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| 21. Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960 by Milton Friedman, Anna Jacobson Schwartz | |
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Reviews (4)
The most important part of this book is the section on the Great Contraction. Federal Reserve policy did contract the money supply by 1/3 during the early years of the depression. The Federal Reserve did revive the depression by increasing reserve requirements in 1937. The collapse of the banking system collapsed the real economy. The recovery of the banking system was important to the recovery of industry. Money matters. The style of this book is excellent. Considering the sophistication of its subject matter, it is highly readable. It gets into both statistics and relevant written history. It also has a helpful appendix on the determinants of the money supply. There are some problems with this book. Money is not all that matters. Government policies that prevented wage deflation contributed greatly to the Great Depression. Of course, this book was meant to focus on monetary history alone, as the title implies. But, readers must keep the limitations of such a narrow focus in mind when considering the explanatory power of this book. Its' authors also have too little appreciation for private banking systems (Friedman latter embraced free banking). Despite its' limitations, this book is important as a empirical source for understanding how money matters to economic conditions.
While some counter with the argument that Smoot-Hawley Tarrif Act of 1930 (which took effect in mid-1931) caused the Depression, nations such as Argentina, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Portugal, the Dutch East Indies, and South Africa all began raising tariffs in 1928-29 against a backdrop of commodities price deflation and a collapse in currencies. I am sorry, Professor Friedman, the Great Depression was caused by misinvestment, excessive credit expansion, and structural collapse in the international credit system. Sound familiar (October 1998)? ... Read more | |
| 22. Managing Bank Risk: An Introduction to Broad-Base Credit Engineering by Morton Glantz | |
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| 23. Collection Management Handbook : The Art of Getting Paid by A. MichaelColeman | |
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Book Description "I continue to marvel at how Collection Management Handbook: The Art of Getting Paid is still the single most valuable book in my library. Not only does this book answer every collections question possible, it is my constant source of inspiration. When I feel I need to be motivated, I only have to scan through this book. I highly recommend it, even to the most seasoned accounts receivables associates." "BRAVO! Mr. Coleman has touched upon all the important topics in an easy-to-read manual to effectively generate cash flow from dormant collection accounts. This book is an important read. I highly recommend this valuable asset to any aspiring bill collector and collection department personnel." "Throughout this book, Coleman offers creative solutions for todays toughest collection problems. This is a must-read for anyone with past due receivables." | |
| 24. Essentials of Credit, Collections, and Accounts Receivable by Mary S.Schaeffer | |
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Book Description Full of valuable tips, techniques, illustrative real-world examples, exhibits, and best practices, this handy and concise paperback will help you stay up to date on the newest thinking, strategies, developments, and technologies in credit, collections, and accounts receivable. "This book is filled with wisdom, common sense, and practical solutions. Mary Schaeffer is right on when she states that credit is part science, part art, and part gut feel. I recommend this book to anyone interested in understanding the essentials of credit, collections, and accounts receivable." "Mary Schaeffer has written an excellent book for the credit and collection professional. Every credit professional should read this book and keep a copy handy in their personal library." "Mary Schaeffer has taken a sometimes complex subject and reduced it to an easy- to -understand guidebook. This book should be in the reference library of every credit professional." | |
| 25. The REPO Handbook by Moorad Choudhry | |
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our price: $96.00 (price subject to change: see help) Asin: 0750651628 Catlog: Book (2002-06-15) Publisher: Butterworth-Heinemann Sales Rank: 319658 Average Customer Review: US | Canada | United Kingdom | Germany | France | Japan |
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Reviews (15)
"Mr. Gagan Singh" writes several negative reviews of other books, but positive reviews of Mr. Choudhry's books. "Mr. Gagan Singh" wrote negative reviews of Ms. Stigum's "The Money Market" and alternately hails from NY, the USA, Capetown or from wherever next this chameleon chooses to hail as the reviews change. "Matthew Bartlett" is another alias used on two book reviews of Fabozzi's "Collateralized Debt Obligations" book. One of the "Matthew Bartlett" reviews is signed "Moorad Choudhry" and praises the book with 5-stars, but the other review is unsigned and gives the book a one-star review. This is a serious identity crisis.
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| 26. Resilience at Work: How to Succeed No Matter What Life Throws at You by Salvatore R. Maddie, Deborah M. Khoshaba, Salvatore R. Maddi | |
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| 27. Foreign Currency Trading: From the Fundamentals to the Fine Points by RussellWasendorf | |
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| 28. A Term at the Fed : An Insider's View by Laurence H. Meyer | |
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Book Description As a governor of the Federal Reserve Board from 1996 to 2002, Laurence H. Meyer helped make the economic policies that steered the United States through some of the wildest and most tumultuous times in its recent history. Now, in A Term at the Fed, Governor Meyer provides an insider's view of the Fed, the decisions that affected both the U.S. and world economies, and the challenges inherent in using monetary policy to guide the economy. When Governor Meyer was appointed by President Clinton to serve on the Federal Reserve Board of Governors in 1996, the United States was entering one of the most prosperous periods in its history. It was the time of "irrational exuberance" and the fabled New Economy. Soon, however, the economy was tested by the Asian financial crisis, the Russian default and devaluation, the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management, the bursting of America's stock bubble, and the terrorist attacks of 9/11. In what amounts to a definitive playbook of monetary policy, Meyer now relives the Fed's closed-door debates -- debates that questioned how monetary policy should adapt to the possibility of a New Economy, how the Fed should respond to soaring equity prices, and whether the Fed should broker the controversial private sector bailout of LTCM, among other issues. Meyer deftly weaves these issues with firsthand stories about the personalities involved, from Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan to the various staffers, governors, politicians, and reporters that populate the world of the Fed. Since the end of his term, Meyer has continued to watch the Fed and the world economy. He believes that we are witnessing a repetition of some of the events of the remarkable 1990s -- including a further acceleration in productivity and perhaps another bull market. History does not repeat itself, yet Meyer shows us how the lessons learned yesterday may help the Fed shape policy today. Reviews (5)
In essence, Alan Greenspan became convinced that the sustainable economic growth rate without causing undue inflation was substantially higher than it was in the past. As a result, Greenspan was comfortable lowering interest rates to record low levels, and keep them there for longer than any other Fed Chairman would have dared. Greenspan recognized that there were several factors that would keep inflation in check. These economic forces included a secular rise in U.S. labor productivity, and deflationary forces associated with globalization and the lower cost of production in China. It goes without saying that Greenspan was right one more time. Unless he undertakes a major screw up between now and then, Greenspan is likely to be remembered as the best Fed Chairman we had by the time he retires at 80 years old in 2006. Alan Greenspan was sometimes intellectually dictatorial in his own thinking as depicted in the previous paragraph. This apparently frustrated the author somewhat who would have preferred a more collegiate, democratic, and open management style. These are good points, but they are unrealistic. The Fed Chairman has an extremely high profile. His persona is deemed to be responsible and accountable for the largest economy in the World. This economy is in turn the World's economic engine. The burden of responsibility on Greenspan is enormous and falls squarely on his shoulders alone. If he gets it wrong, he is toast. He can't in turn blame Laurence Meyer for a Fed's mistake. Alan Greenspan's successor will probably be as brilliant, and diplomatically dictatorial as Greenspan is. It is just the nature of the job. Even though, you get that Meyer disagreed with Greenspan on their respective reading of economic indicators and policy implications, Meyer developed much intellectual and professional respect for Greenspan. The book is not at all the works of a disgruntled employee. Meyer fully recognizes he worked at the Fed during a historical transition. And, despite his occasional frustration with the job, including a lack of recognition, he most probably cherished the experience and opportunity. Meyer comes across as having a high self-esteem, yet being egoless, with much humor. In other words, he must have been an ideal colleague to work with at the Fed. He certainly is a very good author, and has a gift for conveying complex technicalities of monetary policy in very readable and even entertaining prose. If you enjoy books on economics and policy, I also strongly recommend "In an Uncertain World" by Robert E. Rubin, former Secretary of the Treasury under Clinton. Rubin is also probably the top candidate to replace Greenspan in 2006, if John Kerry wins the Presidential election.
Meyer does a skillful job of interpreting the flow of economic events from mid 1996 to early 2002 within the intellectual framework of mainstream economics, a "school" that includes Alan Greenspan and the influential Federal Reserve staff. That this was such an interesting period in U.S. economic history --- including the late 1990s productivity acceleration, the Asian and Russian Crises, the bursting of the equity bubble, and 9/11 --- means there are plenty of potentially confusing cross currents that must be made to fit into a single framework, and Meyer does this clearly and without resort to much jargon. As a long-time professor of monetary economics, Meyer knew well the organization and mechanics of the Fed. What he learned from his time there and reveals in this book is the real functioning of the Fed under Greenspan, especially in its conduct of monetary policy. The chapter entitled "Come with Me to the FOMC" is an interesting and insightful blow-by-blow account of a meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee, the policy-setting body of the Fed. For the advanced student of monetary policy, the book develops the 'playbook for monetary policy' in the Greenspan era, putting in context the Fed's "risk management" approach and penchant for "gradualism." After serving closely with Alan Greenspan for nearly six years Meyer has little but praise for Greenspan's abilities as Fed Chairman. While Meyer clearly would adopt a more open and engaged style than Greenspan if he were chairman, he came to respect the Chairman's go-it-alone, no-nonsense, style. If there is a cautionary note it is that any successor to Greenspan would need to quickly establish themselves in the eyes of the other FOMC members and adopt Greenspan's technique of "leading from the middle." It makes finding a Greenspan replacement sound like a rather daunting challenge. Finally it is refreshing to hear the candor and humility with which the tale is told. As a former leading member of what is arguably one of the world's most powerful institutions, he could have been excused for exaggerating his own importance and tooting his own horn. Rather we get an honest description of how he and his colleagues struggled to understand the remarkable performance of the economy in the second half of the 1990s and how it responded to a series of shocks starting in early 2000. A key lesson of that period made clear by this book is that the conduct of monetary policy is far too difficult and far too important to be left to amateurs and that we need more people like Meyer to sit at the big oval table at 20th and C streets.
When "The New Economy" fell apart, I, like everyone else, wondered what happened and where we would go from the wreckage. I've been waiting for this book. Humorous asides that allow one to vicariously enjoy Meyer's trip into "DC land" while studying an account of the economic history taking place during his term, make the book hard to put down. The likable Meyer reveals an endearing humility and strength of character in drawing himself not only as person who is proud of his accomplishments, but one secure enough to share his foibles and fears for the amusement of the reader. Most importantly, Meyer's experience as a professor shines as he magically makes complex economics concepts easier to understand for non experts such as myself. If you want another tome about Greenspan, this one is not going to tell you anything earthshaking or new. But if you are interested in a educational report written by an extremely knowledgeable, intelligent, forthright, and witty man, on the workings of the Fed during an intriguing time in US economics , Meyer's book is for you.
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| 29. In an Uncertain World : Tough Choices from Wall Street to Washington by ROBERT RUBIN, JACOB WEISBERG | |
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our price: $11.53 (price subject to change: see help) Asin: 0375757309 Catlog: Book (2004-09-07) Publisher: Random House Trade Paperbacks Sales Rank: 14614 Average Customer Review: US | Canada | United Kingdom | Germany | France | Japan |
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Reviews (29)
Throughout Rubin reflects on his analysis-driven, "probabilistic" approach to decision-making, which carefully weighs the upside as well as the downside of decisions taken under conditions of uncertainty. The tone of the book is low-key and balanced, and the economic discussions are clear and non-technical. Rubin's writing may not sparkle but he does have a gift for anecdotes and for wry, self-deprecating humor. He deflates faddish "new economy" gurus on Wall Street and tax-cutting theologians in the GOP without resorting to ad hominem remarks. In a strange way, his book is almost inspirational: it reminds readers that not too long ago the United States had a government that weighed evidence and considered options before taking fateful decisions. I gave "In An Uncertain World" four stars (instead of five) because, in the last analysis, Rubin really is discreet to a fault: readers (and historians) would have benefited from a much fuller discussion of his relationship with Bill Clinton and from more details on policy differences and debates within the Clinton Administration. Maybe Rubin held his tongue because he hopes to re-enter public life in a future Democratic Administration. Or maybe he's just a classy guy.
Rubin likes to "tell" almost as much as he likes to "show," so the themes aren't all that hard to find. First, clearly this is a treatise on, and justification of, the importance of probabilistic decision-making in an increasingly complex, interdependent world. And with nary a number, he repeatedly demonstrates a key weakness of traditional market models: they are not able to incorporate the potentially devastating impacts of certain events which are extremely unlikely to occur, but nevertheless are possible (e.g., what if the U.S. government defaulted on its debt?). Second, politics is yucky business. Here is where I was most fascinated. Rubin manages to paint his political life as much more difficult and challenging than any of his private sector roles. This is virtually a unanimous verdict, as I read it, stretching from the expected (e.g., government strains to serve multiple, conflicting objectives while business ultimately gets to serve only the profit master) to the counter-intuitive (e.g., he apparently had a better work-life balance at Goldman). On important questions-in this book and in his speaking-he likes to divide the issue into a "substantive" piece and a "political" piece, tackling them separately. Third, this is a modern day Aesop's fable, specifically the one where "nice guys finish first." By finishing first I mean to say that he amassed $100+ million along the way (not in the book, but elsewhere documented) and ended up at Citigroup without direct line responsibility! But seriously, you can see why even Rubin's critics respected him. He is possessed of humility ("anyone who has done well will acknowledge the enormous role played by chance"), candor ("I had no interest in becoming polished at television appearances, nor I suspect the capability to do that"), wisdom, and unbelievably good manners. For example, he was clearly wounded by ad hominem attacks during the 1995 budget fight (in particular, Newt Gingrich has a reoccurring nemesis role, calling Rubin "untrustworthy" on television), but when it comes to personal retorts, Rubin can only manage to praise Gingrich for his understanding of the dimensions of the Mexican crisis. Finally, experience has led Rubin to believe that it is almost impossible to help ordinary voters understand the complexities of fiscal and foreign policy. He illustrates this expertly when he reviews his role in the debate around Bush's tax cuts in 2001 and 2003, where he dishearteningly cannot find a succinct way to warn of the long-term consequences of a structural deficit in the face of politically resonant messages that attach to tax cuts and spending increasing. He does find a terrific analogy in global warming: no one person experiences current suffering, but there is a small chance that inaction will hurt everybody gravely at some future time. I wanted to give five stars, having really looked forward to this book. But as a literary work, the book does not reach the greatness of the man. It is ironic that Rubin, who excels at self-deprecating candor, reveals so little that is particularly new or insightful considering that he ran one of the most mysterious, successful organizations (Goldman) ever created; held a catbird seat in the Clinton administration; and is uniquely qualified to opine on the lessons of the raging bull market of the 1990s. The virtue of humility, alas, often makes his achievements appear all too easily-won. His favorite management technique appears to be taking interview notes on a legal pad (it is really endearing the first couple or few times but eventually...). Perhaps because they are especially memorable, he spends too much time introspecting on his transitions; e.g., virtually all of Chapter Eleven is about him stepping down from Treasury and figuring out where to go next. Oh the agony, but you can skip this chapter and I'll summarize: it's a lot like your last job change, but Sandy Weil is trying to sell you instead of some slimy headhunter. Also, I don't think you should buy the book for the "Rubin Doctrine." These principles are sort of like the Ten Commandments (Number 9: never let your rhetoric commit you to something you cannot deliver...translation: don't make promises you can't keep). You will recognize them, as they are important clichés. It's not so much you need to read them, as politicians need to follow them. I was disappointed by the lengthy and expected discussion of the rise and precipitous fall of the stock market. Forget the Monica Lewinski admission, the real scandal in this book is that Rubin adds virtually nothing to the stock market discussion beyond the familiar refrain of pent up imbalances that inevitably had to unwind (to his credit, he pretty much confesses as such). He cites the usual culprits, including profitless dotcoms and myopic investors. If you are looking information which is helpful to investing, you won't find much here. But Rubin totally redeems himself in Chapter Thirteen, to my mind easily the best chapter in the book, where he expertly explains both the politics and substance of fiscal policy. This Chapter is worth the price of the book
I am upset about this for two reasons. 1) Philosophically I believe in a flat tax rate -- I believe everyone (and every corporation) should pay an equal percentage share in taxes over a certain minimum income level. 2) I'm worried this misrepresentation will result in poor decisions on a macro level -- like a call for higher taxes irregardless of the economic impact. If we tighten fiscal and monetary policy prematurely during 2004-2005 (as Greenspan and Bush are now signaling), we risk a deflationary spiral. That danger is emphatically not over, despite rising oil prices, a resurgent stock market and a continuing real estate boom. Maybe I'm wrong, and we can all address the current budget deficit without regard for the possibility of over-tightening. However, I'd like to feel that irrational economic decisions driven by a Big Lie are not part of our problem. I'm saying we all want to get the United States' fiscal house in order. In the process, lets not confuse party politics (progressive taxes vs. a flat tax) with sound economics. 90% of this autobiography is a well-written, measured story of an awesomely talented individual chalking up major accomplishments as a highly professional manager in a series of extraordinarily difficult and high-impact positions. Rubin is most likely a truly superb manager. I've never worked with or (more likely) for the guy. Having read the book, however, I would be very upset seeing Robert Rubin follow Alan Greenspan as Governor of the Federal Reserve. He has clearly misrepresented the economic facts in this book to suit his political positions. He'd be great as a Secretary of State for a Democratic administration, or a Secretary of Treasury redux. I give the book three stars, because Rubin is a legitimate American super star. Pity he's a Democrat.
Mr. Rubin was vital in the formation of Clintonomics--a set of policies that stressed the importance of deficit reduction. Although politically vilified for "raising taxes," Mr. Rubin's platform of deficit reduction was associated with remarkable productivity and economic growth in the 1990's. Mr. Rubin's account is especially timely and thought provoking considering the recent deficits incurred by the U.S. government, the historically low interest rates that are nevertheless present in America, and the 12 billion dollar bet on foreigns currencies recently placed by Berkshire Hathaway. As someone who has visited and invested (with very mixed results!) in developing countries, I was also interested in Mr. Rubin's accounts of how and why he, Clinton, and others at institutions like the IMF created multi-billion dollar rescue loans to these nations. The conflicts of interest between investors, the borrowers, and the loaners is fascinating to contemplate. It is also instructive to consider why some rescue packages (designed for Indonesia) failed while others (designed for Mexico) succeeded. While recounting these stories Mr. Rubin does an admirable job explaining why lowering tarrifs and expanding global trade with emerging markets is a win-win situation for all parties involved. For an even better explanation of the underlying principles of international finance read "Economics in One Easy Lesson" by Hazlett. It sounds like a children's book, but the clarity of explanation of complex ideas in this book is amazing.
Educated at Harvard, Rubin became an arbitrageur at Goldman Sachs in the 1960s and rose to co-ceo of the company before leaving for Washington during the Clinton years. His theme for life was that that there are no certainties. He called his philosophy probabilistic thinking. He explained it this way: "Success came by evaluating all the information available to try to judge the odds of various outcomes and the possible gains or losses associated with each." It was a philosophy that enabled him to succeed in both public and private endeavors. His book is highly interesting but may be a difficult read for someone without any knowledge of economics. For those familiar with economic terms and concepts the book will be both enlightening and educational. While we may live in an uncertain world this book is a certain success. ... Read more | |
| 30. Why Men Earn More: The Startling Truth Behind the Pay Gap -- and What Women Can Do About It by Warren Farrell | |
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| 31. Financial Markets and Monetary Policy by Jeffrey A. Frankel | |
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| 32. Central Banking in Theory and Practice (Lionel Robbins Lectures) by Alan S. Blinder | |
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Book Description Alan S. Blinder offers the dual perspective of a leading academic macroeconomist who served a stint as Vice-Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board--one who practiced what he had long preached and then returned to academia to write about it. He tells central bankers how they might better incorporate academic knowledge and thinking into the conduct of monetary policy, and he tells scholars how they might reorient their research to be more attuned to reality and thus more useful to central bankers. Based on the 1996 Lionel Robbins Lectures, this readable book deals succinctly, in a nontechnical manner, with a wide variety of issues in monetary policy. The book also includes the author's suggested solution to an age-old problem in monetary theory: what it means for monetary policy to be "neutral." Reviews (2)
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| 33. Trading the Fundamentals: The Trader's Guide to Interpreting Economic Indicators and Monetary Policy by Micahel P. Niemira, Gerald F. Zukowski | |
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(price subject to change: see help) Asin: 0786311002 Catlog: Book (1998-01-01) Publisher: McGraw-Hill Companies Sales Rank: 434666 Average Customer Review: US | Canada | United Kingdom | Germany | France | Japan |
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This book explains what is important about each release, how they are compiled, and how the market interprets them. If I could choose only one book - THIS WOULD BE IT. Kevin Cotter, The Cents Financial Journal ... Read more | |
| 34. Money Mischief: Episodes in Monetary History by Milton Friedman | |
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our price: $10.50 (price subject to change: see help) Asin: 015661930X Catlog: Book (1994-03-01) Publisher: Harvest/HBJ Book Sales Rank: 141613 Average Customer Review: US | Canada | United Kingdom | Germany | France | Japan |
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Book Description Reviews (7)
More then half of this collection of essays is about the so-called 'Crime of 1873' - America's decision, following the issuance of fiat money (that is, money irredeemable in specie) during the Civil War, to peg the dollar not to both silver and gold, but to gold alone. This seemingly arcane and academic topic was a major political issue in the 1880s and 90s, climaxing with the nomination of the silver Democrat, William Jennings Bryan to the presidency of the United States in 1896. As the Unites States, along with most other 19th century nations such as Germany and France, followed Great Britain in adopting the gold standard, the price of gold rose in terms of other resources, so prices went down. Therefore there was a severe deflation causing much unrest and discontent. The cure to the deflation came not through political or monetary means, however, but because of an invention of a method to extract gold from low grade ore. This increased the supply of gold, lowered its prices. Hence stopping the deflation, and killing the presidential ambitions of William Jennings Bryan. The rest of the book describes various issues, from FDR's decision to 'help silver' which helped Communism in China instead (by increasing the cost of silver, overvaluing the Chinese currency and thus hurting Chinese exports and undermining the Chinese economy), to the policy of pegging a currency to the dollar (not a good idea as it subjects the country to the whims of the world economy. The policy was a grave failure to Chile and a great success to Israel, due entirely to external changes in the value of the dollar). The theme of the later parts of the book is undoubtedly inflation. Friedman demonstrates his claim that inflation is "always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon" (p.104). Inflation is caused by government increasing the money supply, although one time price increases may be caused by unfortunate outside events (like Arabs reduction of the exportation of oil in the early 1979s). Although Friedman is well known as an economic right winger, there is nothing in this account that should be displeasing to anyone from the left - Friedman's case is against mismanagement, not for small or big governments. Nor is there any argument about whether government spending should go to the military, to welfare, or to any other cause. Although Friedman's book is filled with stories of the political economy, its moral is politically neutral. Indeed, Friedman clearly discusses how inflation is often used by governments because direct taxation is unpopular (p.205) - can you say "read my lips, no new taxes"? Furthermore, the economic analysis of some reviewers in Amazon is shaky. Friedman writes "all these adjustments [the negative effects of inflation] are set in motion by changes in the rates of monetary growth and inflation. If monetary growth was high but steady... the economy would adjust to it. ... Such an inflation would do no great harm " (p.222). Although Friedman does not like inflation, he actually makes a case for it, at least at a low single digit level. Since people are usually sellers of few things and purchasers of many, they are more aware of the increase in the price of the commodity they sell then they are of the increase of general prices, especially when those changes are low. People like to see their income go up, as they feel it is a just reward for their efforts (p. 70). 'Money Mischief' is an interesting, challenging book. Its chapters vary from the extremely technical and difficult, (notably chapter 4, a counter-factual exercise estimating the effect of continuing bimetallism after 1873), to 'pop economics' chapters which are no less enlightening and easier to read. The book ends with a discussion of the new experiment started in the 1970s - currency which is entirely unredeemable by any kind of good. Earlier economists thought that this was impossible, and would necessarily lead to high inflation, but Friedman is optimistic - he believes that aware and well informed public and decision makers can pressure the government against unduly increasing the money supply. Thus, widespread understanding of economics is the real cure for inflation.
This book examines 10 different episodes in world history in which seemingly trivial policy choices towards money had profound, unexpected, and unforeseen consequences (usually very bad). They make enjoyable reading and are most educational. The discussions are not all that technical and, to me, sparkle with wit and insight. This book can serve as a great introduction to how gold and silver money was abused, the effect that minting rights can have, how technology changes in mining precious metals caused a crisis of devaluation, what the heck bimetallism is and what the issues around it were (are), and most important, the risks of the kind of money we have (fiat money - because it is not tied explicitly to some kind of commodity and is therefore at the risk of somebody running the printing press too much). This is all great stuff. Enjoy! There are several useful graphs and tables. Also, a reference list in the back can act as a bibliography for further reading.
In any nation at any point in modern history, inflation comes from only one source the national government, not by some physical event, war or deficit spending. He details how the cause of inflation is growing the money supply faster than the output of goods and services. In his fabulous review of money he chronicles the centuries of price stability that came to an end with the creation of paper money. This fiat money is not backed by a precious metal and it has spread becoming the only remaining currency in the world. He does not argue for the return to a precious metal standard as some have misrepresented. He provides details in country after country of how governments hallucinate that the citizens will not blame the government. Inflation directly benefits the government at the expense of the citizens. In addition to the impact on your liquid assets, the government debt is paid back or refinanced with far less valuable inflated dollars. He shows how tax cuts only giving back the tax increases that come from bracket creep in an inflationary environment. Finally. People and the financial markets quickly learn that interest rates have to compensate for inflation plus a real above inflation. In current times this means government ten year bond rates of six to eight percent or more. The last ten years was the most ideal time in a century to control inflation. However, inflation was still three to five percent per year. The only logical assumption is that in the next ten years inflation is more likely to be near five percent or more. The historical real return required on government bonds is viewed as about three percent hence the total yield of six to eight percent. Currently, it is slightly below the range. Home mortgages will tend to be a couple percent higher than the government bond. In the simplest terms, had the Federal Reserve controlled inflation to zero, mortgage rates would be half what they are today. Since Greenspan went into the job committed to zero inflation like no other Fed Chairman, there will be no realistic basis for trusting in any potential Federal Reserve policy to eliminate inflation. It would take many years of proof before bond markets would believe any such policy. Because of money mischief we are stuck with high interest rates for a very long time. Thanks to our Federal Government and no one else. The blame could not be more clear. Many governments have fallen including democracies over the matter of inflation. As USA citizens learn about inflation, it follows that political views will change. One of Friedman's most valuable contributions is the mathematical proof and imperial evidence collection that a little inflation does not help reduce unemployment. It worsens employment. Specifically, while 3% inflation is a smaller crime against the people than 10% inflation, it is still a crime with no redeeming virtue. This is not a matter of theory or political philosophy. Thanks largely to Friedman, the proof is in and the public debate should draw to a close. The crowning moment of the book is when he details the observations that fiat money as a global money system is only a few decades old and it remains to be seen if governments can be harnessed by citizens to stop inflation. Friedman causes us to appreciate that there is only one place to draw the line. That is at zero inflation. The wreckage of inflation is not just in the aggregate economy, the low income and the retired. The mismanagement of money in the case of the USA by the Federal Reserve eventually reeks havoc in the securities markets. While Friedman is the Federal Reserves most articulate and worthy critic, his goal is to strengthen the spine of the Federal Reserve by educating the public and the government. After reading this book you are likely to see the senators that rant that "only they care about the unemployed and the Federal Reserve must now and always pump up the money supply" as at best badly misinformed. To label Friedman a conservative or a libertarian economist as some reviewers do is to suggest that you can dismiss the authors views as not mainstream and suspect. This convention has clearly crossed over from the liberal major market media of modern times. It is truly dastardly to degrade the standing of Milton Friedman. His great works should command everyone's study and one should allow your views to be challenged simply on the merits of Friedman's work. A Nobel Prize is not awarded as the result of some game. Friedman's contributions to the modern world are profound.
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| 35. Modeling Monetary Economies by Bruce Champ, Scott Freeman | |
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our price: $29.99 (price subject to change: see help) Asin: 0521789745 Catlog: Book (2001-01-15) Publisher: Cambridge University Press Sales Rank: 413495 Average Customer Review: US | Canada | United Kingdom | Germany | France | Japan |
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