks.

from The Economist, 17 February 1996 ... Read more

Reviews (7)

Macro Musings
By David Guy Atkin
As somewhat of a social insomniac, I have an exorbitant amount of time laying in bed doddling. While playing games with myself is somewhat amusing, I have found the most amazing solution. THIS BOOK! A stimulating read...perfect for rest, relaxation, and casually flipping thru during spare time...especially, the rigorous development of the dynamics of the Uzawa-Lucas model...the illustrations are captivating and encapsulate all I love about Economics and New Jersey.

Economic Growth is just Super!
Prior to having used this book, Macroeconomics was the bain of my life. A short sweater wearing Frenchman assigned it as the set text of his course and everything changed. The models are clear, lucid and stimulating. The exposition is first rate and the mix of theory with empirics is frankly breathtaking.

I used to turn up 20 minutes late to macro lectures out of fear, now I wake up early asking myself "How can I make Peru grow faster". Is Economic Growth dull? Now, not so much as not at all...

Excelent Book
This is an excelent book that covers very well "the old and new" Growth Theory". However it is a very hard book and be prepared to use everything you know about math and economics. Perfect book for graduation courses in growth theory. My only suggestion is to include a chapter about the efect of institutions on the economies.

Taking Xavier's Class at Columbia? This book is a must
Hi, I ran into this book while taking Professor Sala-I-Martin's Intermediate Macro class at columbia. I found it to be much clearer and useful as compared with the assigned textbook. His final is impossible without it, get it early and follow along when he discusses the Solow Swan model, Endogenous growth rate, etc. You'll thank me when you ace the final.

One of the principal books about the modern economic growth.
"Economic Growth" by Robert Barro and Xavier Sala-I-Martin is one of the best book about economic growth theory who I've seen. This book together with "Advanced Macroeconomics" by David Romer and "Endogenous Growth Theory" by Philippe Aghion and Peter W. Howitt are the principal books about all the modern economic growth theory. I recommend very much this book. PD. I bought the last book, sorry. ... Read more

Book Description

After decades of egalitarian, restricted consumption, residents ofChinas cities are surrounded by a level of material comfort and commercial hypeunimaginable just ten years ago. In this first in-depth treatment of theconsumer revolution in China, fourteen leading scholars of Chinese culture andsociety explore the interpersonal consequences of rapid commercialization.

In the early 1980s, Beijing's communist leadership advocateddecollectivization, foreign trade, and private entrepreneurship to jump-start astagnant economy, while explicitly rejecting any notion that economic reformswould promote political change. However, by the early 1990s the reforms in themarketplace not only produced double-digit growth but also enabledordinarycitizens to nurture dreams and social networks that challenged officialdiscourse and conventions through millions of daily commercial transactions.Using participant observation, contributors to this book describe and analyze awide range of these changing consumer practices: luxury housing, white weddinggowns, greeting cards, McDonald's, discos, premium cigarettes, bowling, andmore. ... Read more

Reviews (1)

An insight into the sociology of consumption in China
The consumer revolution in China is a relatively recent phenomena with the former state controlled society slowly moving to a capitalist market where the individual is beginning to exercise choice in his/her consumption decisions. Chinese consumer behaviour is therefore a relatively unchartered area and this collection of studies by 14 authors provides a socio-political context for a range of consumer practices. The studies range from a semiotic analysis of advertising for luxury housing in Shanghai to an analysis of the social impications of the emerging trends of adopting Western bridal wear, purchasing greeting cards, and visiting discos. The book helps the reader get under the skin of an otherwise impenetrable consuming society with anecdotes and insights not available anywhere else. It makes for highly absorbing reading and I would recommend it to anyone interested in gaining an understanding of consumers in this unique market ... Read more

Book Description

The Divided Welfare State is the first comprehensive political analysis of America's distinctive system of public and private social benefits. Everyone knows that the American welfare state is unusual--less expensive and extensive, later to develop and slower to grow, than comparable programs abroad. Yet, U.S. social policy does not stand out solely for its limits. American social spending is actually as high as spending is in many European nations. What is truly distinctive is that so many social welfare duties are handled not by the state, but by the private sector with government support. With sweeping historical reach and a wealth of statistical and cross-national evidence, The Divided Welfare State demonstrates that private social benefits have not merely been shaped by public policy, but have deeply influenced the politics of public social programs--to produce a social policy framework whose political and social effects are strikingly different than often assumed. At a time of fierce new debates about social policy, this book is essential to understanding the roots of America's distinctive model and its future possibilities.Jacob S. Hacker is the Peter Strauss Family Assistant Profesor of Political Science at Yale University. Previously, he was a Junior Fellow of the Harvard Society of Fellows and Fellow at the New America Foundation as well as a Guest Scholar and Research Fellow at the Brookings Institution. He is the author of The Road to Nowhere: The Genesis of President Clinton's Plan for Health Security (Princeton, 1997), which was co-winner of the 1997 Louis Brownlow Book Award of the National Academy of Public Administration. His articles and opinion pieces have appeared in The New Republic, The Nation, the Los Angeles Times, Boston Globe, and Washington Post. A regular media commentator, he has discussed his work widely on C-Span, national public radio and in papers nationwide. ... Read more

Reviews (1)

Informative, Engaging, and Timely!
At a time of renewed debate over Medicare and Social Security, this is an important and insightful look at the origins and effects of America¡¯s distinctive public-private system of social welfare. Hacker¡¯s main point is that the American ¡°welfare regime¡± (he prefers this formulation to the common term, ¡°welfare state¡±) is a lot larger than most people think because, unlike most European nations, the United States relies heavily on private social benefits provided by employers, for example, private health insurance. The book carefully explains why private benefits play such a large role in the United States, why the role of private benefits differs between the two biggest areas of U.S. social policy -- health insurance and retirement pensions -- and what difference all this makes for the politics of U.S. social policy and the nature of present political debates. The book is original and well-researched. And even if you delve into the more theoretical parts of the book, it's a joy to read -- a rare combination of academic rigor, lucid prose, and clear thinking about current affairs. ... Read more

Book Description

"Full of surprises and unusual revelations . . . an informed and disturbing portrait of the new American badlands."--Chicago Tribune

"[Kaplan is] tireless, curious, and smart. . . . I cannot imagine anyone will concoct a more convincing scenario for the American future." --Thurston Clarke, The New York Times

With the same prescience and eye for telling detail that distinguished his bestselling Balkan Ghosts, Robert Kaplan now explores his native country, the United States of America. His starting point: the conviction that America is a country not in decline but in transition, slowly but inexorably shedding its identity as a monolithic nation-state and assuming a radically new one.
        Everywhere Kaplan travels--from St. Louis, Missouri, to Portland, Oregon, from the forty-ninth parallel to the banks of the Rio Grande--he finds an America ever more fragmented along lines of race, class, education, and geography. An America whose wealthy communities become wealthier and more fortress-like as they become more closely linked to the world's business capitals than to the desolate ghettoes next door. An America where the political boundaries between the states--and between the U.S. and Canada and Mexico--are becoming increasingly blurred, betokening a vast open zone for trade, commerce, and cultural interaction, the nexus of tomorrow's transnational world. Never nostalgic or falsely optimistic, bracingly unafraid of change and its consequences, Kaplan paints a startling portrait of post-Cold War America--a great nation entering the final, most uncertain phase of its history. Here is travel writing with the force of prophecy.

"Lively . . . Kaplan has a sharp eye for social truth, and his encounters with a chorus of eloquent citizens of the West keeps the narrative humming." --Outside ... Read more

Reviews (41)

American Travel Writing from an Alternate Dimension
While Kaplan keeps to his usual winning combination of travel writing and social science in "Empire Wilderness," he cannot avoid falling prey to the very same flaws that marred his last book, "Ends of the Earth"; namely, a tendency to over-emphasize pervailing social trends until he begins to sound like some kind of prophet of doom, forecasting a world out of control. When writing about the Third World, this is somewhat more forgiveable approach, but when applied to the United States, the reader begins to wonder how Kaplan can, in good conscience, hype and sensationalize some of the trends on which he chooses to focus. In his writings for the "Atlantic Monthly," Kaplan has admitted to a Hobbesian, conservative view of human nature, and this, at times, makes him sound like a rabid elitist frightened by the dark, deprived "mob" seething beneath the shining surface of America. This is a somewhat unfair characterization, however, as most of Kaplan's social observations demonstrate a stunning ability to forecast history and cut to the heart of the most salient political and economic trends facing our nation. The extra hype and generalization are probably just to sell more books, so we can let Kaplan off the hook on this one. Just be prepared to read this book skeptically, and you are in for one hell of a journey.

Bitter pill to swallow. But the pill seems working.
The poverty of American inland states described in this book shows that, contrary to many Asian people's belief, America is also one of victims of globalization. Benefactors of globalization tend to live in suburban pods. And the pod will be, according to Robert Kaplan, protected by private security guards. About those who are excluded, Kaplan's solution is simple: Forget the poor (though he borrowed other person's mouth). It's too cruel, isn't it?

The issues of border dissolution between U.S. and Mexico and between Pacific North West and British Columbia are empathized very much in this book. These issues are closely related with immigration and decline of nation state. The phenomena of border dissolution is not peculiar to North American continent. For example, the border line between North Korea and China is also being dissolved because of N.K.'s famine. (As a South Korean man, I'm very much concerned about future N.K.'s absorption into either China or South Korea. No small, rich country wants to share border line with a big, strong but poor country. South Korean government is helping North Korea despite political grievances to prevent such an outcome, or so I guess.) Anyway, the strict control of immigration is not universal through human history. I guess it was strengthened because of Cold War.

Positive Reviewers are so Naive
Just because one never experiences racism or does not practice it or because a few CEO's are "minorities" does not mean we can say "problem solved". Why do we still claim racism and race are a factor in the US? because if it wasnt, all minority groups would be equal or at least encroaching upon the same level of economic reality most whites experience; the question is will we be allowed to share it???? So in response to "negative reviewers are so hilarious" think about this...nothing will be solved until "minorities" are at the same socio-economic level as whites, in other words we want the majority of people of color to share the same economic status and cultural priveleges as light skinned people do within every aspect of US culture...can you handle that?

Negative reviewers are hilarious
Kaplan writes what he sees and hears. He directly quotes the people he meets. Accusing him of racist and bigotry is like blaming the TV weatherman for an oncoming hurricane.

Veiled Issues
Kaplan's piece in the Atlantic Monthly "The Coming Anarchy" should give you a sense of what this book, An Enpire Wilderness, will offer. Like the romatic buffonery of Urban and Surburban critics like James Howard Kunstler, Kaplan has a subtle, veiled racism inherit in his travels. This is not new, it is typical of all the historical accounts of Anglo-Americans or European (i.e. light skinned) writers describing the "Third World"--- an offensive and dehumanizing label.
The future is bleak for U.S.-"minorities" indeed if we allow people like kaplan to speak for us. Not only do we suffer their avarice, genocide and lingering neo-colonialism all over the various nations we or our families derive from, now we must be the examples and first victims of the deterioration of Kaplan's euro-centric "Civilization". Kaplan's vision doesnt include "minorities" and it is time to protect ourselves when oil and other natural resources are depleted because like his own accounts abroad prove, who will suffer the most? In the U.S. it makes total sense that those who lack political and economical power, let alone competent and brave voices of dissent within our communities, will be the first to be subjected to the majority's so called "reforms". For me as a U.S. Latino, the future is grim but I dont need Kaplan to show me why. It is time to bypass this veiled racist and xenophobia promoted by impotent neo-liberal "progressives". ... Read more

Book Description

Written in refreshingly accessible prose, Limits to Growth: The 30-Year Update is a long anticipated revival of some of the original voices in the growing chorus of sustainability. Limits to Growth: The 30 Year Update is a work of stunning intelligence that will expose for humanity the hazy but critical line between human growth and human development. ... Read more

Reviews (1)

Humanity Needs to Wake Up: We Are Devastating the Planet
This is a thorough, scientific account of what mankind is doing ecologically to the planet. There are many charts, graphs and research studies proving that the planet is in danger.

Mankind has already gone past the level of sustainability. It's not a matter of IF, but a matter of WHEN the planet will not be able to sustain humanity at the current population level and standard of living.

This book explains about the earth's resources and how we are overusing them. Also about the byproducts of our use of these resources and the pollution it causes. Many examples are given of how people can change their ways of production and resource use.

It is disturbing to think what humans are doing to the planet and what the future will be if we don't change our ways. This book gives the big picture of what is happening ecologically to the planet and what needs to be done NOW to stop the devastation. ... Read more

Reviews (1)

What they should have taught us in high school.
Immanuel Wallerstein has given us an important book. This book explains how and why Great Britain emerged from the 18th century with economic hegemony. The best thing which the book does is to place free-market capitalism as a historical process, rather than as an extra-historical inevitability, which is usually taught in most public schools, and assumed in most public debates and private understandings of economics in the U.S.

Do not be scared away by the book's academic-sounding title. The book is accessible. Wallerstein writes in a lucid manner, but is treating a complex topic, and he seems to be writing mostly for academics. Basically, reading this book should be a challange for the average reader (like me), but a rewarding and seriously educating challange in the end. The reading is slow, but worthwhile.

I would lastly add that education of this sort, especially after one is through with school, is the duty of every citizen of a democracy. Knowledge is the foundation for power. ... Read more

Book Description

In The China Dream, acclaimed business journalist Joe Studwell takes to task the predictions that China will become an economic juggernaut on the world stage in the twenty-first century -- and instead foresees an economic crisis. He argues that since the days of Marco Polo, Western nations have seen the vast population of the Middle Kingdom as a fantastic opportunity for expanding trade, investing time and resources again and again in the hope to develop it, only to see, century after century, its economy crash and their dreams turn to dust. Studwell traces the most recent developments in China from Deng Xiaoping's "liberalization" of its market in the 1980s through the opening of its economy to foreign investment in the 1990s. In his rigorous analysis of the Chinese economy, government, and culture, Studwell also shows the roadblocks to the continuation of the country's unprecedented expansion and why its economy will fail once more -- but this time, harder than ever before, and with potentially catastrophic results. Provocative, flawlessly researched, and endlessly engaging, The China Dream is a book that will have the business and political worlds talking about what's really going on in China -- and what we can do to prepare for the coming crisis. ... Read more

Reviews (11)

China's roaring nineties - the best assessment in print
Joe Studwell, a British freelance journalist who lived in and reported from China from 1991 until 1999, has written one of the best-informed insiders' books about the Chinese economy in the boom years of the 1990s that is on the market. The book is excellently researched, well documented (60 pages of notes accompany 300 pages of text) and profits from a wealth of experience gathered "on the ground."

The main thesis of the book is that many big Western companies substitute a blurry, optimistic picture of a vast potential market for a balanced view based on hard data. When it comes to China, wishful thinking replaces critical distance and realistic assessment.

One thing that "The China Dream" explains very clearly is the extent to which two economies in China exist parallel to each other. One is the old socialist economy that is protected from change and the market forces. The other is a vibrant, export -oriented economy of manufacturing plants that assemble goods under the management of mostly Taiwanese and Hong Kong companies. The latter is the poster child for China, but the former continues to gobble up the people's savings to churn out the products that the planners want to see. Stripped of the success story of the export-oriented manufacturing companies, China's economy looks like a disaster waiting to happen.

Studwell is not a China-basher. He admires the stamina and determination of the small entrepreneurs in China who manage to hold their ground against a rapacious bureaucracy, the lack of credit from state-owned banks and the dumping strategies of pampered state-owned enterprises.

Earlier reviewers have criticized "The China Dream" as biased and uninformed (no CEO interviews). Having worked in China for three years, my impression is that Joe Studwell has a very solid grasp of the economic and political realities in the People's Republic of China, and that there is no point in listening to the rosy projections of CEOs and foreign luminaries who were "toured about in government limousines and fed an endless diet of spurious statistics"(255).

In a nutshell: This book is absolutely recommended reading for anyone who wishes to work in China or just wants to know what to make of all the praise lavished on a socialist developing country.

A Superb Antidote to the China Hype
There's an incredible amount of hype about China's economic market. Its huge population, high-skilled low-wage work force, and relative political stability for a developing country all act as a powerful lure to multinationals eager to set up shop and begin selling to one-quarter of the world's population. Under tough negotiations from Chinese officials, these companies tend to give away the kitchen sink to ensure they get access to the huge market. But what do they get in return?

Joe Studwell does a service to the informed public by clearly demonstrating that almost all the businesses who have gone to China have gotten next to nothing for their technology transfers, special fees, and tremendous time and effort they've dedicated to the market. Almost uniformly, they have high-balled their expected sales and profits from the Middle Kingdom and found immense barriers such as unseen regulations and fees, corrupt officials, unenforced laws, local spin-offs to their products, etc., that should have sent them packing. Yet almost all of them push on, undeterred.

As Studwell explains, the reason for this is an old phenomenon among Western businessmen he calls "The China Dream." Despite continual setbacks, these hard-headed businessmen are too attracted to the possibility that they have something to sell that even a small percentage of Chinese may want to buy. Those huge potential numbers are too much of an enticement to businesses to easily let go of their foothold in China.

But Studwell's book is more than just about the experience of foreign businessmen in China. It also shows that the China market is becoming a trap for the Chinese people themselves. They work hard and save, and the government confiscates and then destroys their money by trapping it in state-owned banks that are insolvent because they lend to state-owned enterprises that are unproductive.

"The China Dream" is well-written and informative. Its thesis is provocative, but well supported. Studwell argues there is no rational basis for much of China's economic success and that most of its market is as closed and overregulated as the Soviet Union's. This book should be required reading for every CEO of a multinational who dreams of selling in China.

"The China Reality"
An excellent book outlining the history of china in relation to its economic structure and trade development, covering the previous few centuries up to the present. Unfortunately it is the same old story inherent in any mania , value goes out of the window and the ability to analyse is crowded out by greed.

I love the frank account of the CEO's absurd optimism about china in the face of so much contrary evidence. China will one day be the largest economic power in the world and its domestic market will eventually become highly developed, unfortunately this cannot happen in the present repressive climate.

I would like to have been furnished with 1 or 2 maps as being a rather ignorant westerner in relation to china's geography, i found placing the different areas a little difficult. However this does not really detract from this being an excellent book and a must read for those who wish to view some contrary opinion about china. This is very welcome instead of the glowing clap trap we are pushed in the west.

Poorly researched
If you only use the 18th and 19th centuries as guide then of course China never made anybody money. I know of NO CEOs today who studied this period. All they now care about is that they get a foot in the door of this huge booming market before their competitors do, and it's a scramble. Many companies have made 100%, 200% or more return on their investment in a couple of years, which must be news to Studwell basking in the Italian sun.

Read David Sheff's China Dawn and Cesar Bacani's The China Investor for a look at the future.

A Nightmare of a Book
This poorly written book suffers from many flaws, not the least of which is the author's lack of access to informed sources. One of the most important things one needs to do when writing a book of this sort is interviewing the CEOs of Fortune 500 companies, and this author has failed to do this, the most basic homework.

For every anecdote one can easily find a hundred anecdotes making the opposite point. If you choose your anecdotes with care, you can prove almost anything. I don't find Studwell's conclusions very convincing. Studwell's choice of historical cases are misleading. When China was prosperous, it was a closed country. By the time Europeans were able to invest, China was in the midst of war and revolution. After the war China was closed again (except to Soviets). The last two decades of reform were also unsuitable for foreign investment, due to structural instability.

If Studwell is right, then I have a hard time understanding why:

(a) Henry Kissinger called China "the most ascendant" among all contemporary world powers (Europe included) ;
(b) Paul Wolfowitz (Deputy Sec. of Defense) said China will soon achieve superpower status within 50 years (by 2025 at the earliest), adding "and that's pretty fast by historical standards";
(c) Jack Welch (of GE) predicted China will be "very competitive" and advised managers doing pie charts to "leave half the pie" for the Chinese, who will "threaten your very existence";
(d) Margaret Thatcher described China as "undoubtedly on course to become an economic superpower", and had this to say about the Chinese people: "everywhere they go they show the same spirit of enterprise and self-reliance, and given the right economic framework, nothing is beyond them";
(e) Joseph Stiglitz, (Clinton's chief economics adviser, former chief economist at the World Bank & Nobel Laureate in Economics) is very bullish and optimistic about China's future, contrasting with his gloomy views of Russia;
(f) Arlen Specter (US Senator, Appropriations & Judiciary Committees) called China "the coming colossus";
(g) Joseph Nye and Sameul Huntington (Harvard dons) predicted China's swift rise to be a problem for the US;
(h) JM Roberts and Eric Hobsbawm (British historians) used "superpower" or "potential superpower" to describe China;
(i) Jeffrey Garten (Dean of Yale's School of Management) called China "the second most important country in the world";
(j) Gregory Chow (distinguished Princeton econometrist) calculated China's economy (gross GDP in purchasing power parity) to be bigger than that of the US by 2025 - even allowing for flawed statistics.

Studwell also chose to ignore the very successful British firms operating in Hong Kong. The drug dealers who brought opium to China got fabulously rich - most were British, while a handful, like Warren Delano (FDR's grandfather), were Americans. Their wealth equalled that of the Vanderbilts. And their legacy persists to this day: the HSBC - the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation - is now the world's third most important bank.

Let people be swayed by the naysayers and sensationalists: it's HARDER to make money when everybody is rushing in to invest. ... Read more

Book Description

The services industries—which include jobs ranging from flipping hamburgers to providing investment advice—can no longer be characterized, as they have in the past, as a stagnant sector marked by low productivity growth.They have emerged as one of the most dynamic and innovative segments of the U.S. economy, now accounting for more than three-quarters of gross domestic product.During the 1990s, 19 million additional jobs were created in this sector, while growth was stagnant in the goods-producing sector.

Here, Jack Triplett and Barry Bosworth analyze services sector productivity, demonstrating that fundamental changes have taken place in this sector of the U.S. economy.They show that growth in the services industries fueled the post-1995 expansion in the U.S. productivity and assess the role of information technology in transforming and accelerating services productivity.In addition to their findings for the services sector as a whole, they include separate chapters for a diverse range of industries within the sector, including transportation and communications, wholesale and retail trade, and finance and insurance.

The authors also examine productivity measurement issues, chiefly statistical methods for measuring services industry output.They highlight the importance of making improvements within the U.S. statistical system to provide the more accurate and relevant measures essential for analyzing productivity and economic growth. ... Read more

Book Description

A radically new interpretation, offering a unified explanation for the growth of Western Europe between 900 A. D. and 1700, provides a general theoretical framework for institutional change geared to the general reader. ... Read more

Reviews (3)

A Liberal Analysis of Modernity?
North and Thomas seek to explain the "rise of the Western world" by illuminating the causal importance of an efficient economic organization that guarantees a wide latitude of property rights and both incentives and protection for economic growth. Although they pay homage to both Marxian and neoliberal theory, they take a theoretical middle ground that privileges the sociopolitical backdrop of economic affairs (as opposed to solely private or class-based activity) and in doing so identifies the roots of modernization as far back as the 10th Century. To justify the novelty and originality of this approach, they write that most analysts have misidentified the symptoms of modern economic growth (technological change, human capital, economies of scale) as the causes. In doing so, previous scholars have failed to answer the question "if all that is required for economic growth is investment and innovation, why have some societies missed this desirable outcome?" (2). Their answer is that some societies (England and the Netherlands) were better than others (France and Spain) at providing an efficient economic organization that could guarantee conditions favorable to per capita economic growth among a rapidly growing population.

These conditions are conceptualized as mechanisms to reduce the gap between "social" and "private" rates of return, the key operating concepts in the analysis. Indeed, any old economic undertaking can provide private gains, but the "social" costs or benefits of this undertaking will affect the society's well-being, and a given discrepancy between the two rates of return means that a third party will absorb benefits or costs of this undertaking (an example would be the lack of intellectual property rights for inventions, leading to copying and piracy by third parties). A lack of strong property rights gives these third parties the institutional incentive or imperative to absorb social costs or benefits, and if private costs exceed private benefits then no rational chooser would ever undertake any risky new private economic activity (trade, inventions, investment, etc.). In a sense, then, the analysis becomes a refreshing neoliberal justification for strong government power.

Population growth serves as a convenient control variable for this analysis, because by holding population growth constant across all the countries concerned, the authors are able to pinpoint their causal variable (parity between private and social rates of return) in the cases where it spurred the rise of capitalism (England and the Netherlands). Population growth serves as a control because the authors show that the rise of the Western World happened only after the second population boom in the period being studied (16th Century) - the fact that it didn't happen during the first population boom (10th through 13th Centuries) means that population growth alone cannot be seen as accountable for modernity. But how did the two population booms differ from each other? Only during the second one were England and the Netherlands able to provide per capita growth by providing a climate of incentives and protections (rule of law, property rights, insurance companies, joint stock companies, etc.) that reduced the gap between private and social returns and laid the groundwork for the industrial revolution to begin.

The evidence provided to back up this causal argument comes in two primary forms: citations of historical scholarship (often quoting large passages out of encyclopedias) that are given a "new" economic spin, and a great deal of quantitative evidence, in the form of graphs and charts, to verify the cycles of population growth and economic growth and recession being identified. The authors admit that the quality of statistical data from the early period under study is rather dubious, but if one can grant the integrity of the historians that uncovered such incomplete and partial data then one can probably take this data as high-quality evidence of the trends being identified.

The authors are intentionally ambiguous about their theoretical implications. Clearly, they seek to refute Marx by showing that technological change alone could not have been the cause of capitalist development, since this change itself was a symptom of both population growth and a favorable institutional climate (what Marx would dismiss as the superstructure). However, it's not clear how much they wish to refute neoliberal theory, since they follow much of its logic regarding the role of incentives in economic growth. They admit that Adam Smith himself went too far in his laissez-faire beliefs, since a weak state would not be able to provide the kinds of efficient economic organization that our authors advocate. But their analysis does not clarify just how strong of a state is required for such organization, especially in the information age economy.

An Examination of Property Rights
An outstanding book that clearly explains how 'our' current understanding of property rights can be found and more fully understood through the feudal history of western Europe. The breath and sweep of this book is truly impressive. The roots of how nations protect property rights are found in western feudal history. The case is made that economic efficiency, or more specifically economic prosperity, is dependent upon how a society defines and protects property rights. Therefore, differences in economic performance among nations can be in part explained by how that particular nation's notion of property rights evolved. North and Thomas compare and contrast the development of property rights and the resulting economic performance during the feudal period in several nations, such as France and England, to make their point. Transaction costs, intellectual property, and negative and positive externalities are also discussed.

First-Rate, But Not For Amateurs
I read this excellent book in preparation for the writing of my senior thesis. It is the most thorough and comprehensive tretment of the economic reasons for the rise of the western world. Every sentence is information dense, and I often found it necessary to reread sentences or even whole paragraphs to digest the wealth of information and analysis. That said, it should be kept in mind that firm backgrounds in both European history and economics are necessary prerequisites for a full appreciation of this book. Moreover, this book is a crucial but nevertheless incomplete explanation for the rise of the western world. In this sense, it has everything on something (economic history), but nothing on anything else. For a broader analysis, see McNeill, "The Rise of the West." (McNeill has something on everything, but everything on nothing. Get it?) ... Read more

Book Description

Most Americans strongly favor equality of opportunity if not outcome, but many are weary of poverty's seeming immunity to public policy. This helps to explain the recent attention paid to cultural and genetic explanations of persistent poverty, including claims that economic inequality is a function of intellectual ability, as well as more subtle depictions of the United States as a meritocracy where barriers to achievement are personal--either voluntary or inherited--rather than systemic. This volume of original essays by luminaries in the economic, social, and biological sciences, however, confirms mounting evidence that the connection between intelligence and inequality is surprisingly weak and demonstrates that targeted educational and economic reforms can reduce the income gap and improve the country's aggregate productivity and economic well-being. It also offers a novel agenda of equal access to valuable associations.

Amartya Sen, John Roemer, Robert M. Hauser, Glenn Loury, Orley Ashenfelter, and others sift and analyze the latest arguments and quantitative findings on equality in order to explain how merit is and should be defined, how economic rewards are distributed, and how patterns of economic success persist across generations. Moving well beyond exploration, they draw specific conclusions that are bold yet empirically grounded, finding that schooling improves occupational success in ways unrelated to cognitive ability, that IQ is not a strong independent predictor of economic success, and that people's associations--their neighborhoods, working groups, and other social ties--significantly explain many of the poverty traps we observe.

The optimistic message of this beautifully edited book is that important violations of equality of opportunity do exist but can be attenuated by policies that will serve the general economy. Policy makers will read with interest concrete suggestions for crafting economically beneficial anti-discrimination measures, enhancing educational and associational opportunity, and centering economic reforms in community-based institutions. Here is an example of some of our most brilliant social thinkers using the most advanced techniques that their disciplines have to offer to tackle an issue of great social importance. ... Read more

Reviews (1)

A very technically demanding read.
It's very interesting how the experts here tore apart The Bell Curve with minimal effort by taking a look at the data in a sensible/ rigorous way. One author assumed that all the data was correct as given and challenged its relevance.

Most importantly, one of the articles used the mathematics associated with these social experiments and asked "Do these numbers really show you what you think they do?" In all of my exhaustive reading about this subject, this book is the first that I have read that specifically addresses that point.

While lots of people have dismissed the proponents of genetic inferiority as an explanation for the "failure" of blacks in the USA, the rebuttals have invariably failed to contront the reasoning of the authors, preferring to dismiss them out of hand as "racist."

One thing that was lacking in this book is a more detailed analysis of the disparity between ethnic groups of the same race-- and yes, they do exist, contrary to what you would believe from reading the newspapers. For this, one of two Thomas Sowell books is a good read. The first: "Race and Culture." The second: "Knowledge and Decisions."

Unfortunately, the use of lots of technical jargon is going to put this fine piece of literature out of the reach of the vast majority of the hoi polloi. ... Read more

Book Description

This study examines the process by which the seemingly impossible in 1987--the disintegration of the Soviet state--became the seemingly inevitable by 1991. It provides an original interpretation of not only the Soviet collapse, but also of the phenomenon of nationalism more generally. Probing the role of nationalist action as both cause and effect, Beissinger utilizes extensive event data and detailed case studies from across the U.S.S.R. during its final years to elicit the shifting relationship between pre-existing structural conditions, institutional constraints, and event-generated influences in the massive nationalist explosions that brought about the collapse of the Soviet Union. ... Read more