Reviews (9)

An Impolite Feud Properly Gerrymandered
For about forty years now there's been a war between two groups of knuckleheads. One group uses social constructionism (or constructivism) to deflate the necessity and relevance of their pet peeves - science is sometimes one of the peeves. The other group of knuckleheads, usually professional peevers, argue back that social constructionists are a bunch of knuckleheads. The practical result of this feud has been significant shifts in social policies, research grant funding, tenure, education programs and a host of tangible issues that bother a lot of knuckleheads, like me.

Professor Hacking tries to take the middle ground in this debate. In a series of disjointed chapters (some of which were published before in different contexts) he explains social constructionism in a way that both (a) deflates some of the bad armchair constructionist-speak and (b) makes good sense of constructionism to skeptics of the *discipline* - who really can't be blamed after all. I mean, since Berger and Luckmann's outstanding treatise so much poop has been published under that rubric.

Professor Hacking admirably accomplishes this mediation by clarifying, loudly and slowly as it were, exactly what social constructionism IS NOT. This is a handy way to quell mis-directed criticisms, hopefully. Less ink is spent telling us what it IS in any way that wasn't already (mis)understood by its critics. It's not a bad idea to have some basic understanding of the sociology of knowledge going into this - and I don't mean the kind of knowledge one gleans from reading books which APPLY constructionism; they're usually the poop.

The chapter about Child Abuse and the chapter about Weapons Research (and parts of the one on Natural Sciences) are worth the price of the book. For me it didn't get going 'till about half way through. Professor Hacking's style was sometimes strained to be neutral. The book did not flow well from chapter to chapter - and I was surprised that he could write a chapter called "Madness: Biological or Constructed?" with only a glance toward Thomas Szasz. Maybe I'm just old fashioned.

I gained a lot of respect for the author while reading this. The book both educated me on the state and history of the feud AND provided me with a better understanding of where Professor Hacking is coming from. This knucklehead gives it 4 stars.

Are the Science Wars a Social Construction?
Like many people might, I looked at the title of this one and fell in love. "Social construction of what?" I'm in, I said to myself, for a great 'take em down' kind of book a la Dawkins and Sokal and, honestly, I love those kind of books. Well, I used to; untill Hacking took all the fun out!!

Why do I say that? Because I've been fooled all these years by gross caricaturizations of social constructionism (which, as were told, ALWAYS must be synonymous with relativism). This book, the only neutral one I've seen, is devoted to explaining, I think, to both sides of the debate (if you want to call it that!) that there is much more middle ground than is realized. Like most answers to most questions, the most likely answer to "Are you a social constructivist?" should be "It depends on the circumstance".

Hacking, a philosopher of science, goes through different meanings of social construction: on the less contreversial side, we have laws and I.Q. Not many will say these aren't real in the sense that they work, but besides that they don't really exist. You can't hold them, directly observe them; they are social tools. In the middle, you have mental disorders and averages. Like the others, they don't exist outside of our classification of them. (one might make a case for mental retardiation, but ask five psychiatrists what "schizophrenia" is and you will get five different answers). The most contreversial, of course, are things like gender and physical matter. Both of these things are observable, thus, it is hard t osee how social construction can change anything with them. Hacking calmly explains how some people suggest you can.

Anyhow, Hackings point is that most of us, however small a degree, are social constructionists about something; we just didn't know it. For my part, on Hackings three part quiz (try it, you'll like it!) I scored a 4-5-1. I never would've realized that by reading more of the polarized books about the science wars and the straw-men therein. Makes me woner...Are the science wars social constructs?....

Balanced and helpful, but also frustrating
In the neverending battle to define "what is real" for each other, to persuade each other of what is good, bad, and important, one disturbing trend in academia is to jump on the bandwagon of things considered "socially constructed." The banner of social construction has become a lightning rod of sorts for all sorts of bizarre things that represent what the author refers to in terms of "rage against reason." X was socially constructed, and therefore is unreal, and even bad, and should be modified or replaced by Y.

Emotions, knowledge, the mind, the economy, the deficit, gender, mental illness, even facts and reality, all have been subjected to literary claims that they are "socially constructed."

Hacking provides an interesting perspective on this whole trend by de-emphasizing the social aspect and focusing on the construction aspect. He views this simply as a way of arguing against the inevitability of something. For example, arguing about 'social construction' of our understanding of quarks in physics, part of the standard model, the question becomes whether an alternate equally successful science could have arisen that had no such concept as a quark. Hacking then struggles with what a successful science means, and how we would recognize it. There are many examples that follow this pattern, each discussed in terms of whether X was inevitable, and thus how else it could have been constructed in our minds and in culture.

Hacking goes as far as an offhanded treatment of nominalism and essentialism relevant to this inevitability question (essential qualities are those that are seen as inevitable). He breaks down difficult questions into relatively simple ones using this same kind of straightforward procedure. In analyzing the social construction of X for many examples, he looks for those elements of X that were inevitable, and those that serve "extra-theoretical" purposes and could have been constructed differently.

One particularly unique aspect of hacking's work here, the prototype of social constructionism here is not the sociology of science in general. He uses Pickering, LaTour, and Woolgar as his prime examples, rather than folks like Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch, who are often considered in the same category. Hacking considers them distinct for his purposes, and this reveals some interesting distinctions.

What I liked best about this book is that while it is carefully done, there is an offhanded air about the points Hacking makes. He makes some very difficult analyses seem very easy by pulling particularly useful examples from the literature. He navigates a lot of difficult philosophy by asking deceptively simple questions, like "what is the point ?" rather than "what is the meaning ?"

There are some interesting sweeping gestures here like claiming that social construction can simply by thought of as an argument against the inevitability of X, and then analyzed for how committed the author is to claiming X is bad and overturning X. Another interesting example is Hacking's description of essentialism as simply a way of talking about inevitability.

This book is somewhat disappointing if you're looking for simple answers to each of the questions posed, "is X socially constructed or not ?" However, it provides an extremely helpful way of looking at each case and trying to decide whether a 'social construction' critique actually has any value, or whether it just gives the history of the topic. Perhaps most useful is Hacking's "3 sticking points" with which to address the construction of a concept: contingency, nominalism, and stability.

This is a thinking person's book, but not nearly as incomprehensible to the layman as most works of modern philosophy, and much easier to read and more helpful than most of the "social construction" literature itself.

I'd go as far as to say that in many cases, we could replace the "social construction of X" arguments with Hacking's style of analysis about inevitability and the 3 sticking points, and come up with a more enlightening answer about the reality of the X in question.

If there is any flaw that I found here it is that I didn't think there was enough detail provided on any one topic to resolve the questions asked, they are pretty much all examples, and more questions are raised than answered. That can get maddening when you are just getting interested in the topic.

A Pacifist in the Culture Wars
This book is terrific. Humane, balanced, measured observations of the battle between those who see science as socially constructed and those who hew to a more naive realism (most scientists, like myself), written by a self-professed non-combatant. The views expressed are insightful, sophisticated and very informative for those not familiar with this kind of internecine warfare. Some of the chapters were written at other times and do not fit completely, but there is enough here to satisfy anyone wanting to know what the fuss is all about and how it might be understood. A really wonderful book that deserves a wide readership.

How to take imperfect knowledge seriously
One of the things Hacking has taken from Wittgenstein is his aversion to grand theory-making in philosophy. Unlike some philosophers, Hacking has learned from mistakes of the past and is not doomed to repeat them. Those who want grand, clear-cut theories in their philosophy are liable to be frustrated by the present book, and come up short in their interpretations of it (see the reviews in the Economist and the NY Times Book Review, for example). It's not that Hacking does not have a position, it's just that, as the reviewer from New York wrote, his distinctions are finely-spun and less subtle minds may have trouble getting a grip on them. Hacking is too humane and takes the world, people, and people's coping far too seriously to be glib about things (_pace_ the one-star reviewer below). Indeed, his writings, from the earlier books on probability and scientific realism to his paper on "Styles of reasoning" and his later books on psychiatric issues, can all, I think, be illuminated by the rubric "how to take imperfect knowledge seriously".

Those rare science warriors, on either side of the debate, who polemically espouse the perfection of their cause will therefore be disappointed. For the rest of us, Hacking's careful commentary on the issue comes like a gust of fresh air. Hacking really admires science, and he understands it pretty well, too. But remember the rubric: "taking imperfect knowledge seriously". Hacking certainly doesn't think that all that's true and can be said about science is said by science or dogmatic scientists themselves. Some of the social constructionists have exposed important if imperfect historical truths, too.

Those who are interested in broader debates on social constructionism will certainly profit from this book. I will not say more, as I think the reviewers from New York and London have summed things up well. Although this book is topical and has a nice, shiny cover, I will say that if you are mainly interested in getting acquainted with Hacking's style of philosophy, one of his earlier books will serve you better. Representing and Intervening is probably your best bet.

One more thing: while Hacking is serious, as the reviews suggest, he can also be extremely funny, if in a dry way. Hacking's books, unlike some philosophy, are a joy to read. ... Read more

Book Description

Concepts, methods and techniques of statistical physics in the study of correlated, as well as uncorrelated, phenomena are being applied ever increasingly in the natural sciences, biology and economics in an attempt to understand and model the large variability and risks of phenomena. The emphasis of the book is on a clear understanding of concepts and methods, while it also provides the tools that can be of immediate use in applications. The second edition is a significant expansion over the first one which meanwhile has become a standard reference in complex system research and teaching: Probability concepts are presented more in-depth and the sections on Lévy laws and the mechanisms for power laws have been greatly enlarged. Much material has been added to the chapter on renormalisation group ideas. Further improvements can be found in the applications to earthquake or rupture models. ... Read more

Reviews (2)

One of the best textbooks ever written for graduate students
Didier Sornette who is potentialy nobelisable realises with this book a great present for everybody interested to the recent progresses toward the physics of critical phenomena.
Particularly, it shows the way that some seismologists follow toward the ultimate goal to predict the event of large earthquakes. If this task was impossible yesterday,Didier Sornette shows that it is now became realisable.

A must for understanding complexity
Sornette's book is quite an achievement both in quantity and
quality. The presentation remains informal and quite readable; it reads like a physics textbook, not a math textbook. The references are very extensive (a total of 832! altogether) and they are a very valuable component of the book. In fact much of the book is about the reference material. You might choose to read the book instead of the 832 references... I think this is
the point...

There's probably nothing wrong with this book besides the fact that it throws it all at you at a high degree of sophistication and in as terse a way as possible, it seems. It's a unique and beautiful achievement but because it is so dense with information and insight, it seems every word counts for ten and you'll want to read several chapters again and again. Also, even though there is a clear unifying theme from chapter to chapter, the book simply ends almost like in the middle of a sentence. After machinegunning out 392 pages of material at research level spanning quite a few scientific fields, there is absolutely no attempt to put it all together. It's up to you to do it and it almost seems like the author is indirectly suggesting you start reading it all over again to "get it"... So, for the second edition, perhaps the author will be bold and add ten pages of wrap up material at the end so that this will read less like an atlas. Apart from that, it's the best! ... Read more

Book Description

Unmatched in breadth and depth, Philosophy of Science addresses the pivotal questions that have occupied philosophers and scientists in this century. Forty-six readings by leading thinkers such as Thomas S. Kuhn, Sir Karl Popper, and Philip Kitcher examine issues ranging from models of explanation to theoretic confirmation and prediction; from the significance of rationality, values, and objectivity to the arguments for and against scientific empiricism and realism, with two unique chapters on "Science and Pseudoscience" and "Laws of Nature." ... Read more

Reviews (2)

An Exemplary Anthology
I hope I won't be suspected of overstating the virtues of this book when I say that this is the single finest philosophy anthology that I've ever encountered--and, believe me, I've seen my fair share of them. Curd and Cover deserve to be commended--and I hereby commend them--for their work in editing this volume. Not only have they made compiled a very useful anthology of approximately fifty selections in contemporary philosophy of science, but they've included a very significant amount of original editorial material. Indeed, I've never seen a philosophy anthology with editorial material anywhere near this extensive or helpful. Curd and Cover provide the reader with introductions to each section; detailed and thoughtful commentaries, many of which are forty to fifty pages long, on the readings at the end of each section; a twenty-page glossary of terms; and extensive bibliographies on each of the subjects covered. Roughly a third of this book, which is 1300+ pages long, has been written by the editors.

Because of the comprehensiveness of the commentaries that Curd and Cover have included on each section of readings, this volume, unlike many such anthologies, works very well as a stand-alone introduction to the field. For these commentaries provide the necessary background that the reader needs to fully appreciate the problems with which the authors of particular selections are struggling, the arguments they present in the selections, and the importance of the various selections in contemporary thinking about how best to solve the problems of the philosophy of science. In other words, the commentaries here do much of the work that a lecturer would do, and so reading these papers along with the commentaries is like going through an excellent and wide-ranging introductory course in the philosophy of science.

This anthology is intended to introduce the most general subjects in contemporary philosophy of science. Curd and Cover emphasize work in the philosophy of science that is of importance to anyone interested in the subject, and they have deliberately tried to avoid including readings that assume the reader is familiar with a great deal of contemporary science or its history. There are sections on each of the following topics: the demarcation problem (the problem of isolating what, if anything, is essential to, and distinctive of, scientific inquiry), values and objectivity in science, underdetermination and the Duhem-Quine thesis, induction and the nature of scientific evidence, explanation, laws of nature, intertheoretic reduction, and scientific realism. Most of these sections include four or five papers (the section on realism, which is by far the largest section, contains about twice as many). And this book includes work by many of the most important figures in these areas, including Kuhn, Popper, Hempel, Lakatos, Laudan, Kitcher, van Fraassen, et al.

And the reader should note that this anthology focuses only on work in the natural sciences. None of these selections discusses philosophical issues arising in the social sciences--though the topics covered are of sufficient generality that they should be of interest to people studying the social sciences as well. Furthermore, none of these selections are primarily about the philosophical issues arising in particular natural sciences. So don't come to this anthology looking for philosophy of biology or philosophy of physics.

I'd recommend this book to anyone interested in the philosophy of science, and it's ideal for classes introducing philosophy of science to advanced undergraduates and to graduate students.

Excellent introduction in the philosophy of science
Anyone who ever wondered about science in general, or what answers sciences can give us to questions we pose, and which not, if we should believe what science tells us or rather not, what it is that sets apart physics and astrologie, or if the picture that science gives us in its laws and theories reflects reality or is just an instrument for science, all those (and all those who would like to start pondering right now)can get a very profound introduction into those (and other) aspects of philosophical contemplation by reading this very well written and edited book. It consists of 9 chapters, each treating one subject by first giving a short introduction by the editors, then several papers by leading philosophers in the field, and then a very well written commentary on each of those papers, that retrace and explain the papers for easier digestion. My fullest recommendations for this book. ... Read more

Book Description

The holistic paradigm, Gaia, deep ecology, new alchemy, all have a hidden ancestor: Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749–1832). At the young age of twenty-one, Rudolf Steiner was chosen to edit Goethe’s scientific writings for a new collection of Goethe’s complete works. Goethe’s literary genius was already universally acknowledged; it was Steiner’s task to understand and comment on Goethe’s unique scientific achievement. Rudolf Steiner recognized the compelling power of Goethe’s work with nature and developed Goethe’s theory of knowledge in remarkable and far-reaching ways. Here, in fact, began Steiner’s own training in epistemology and spiritual science.

Natural science had created a powerful tool for understanding the inorganic world, but failed to comprehend the phenomenon of life. Goethe discovered how thinking could be applied to organic nature, and he understood that this experience requires not just rational concepts but a whole new way of perceiving. This volume, Steiner’s introduction to Goethe, is nothing less than a re-visioning of what it means to know the world.

In an age when science and technology have been linked to great catastrophes, many are seeking a different way to address nature. With a fundamental declaration of the interpenetration of our consciousness and the world, Rudolf Steiner shows in Nature’s Open Secret how Goethe’s approach points the way to a more compassionate, intimate involvement with nature. ... Read more

Book Description

Did Newton "unweave the rainbow" by reducing it to its prismatic colors, as Keats contended? Did he, in other words, diminish beauty? Far from it, says acclaimed scientist Richard Dawkins; Newton's unweaving is the key to much of modern astronomy and to the breathtaking poetry of modern cosmology. Mysteries don't lose their poetry because they are solved: the solution often is more beautiful than the puzzle, uncovering deeper mysteries.
With the wit, insight, and spellbinding prose that have made him a best-selling author, Dawkins takes up the most important and compelling topics in modern science, from astronomy and genetics to language and virtual reality, combining them in a landmark statement of the human appetite for wonder.
This is the book Richard Dawkins was meant to write: a brilliant assessment of what science is (and isn't), a tribute to science not because it is useful but because it is uplifting. ... Read more

Reviews (76)

Unweaving the mysteries of the mind and universe
After reading Dawkins' classic works on evolution and combatting creationism (_The Selfish Gene_, _The Blind Watchmaker_ and _Climbing Mount Improbable_), I was unsure as to what more our Prof. Dawkins could relate to us in his latest instalment. However, to my delight it seems that my skepticism was ill-founded.

In this volume Dawkins does for Science in general what his previous books did for evolution. The book's title refers to Keat's criticism of Newton for destroying the mystery and beauty of the rainbow. Dawkins' mission in this book is to show the public that naturalistic science is just as, if not more intriguing than a poet's perspective of the natural world. Dawkins takes the reader on a journey that spans the mysteries of the rainbow, radio waves and genetics with occasional interludes in debunking the pseudo-science of astrology and other supersitions. Dawkins' writing is riddled with quotes from famous poets and the prose itself is akin to that poetry.

For those lay readers that consider themselves experts in the realms of ccience, this book may seem a bit simplistic in places. At times I found myself wondering about the relevance of certain chapters in the book to the central tenet that science in its most natural form is poetic, however I enjoyed the digressions as they were interesting nonetheless. Overall, I enjoyed this book thoroughly and in paritcular I felt a warmth emanating from the prose that could only have been exuded by one of the most brilliant humanistic thinkers of our time.

Fact vs. Fiction
A fabulous book on a fabulous subject, in this book Richard Dawkins continues his understandable explanations of natural selection and evolution while at the same time championing the cause of science in a society obsessed with aesthetics and poetry.

The general scientific topics he explores I felt made the book a LITTLE less reachable than his other works. Chapters 3-5 particularly go into scientific areas one feels that Dawkins himself doesn't wholely understand and therefore you feel as if you're trusting him that he's getting the explanation right.

However he does his best and his best is better than most! Also he should be forgiven for delving deep into a variety of subjects considering his applaudable goal of showing without-a-doubt the poetic and aesthetic brilliance that can and SHOULD be found in science of all kinds.

While I feel that the book was sadly lacking in his wonderful writing on the topics of religion and theology (most of the time he touches on these topics only to make the point that statistics and mathematics are more reliable) it still accomplishes his point of showcasing the wonders of sciences often assumed to be dull and lifeless.

A wonderful read for anybody looking for the pizazze in science and fact that is generally believed only to be found in fairy tales and illusions.

Who is afraid of good science destroying aesthetics?
As someone who enjoyed this book in particular, and who enjoys books on science in general, I am bewildered by some of its very negative reviews. I am however conscious of some of its limitations. One reason might be that this otherwise wonderful book covers so many different ideas, and often unevenly. I could see why it would be easy to have unmet expectations. So it is helpful first to be clear about some of the topics this book is NOT fundamentally about: a systematic exposition of the scientific method; the history of science; the mind-body debate; evolutionary biology (not particularly, even though this is the author?s specialty); and how poets and artists might do a better job in their works of representing science.

Even if the somewhat meandering manner of the book does not upset you, you might be upset by Dawkins? rhetorical style (I was not) . You might prefer more subtlety to his no-holds-barred approach to labeling some of the enemies of good science. The catalogue includes: ?pseudo-scientists?.populist dumbing down?hostility from academics sophisticated in fashionable disciplines?purveyors of cultural relativism?few vocal fifth columnists within science?.? He has no compunction in bemoaning a lack of either understanding or appreciation of science from many of the titans of the world of arts and poetry including Coleridge, Keats, and Ruskin, among others.

So, why is this a worthy read? I believe it is because Dawkins tackles a subject which is fundamental to what it means to be human. It is also a subject which few writers, scientists or non-scientists, handle well: why good science can (and should) be a pleasurable and passionate pursuit, for both scientists and non-scientists. Dawkins would like to think that enjoying science could be like enjoying music even if one does not play an instrument ? a view I find very encouraging.

This book is a spirited attempt to rescue us from the misplaced view that science is at odds with aesthetics. Dawkins makes no apologies for clearly distinguishing how scientists can view the world differently from poets, without losing an appreciation of beauty. QUOTE The mystic is content to bask in the wonder and revel in a mystery that we were not meant to understand. The scientist feels the same wonder but is restless, not content; recognizes the mystery as profound, then adds, ?But we?re working on it.? UNQUOTE

Even if poets and scientists may view mystery and beauty differently, Dawkins holds that ?the spirit of wonder which led Blake to Christian mysticism, Keats to Arcadian myth and Yeats to Fenians and fairies is the very same that moves great scientists..? I can sympathize with Dawkins? lament with the distortions of science we can find in poetry, because he demonstrates the scientists? appreciation of artistic endeavor in an ability to reconstruct poetic passages completely in scientific terms. I was moved by one stanza he quotes which I reproduce here:

To see a world in a grain of sand,
And a heaven in a wild flower,
Hold infinity in the palm of your hand.
And eternity in an hour

When he wrote the above four lines, William Blake could not have been expected in 1803 to anticipate new concepts of space and time and discoveries of quantum physics. And cosmology in twentieth century science. Yet, we can today marvel at his stanza and cherish these lines while understanding them completely in terms of modern science, which stikes me as a remarkable product of human artistic and scientific achievement.

The title of the book refers to Keats' lament of Sir Issac Newton's use of prisms to decompose the components of white light, supposedly because this experiment destroyed a sense of beauty and wonder related to observing the rainbow. It is clearly emblematic of how such poetic lament is at odds with the sheer wonder that scientific discoveries such as Neton's can evoke. It was this discovery, together with those of later scientists, which have led us to understand in the twentieth century how we are part of a much larger universe than humans previously imagined, which is expanding, and which is made up of the same common material everywhere, and has revealed to us even greater mysteries that we could not have previously imagined.

For adults who may have acquired a distaste of science from unfortunate early school experiences, this book may restore a sense of wonder and beauty to this endeavor. Or, by offering some wonderful imagery to convey some simple but important scientific idea, this book may help adults and children dialogue about science in an accessible way. For example, the author compares the time scale of biological evolution to the span between the fingertips of left and right hands when both arms are outstretched in a gesture of open embrace. The epoch when simple celled organisms and bacteria were the only form of life forms the large bulk of this span, with dinosaurs only appearing at the point in the upper part of the right palm, and human beings appear only at the very fingertips!

This book reminds us of that unfortunate chasm in our culture between poetic or artistic expression and scientific endeavor. I confess that as an advocate of greater scientific literacy among the general public, I would be happy to see more of this genre.

The Darwinisation of the "Cambrian Explosion"
Let's assume that Gould is right in his observation that the Burgess Shell is a testimony to an incredibly hectic period diversification, on a different time scale from what we experience now. The high rate of change in life forms (new phyla "bursting") in the period leading to the Cambrian and through its early stages surely doesn't have to mean large evolutionary "jumps", but rather a different "natural frequency" of the standard, gradual evolution process by the tried and true Darwinian mechanism. What has to be explained is the causes of the different rate. It is quite safe to postulate that this rate is determined by the feedback between different parts of the Darwinian mechanism, just as is the case for other cyclic phenomena. The cycle in this instant is the generation and elimination of life forms. It seems that the current rate is "optimize" to populate every possible ecological niche, but that does not mean it's the one and only possible rates. On the contrary. Different ecological situation surely must influence this rate. For example, in a resource-rich and under-populated environment, such as a "virgin" island, mutations that normally would be considered "unfit", will survive. This is the conventional rationalization behind the "Explosion" metaphor, if you don't take it to mean "instantaneous", just incredibly fast. So it boils down to the question the speed of the evolutionary process and what controls it.

We know the engine of change and mechanism of "Quality Control" by which most of the changes are rejected. Those two work as a superbly coordinated team' at least as far as the end result is concerned. Evolution might be a blind watchmaker, but also a very successful one. Creationists may even ask who created the watchmaker! In other words, how come that the parameters of the evolutionary process have the values that actually produce evolution? We surly reject the "Intelligent Design" type of answers, but that does not free us from the need to provide a satisfactory scientific answer. Which brings me to speculate, that the apparent correspondence between the different parts of the evolutionary equation is too well fine-tuned to escape the conclusion that the evolutionary mechanism itself evolved in a similar process. The blind watchmaker was fine-tuned by a blind watchmaker - and it's not a meaningless recursion.

We all know the essential ingredients of the formula used to tune natural evolution:
1. The conservative force of genetic inheritance, operating like gravity on pendulum
2. The erratic drive of mutation, generating the required perturbations from stasis, pushing the pendulum in every possible way
3. The environment enhancing the successful "modes of oscillation" to be conserved, as in a resonant mechanism, and rejecting the non-resonant modes.

(The clockwork metaphor is intentional, but should not be take to imply one-to-one correspondence between the two mechanisms. It's just "poetics"' hopefully a good one.)

In the Pre-Cambrian environment, the initial survival rate of new mutant was presumably higher, but not for a long time. Soon enough, the available resources must have been fully utilized and the Darwinian competition begun. The conventional rationalization about overly abundant environment can't be justified in geological time-scale. However, the mutation rate and the conservative constrains of the genetic mechanism could be quite different than what we see now. Actually, even today we do see a great variation in mutation (successful ones too!) rate between different life forms. For example, certain microbes mutate before out eyes almost day to day. With a much higher rate of evolution than we experience today in multi-cellular life forms, it would seems that phyla were "invented" during the Pre-Cambrian in a very short geological time span, requiring large successful "jumps", while actually the great many steps required to accomplish the transition just happened very quickly. But the environment is the "negative" aspect of the Darwinian process, culling the unfit, not the "positive" force blindly experimenting in new life forms. To understand the "explosion" we must allow for a different equilibrium of checks-and-balances between the conservative and the mutating forces in the genetic mechanism itself, namely the copying of DNA.

Of the many "exotic" life forms populating the Pre-Cambrian world, few survived. The new environmental condition narrowed the criteria for passing the survival test, a change that was mirrored in the optimal balance between conservation and change in the selection formula for the genetic material (DNA, RNA, what have you) and its associated molecular mechanism. Gone were the days when sloppy copying was tolerated - even encouraged - by the QA department. The fast mutating life forms lost to the ones based on a very pedantic DNA copy machine. The conservatives won the day and the wild variation of gene-inheritance alternatives dwindled to one. Only phyla that adapted this mechanism survived. This mechanism is so biased towards conservatism, that no new phyla could arise since it came to dominate file. The explosion deserves its name only if you assume that the current mechanism is what always was - an idea as absurd as assuming that the species themselves are what they always were.

In other words, we have to apply the Darwinian adaptation mechanism to the molecular infrastructure underlying the genes, as we do to the genes themselves, in order to understand the fine-tuning of the evolutionary rate we see today. In the early stages of the evolution of multi-cellular life form, before low mutation rate was selected (frequency-locked) by natural selection, the appearance of radically new life forms took just millions of years, rather than hundreds of millions. The natural selection of gene conservation mechanism was affected, probably, by selecting the very stable and predictable DNA/RNA one over alternatives (for example "horizontal" transfer of genes, as in bacteria) and all the other parts of the fine molecular dance of the genes. You may think of this as the mirror process to the one leading to the selection of sexual strategy. The later was selected to enrich the variation after the first fixed the rate at a too low value relative to environmental changes.

To summarize, what I'm trying to propose is that the same logical thinking that make Classic Darwinian evolution inhabitable apply also to the evolution of the genetic mechanism underlying the Darwinian process. It couldn't be as good as we experience it now if it didn't undergo a multi-staged fine-tuning under selective forces. Once this postulate is accepted, the "Cambrian Explosion" becomes a legitimate part of evolutionary orthodoxy.

Every book helps
The last review by Ryan answers the question posed by the previous review by Kevin, as many times as a book is published that goes over these same grounds there will be those who fail, deliberately or otherwise, to understand the points being made.

To those who complain that Dawkins is reducing humans to a collection of synapses the answer if you read anything that Dawkins has ever written is that yes we are such a collection and we are also just meat and bones but what's your point? I can live, love, laugh, cry etc just as much as you can but I also have a clearer appreciation of how these thing have come to be than you with your mysticism. The evidence is all with Dawkins, the complainants never really advance anything more than wishful thinking and mere assertion, 'we are not just...' 'there has to be something more....', no there doesn't, what we have is inspiring and beautiful enough and that is what this book (all of it)is about. ... Read more

Book Description

Consciousness is at the very core of the human condition. Yet only in recent decades has it become a major focus in the brain and behavioral sciences. Scientists now know that consciousness involves many levels of brain functioning, from brainstem to cortex. The almost seventy articles in this book reflect the breadth and depth of this burgeoning field. The many topics covered include consciousness in vision and inner speech, immediate memory and attention, waking, dreaming, coma, the effects of brain damage, fringe consciousness, hypnosis, and dissociation.

Underlying all the selections are the questions, What difference does consciousness make? What are its properties? What role does it play in the nervous system? How do conscious brain functions differ from unconscious ones? The focus of the book is on scientific evidence and theory. The editors have also chosen introductory articles by leading scientists to allow a wide variety of new readers to gain insight into the field. ... Read more

Reviews (2)

A fascinating collection of articles
If thought about in retrospect, it is perhaps flabbergasting that the study of consciousness was not considered, and could not be considered, part of science. The impact of the behavioral school of psychology was no doubt both a symptom and a cause of this exclusion. The reasons though for excluding the study of consciousness from science are now properly given to historians, for, as this book is an indication of, extensive scientific research is now being done in this area, and this research is a fascinating story. Once thought to be the domain of mysticism and philosophy, research into consciousness has, finally, entered the domain of the laboratory. The arm-chair speculations of Edmund Husserll are now replaced by the fMRI scan and careful observations. In the words of Francis Crick and Christof Koch, who have written an article for this book, "the time to start the scientific attack is now."

The book is a collection of articles written by active researchers in the field. The preface and the introductory article are excellent and not only introduce the reasons for the book but also put the articles in historical perspective. The author addresses the skepticism of some scientists on whether there is any evidence of conscious experience as such. The articles in the book were selected according to their approach as treating "consciousness as a variable", similar to any other topic of scientific inquiry. He is aware of the problems associated with such a view though, since consciousness, he says, cannot be varied "from the inside". Decreasing it will cause us to lose the ability to observe anything, and the consciousness of others is not accessible directly. The author stresses though that contrary to the assertions of some philosophers, consciousness is not beyond scientific study. We need not depend on "plausible intuitions, thought experiments, or rhetorical brilliance", but can instead rely on experiments and testable hypotheses. He calls this a "verifiable phenomenology" in contrast with the philosophical movement of the last century.

The article by George Mandler also expresses this attitude, asserting that the study of consciousness has been plagued with "philosophical, theological, and pedestrian semantic debris". For Mandler, the "mind" refers to the "totality of theoretical processes ascribed to the individual", and this viewpoint, he believes, will avoid the collapse into solipsism and sophistry that so often accompanies the philosophical view of the mind. Mandler gives an excellent overview of some of the approaches taken in the scientific study of consciousness. He also outlines his personal views on the subject, asserting that for him, consciousness is tied to a system of limited capacity, this limitation referring to the number of "functional units" that can be kept in consciousness at a particular point in time. Mandler does believe though that psychologists and philosophers are correct in their assertion that the content of consciousness is not directly available, and so other strategies must be invented to deal with this content. Most interesting though is that the author does not view consciousness as primary, but instead views it merely as one particular mode of processing. Conscious processing of information cannot therefore be said to have more status than processing that does not.

There are many interesting articles in this book, and space constraints do not permit a detailed review here. Some of articles that this reviewer found interesting or exceptionally well written are: 1. "Consciousness and Isomorphism" by Stephen E. Palmer, which addresses the "inverted spectrum argument". This has been a source of philosophical argumentation ever since John Locke first proposed it in 1690, and asks for a demonstration that the visual experience of colors between two individuals are the same, or whether they are spectrally inverted. The author discusses his reasons for rejecting Locke's assertion that there is no way to tell whether the spectrums are indeed inverted without the two persons "getting into each others heads." 2. "Strategies and Models of Selective Attention" by Anne M. Treisman. The author outlines her strategies for classifying attention tasks and experimental procedures to study them. She restricts herself to tasks that require immediate perception and response, wherein the experimental subjects are subjected to information overload. Her goal is to find out to what extent the mechanisms of selective attention can be encapsulated into a single mechanism. 3. "Aspects of the Theory of Comprehension, Memory, and Attention" by Donald G. MacKay, which attempts to provide evidence for a "modern" version of Wundt's theory, the latter of which asserted that the processing of sentences takes place at two distinct levels, one involving preattentive processes and the other attentive ones. The "modern" version asserts that the perceptual mechanism consists of two distinct and interrelated levels of components, with the first involving limited capacity short-term memory, and the second a large long-term memory. 4. The article "Conscioussness and Complexity" by Giulio Tononi and Gerald M. Edelman. This article, like all the rest in the last part of the book, called "Theory" is fascinating, again because of its attempt to respect the role of experiments. The authors attempt to identify the types of neural processes that account for the key properties of conscious experience, emphasizing that conscious experience is integrated but simultaneously also highly differentiated in that one can experience a large number of different conscious states within a short time. The authors discuss tools for measuring integration, which they call 'functional clustering' and for measuring differentiation, which they call 'neural complexity'. Then they give criteria for determining whether in fact a group of active neurons can contribute to conscious experience. These criteria are encapsulated into the 'dynamic core hypothesis', which they claim is a testable hypothesis on neural contributions to conscious experience. Recent experimental findings are discussed that, in the author's view, show that this hypothesis is viable. These measurements of neural activity shed light on what kind of neural circuits are needed to perform different types of tasks, these tasks sometimes needing conscious control, and sometimes not.

it is finally here
What can somebody who is a science of consicousness freak say about a 1000 pages book about the psychological, cognitive, theorethical, neurological, and historical bases of consciousness? ......well, maybe "finally". This is THE definitive collection of papers on the science of consicousness, something that could only be said before about all three volumes of Towards a Science of Consicousness, edited by Hameroff.

Everything one needs to know to START an inquiry into this interesting field is here. Represented are those papers that started the whole cognitive revolution, all the way to the most recent theoretical investigations on consicousness. The only thing one who is familiar with the literature can disagree with is witht he inclusion and omission of certain key papers, but I am sure the editors had their hands full in making the books size acceptable and at the same time representative of the field. That said, it is impossible to ignore that Baars seems to have chosen some contributions on the basis of how much they are supportive of his global workspace model. I doubt this was made on purpose, however. Another objection could come from the absence of a neurochemistry of consicousness chapter, or a consicousness in quantum physics chapter. The former seems to me impardonable to have been left out, and the latter probably should have been there simply because of the popular attention paid to it, if not because of its shaky scientific foundations.

It is a custom of mine to declare a book on consicousness a must-have, but this one has the most merits to deserve such title. No one who has pronounced the word consicousness in a scientific context can do without this volume...it could also work quite well as a textbook for graduate level consicousness courses. One only hopes that many more editions are published, and that it can be someday extended to various volumes. ... Read more

Book Description

William Dembski, Michael Ruse, and other prominent philosophers provide here a comprehensive balanced overview of the debate concerning biological origins--a controversial dialectic since Darwin published The Origin of Species in 1859. Invariably, the source of controversy has been "design." Is the appearance of design in organisms (as exhibited in their functional complexity) the result of purely natural forces acting without prevision or teleology? Or, does the appearance of design signify genuine prevision and teleology, and, if so, is that design empirically detectable and thus open to scientific inquiry? Four main positions have emerged in response to these questions: *Darwinism* *self-organization* *theistic evolution* *intelligent design*. The contributors to this volume define their respective positions in an accessible style, inviting readers to draw their own conclusions. Two introductory essays furnish a historical overview of the debate. William A. Dembski is an associate research professor in the conceptual foundations of science at Baylor University as well as a senior fellow with Seattle's Discovery Institute. His most important books are The Design Inference Cambridge, 1998) and No Free Lunch (Rowman and Littleton, 2002). Michael Ruse is Lucyle T. Wekmeister Professor of Philosophy at Florida State University. He is the author of many books, including Can a Darwinian Be a Christian?: The Relationship Between Science and Religion (Cambridge, 2000). ... Read more

Reviews (5)

UNFORGETTABLE IDEAS
I read this book some years ago and find the ideas in it have stayed with me, as they go a long way toward filling some holes in our understanding of reality. Sheldrake's Morphic Fields mean living things communicate even when they are not in physical proximity. This explains some of his other research, such as psychic connections between human and animal. Read Sheldrake's book, Dogs That Know When Their Owners are Coming Home, a fascinating look at the human-animal bond.

But the idea that once a new technique is learned by part of the population, it is more easily learned by the rest is startling. Can it explain the rapid spread of computer literacy? Like the old joke in school, can we actually learn "by osmosis?" Sheldrake's examples of group behavior and generational learning in the animal world points exactly in that direction. What one generation learns can be passed to the next. What I learn can make it easier for you to learn. This is a radical idea!

I've recently read astronaut Dr. Edgar Mitchell's book, The Way of the Explorer, in which he presents his view of reality, based on years of research into psychic and spiritual pehonomenon. His view incorporates Sheldrake's ideas in that he accounts for knowledge that does not come from standard learning methods. Knowledge received from spiritual insight or received psychically is part of the natural but unseen web underlying our universe, according to Mitchell. All knowledge of past and present is available, but is not sought by most people, since they do not know or practice the techniques for tapping into that source and there are no currently accepted scientific theories to explain how it works. Sheldrake's Morphic Fields are one such explanation.

The Presence of the Past is an influential book that will continue to be consulted and discussed. Since reading it, I've had more reason to think Sheldrake is right and I've read nothing elsewhere that disproves his fascinating conclusions.

Hmm? am i really the first to give 5 stars?
I felt compulsed to write a 5-star review after seeing only 3 reviews, all of them giving 3 or 4 stars to this classic masterpiece. Hey, don't get it wrong! this is a superb book you can't put down once you've started. I have read it twice and intend to translate it into Estonian.
Although, yes, only maybe a quarter of orthodox biologists can stand Sheldrake's name, the implications of his theory - if correct - are enormous. It would thoroughly change our present understanding of the concept of memory, which means that we need new fields of science - physical semiotics, for example. It would push the "borders" of semiotics to include the very first particles after the BB. Followers of C.S.Peirce would drink lots of champagne and would celebrate the victory. It would also require a radical revision of the ideas of evolution.
So - yes, yes, this IS a popular half-science-fiction book, easily dismissed by orthodox scientists. However, several of Sheldrake's examples are convincing and his theoretizing makes sense. So, I prefer to keep Sheldrake's ideas in "Interesting unsolved cases" drawer. Sheldrake is very much like Ken Wilber. "Serious" philosophers don't call Wilber a philosopher, but an "interesting individual". I would take it as a compliment.

An excellent place to start
Sheldrake's ideas, while controverial are an excellent place to add to anyone's ongoing exploration of Metaphysics. I agree with a previous reviewer in that these ideas can be interpreted using old terminology. Instead I have found it better to synthesize Sheldrake's excellent works with David Bohm, and any other relevant source I can find. Where do these Morphic fields come from? That is the truly interesting question.

good ideas more development needed
Sheldrake's original idea expounded in his earlier : "A New Science of Life" is further investigated here, I say investigated rather than developed because he seems to have taken a step back towards the view of the science he purports to have surpassed. The idea of morphic resonance is very interesting indeed, however the use of the field concept is much the same as the fields proposed in physics. One feels Sheldrake is making use of such devices because a new idea is not at hand whereas a truly new approach would revitalise this idea of morphic resonance and perhaps consider the whole rather than a piecemeal approach such as fields which act like pieces, the common use prevalent in physics with the possible exception of quantum theory.

In this aspect I agree with the previous reviewer but on the other hand there are some really fascinating ideas present, the basic one being morphic resonance, and the habits of nature. There certainly is a fair bit of experimental evidence to support at least a deeper investigation of these ideas rather than the usual "crank" reaction of mainstream science which of course considers it heresy. Crucial to such an investigation would be a device capable of measuring this "field" or at least the effect on the formation of structures such as crystals which Sheldrake notes should provide an interesting test of his ideas.

I believe Sheldrake does not take enough care to avoid a certain feeling of uncertainty and even at times a sense that there is something not quite solid about the reasoning. I also believe this was not his intention and that his ideas have great worth and deserve the most serious consideration.

Not as challenging as it could have been.
"Familiarity with concepts conceals a deep problem". Mr Sheldrake is right to point this out, but never quite gets to grips with the problem he is tackling because ironically, he is never quite able to escape the familiarity of his own field of expertise. Like every scientist who is trying to say something new, he struggles to keep it in the fold of accepted thinking and to that purpose does no more than invent a new language in his conception of morphogenetic fields which does little more than the old idea of psi-fields or holons. From a scientific point of view, it gives to the kind of information he is dealing with an acceptable image, but in the end it is the same as saying that there is a something-I-know-not-what going on. The fact that experiments he has performed or reported on suggests something extraordinary in the nature of reality amounts to no more than saying that there may be something in it. The book has a lengthy section analysing the notion of a law as it has come down to us from the Greeks, but he never actually challenges the familiarity of the basic concepts of science that are passed down the generations as immutable. Consequently, he picks on the notion of a "field" within whose boundaries he presents his case for the morphogenetic experience and causative formation, not noticing that this conception itself is designed to bolster the laws of inertia which are now some three hundred years old and still unrevoked. Consequently, he is blind to the role that death plays in the structure of reality and within morphogenesis itself, merely noting that dead languages or unfamiliar languages can be learnt faster than gobbledegook or invented languages never spoken before. Furthermore, it suffers from a flaw that was a criticism of the platonic Forms in that Mr Sheldrake thinks that new fields arise with the formation of new ideas. He does not consider that, in the event of a field existing, it is just as capable of being switched off! To try to demonstrate the drama of experience in a test-tube is to invite the drama to dissipate and leave only a husk of itself for eyes to pry. It was the same problem for those experiments exploring psychic phenomena: how can the interest of the phenomenon be sustained over long periods of cold examination? Usually the experiments are held up as evidence of disproof by the skeptical and the positivist. At the end of the day, given the narrow parameters of operation, and the desire to be scientific, the best one can say is that there may be something in it and that is the end of that. What is really needed are ideas that challenge the autocratic position of science which is self-assumed which demands that anything concerning the nature of reality must comply with the conditions laid down by etc.etc. Even so, it is an interesting read, as far as it is prepared to go. ... Read more

Book Description

Matthieu Ricard trained as a molecular biologist, working in the lab of a Nobel prize—winning scientist, but when he read some Buddhist philosophy, he became drawn to Buddhism. Eventually he left his life in science to study with Tibetan teachers, and he is now a Buddhist monk and translator for the Dalai Lama, living in the Shechen monastery near Kathmandu in Nepal. Trinh Thuan was born into a Buddhist family in Vietnam but became intrigued by the explosion of discoveries in astronomy during the 1960s. He made his way to the prestigious California Institute of Technology to study with some of the biggest names in the field and is now an acclaimed astrophysicist and specialist on how the galaxies formed.

When Matthieu Ricard and Trinh Thuan met at an academic conference in the summer of 1997, they began discussing the many remarkable connections between the teachings of Buddhism and the findings of recent science. That conversation grew into an astonishing correspondence exploring a series of fascinating questions. Did the universe have a beginning? Or is our universe one in a series of infinite universes with no end and no beginning? Is the concept of a beginning of time fundamentally flawed? Might our perception of time in fact be an illusion, a phenomenon created in our brains that has no ultimate reality? Is the stunning fine-tuning of the universe, which has produced just the right conditions for life to evolve, a sign that a “principle of creation” is at work in our world? If such a principle of creation undergirds the workings of the universe, what does that tell us about whether or not there is a divine Creator? How does the radical interpretation of reality offered by quantum physics conform to and yet differ from the Buddhist conception of reality? What is consciousness and how did it evolve? Can consciousness exist apart from a brain generating it?

The stimulating journey of discovery the authors traveled in their discussions is re-created beautifully in The Quantum and the Lotus, written in the style of a lively dialogue between friends. Both the fundamental teachings of Buddhism and the discoveries of contemporary science are introduced with great clarity, and the reader will be profoundly impressed by the many correspondences between the two streams of thought and revelation. Through the course of their dialogue, the authors reach a remarkable meeting of minds, ultimately offering a vital new understanding of the many ways in which science and Buddhism confirm and complement each other and of the ways in which, as Matthieu Ricard writes, “knowledge of our spirits and knowledge of the world are mutually enlightening and empowering.” ... Read more

Reviews (8)

The Frontiers of the Mind unravelled by Ancient Wisdom
The mystery of the wonderful journey of Human-kind is here secretly unravelled through the power of Mind-kinds of two brilliant scientist,Trinh Xuan Thuan and philosopher, Matthieu Ricard. An astonishing dialog that brings us closer to the crossroads of the 2500 years old Wisdom of buddhism and a younger but strongly established network of Science. Matthieu Ricard acts in this fake fighting, full of sharp remarks, to put on our still unconscious self-screen an image of what could be called Wisdom. Producing counter-arguments that provoke a tension, worthwhile to find our way, Trinh Xuan Thuan proves the western intellect has enough material to compete and some ideas of high calibra. In the end, the question is left for us to decide if these two worlds can accmodate a common ground. This should not be a problem, given the Quest is the same: what is Wisdom?
A book highly recommended for those who want to broaden their mind. Don't worry, apparently it has no boudaries...

Read by one with no interest in Buddhism
This book started very disappointingly, with what I felt was a lot of leading the reader to conclusions. However, the authors seemed to abandon that tendency after the first few chapters. Certainly, there is a lot of text that reads like a sales brochure for Buddhism. There are a number of areas where they run off on tangents about loving your fellow man and achieving enlightenment and nirvana.
Ignoring all that, there are many really thought-provoking and interesting discussions within, on the nature of the universe and our place in it. These authors get much more philosophical than the typical science text would, and that presents a much different perspective that's worthwhile.

This book has helped me see the big picture
First of all, this is a unique book that helps you really understand buddhism especially if you are familiar with modern day physics.

Robert Thurman, the Tibetan Schoolar said that Buddhism is "an education system", not a religion. Then the steps that one takes reading this book are like clear concise course work. The authors explain modern quatum mechanics and shows how the notion of
"inherent emptiness" is reflected in a scientific theory that has been rigorously tested.

What I learned from this book is a new way of looking at reality.
This reality is a non-material , non -linear reality that somehow coincides with modern scientific test results. We begin to see how the discipline and rigour with which science is held up to applies just as well to Buddhist thought processes. So that is the beauty of the book. Buddhism is not about faith, the practice is about finding what works through learning and practical experience.

Finally
Finally, a real scientist and a real Buddhist philosopher present a fair, balanced, and realistic dialogue on the correspondence between the modern scientific and Buddhist cosmologies. Watch out, Fritjof Capra and Wes Nisker, we're coming to getcha! Reality breaks through with a vengeance...

Hopefully, this book will set a new standard for writing on the subject of Eastern religions and the "new science." No longer will solipsistic arm-waving be allowed - only sincere and open communication, from the heart, between truly informed scientific and spiritual perspectives.

I find this book refreshing, hard-nosed, unafraid, and therefore liberating from our current fuzzy literature in this area. Thank you, thank you, thank you, Matthieu and Trinh.

Buddhism and the Discussion between Science and Religion
The nature of the relationship, and the compatibility, between the scientific and religous outlook continues to fascinate scientists, religious people, and philosophers. Most of the many books on this subject deal with religion in general terms or concentrate on Western theistic religions (primarily Christianity and Judaism.)

This book is a fascinating discussion of Buddhism and science told through articulate and intelligent exchanges between Ricard and Thuan. Ricard earned a PhD in chemistry in France before leaving a promising career to become a Tibetan Buddhist monk. Thuan is a Vietnamese who became enamored of at an early age and is a world-renowned astrophysicist and writer.

The most important sections of this book are the introduction, which sets the problem, and the conclusion. Science does not satisfy the spiritual needs of man -- his need to end suffering, understand himself, and the nature of his world -- to find meaning. How is it possible to find religious meaning in a world where science seems to be the only source of knowledge?

In his introduction, Ricard argues that science and Buddhism approach reality in different ways. He finds Buddhism non-dogmatic, willing to accept scientific findings and based on an introspection into the human condition with Buddha as a guide. Thuan agrees that human beings need spirituality as well as science.

There are fifteen chapters discussing with impressing erudition specific scientific issues and how Buddhists might view them. We get discussions of the "big bang" theory of quantum mechanics, the nature of time, computers and thought, and the nature of consciousness, among other topics. For a book cast in the form of a discussion, the references are copious.

There is a great deal of discussion of Buddhism's focus on indeterminacy and change and its relation to science. Also, Ricard focuses of the deep and difficult Buddhist teaching of dependent arising. He tries to argue that this teaching shows the untenability of scientific (or metaphysical) realism -- the view that science describes an independently existing reality.

Ricard also takes issue with theism and here he gets something of a disagreement from Thuan who believes in a Spinozistic concept of God (which needs explaining) and is something of a scientific realist.

There is a wonderful summation by Thusn: "Made of stardust, we share the same cosmic history as the lions on the savannas and the lavenders in the fields. We are all connected through time and space, and thus interdependent.(page 280)

Some of this book is highly technical and Ricard, is spite of himself is over dogmatic in places. This is still a wonderful book. It teaches a "secular spirituality" in the words of Ricard and may be read with benefit by those with no particular commitment to Buddhism. ... Read more

Book Description

Wittgenstein's work remains, undeniably, now, that off one of those few philosophers who will be read by all future generations. ... Read more

Reviews (2)

The Differentiation of Reality through language
This is the Calculus we all ought to be studying in school. Not since Whorff have we come this close to the heart of Languages.

Some remarks on Remarks...
If you are interested in the philosophy of mathematics, this is the book for you! No special knowledge of mathematics or philosophy is needed to read and understand this book. Some prior experience with philosophy would be helpful, though,just to get you used to discussing philosophy. Some reading of other philosophy books by Wittgenstein, especially Philosophical Investigations or On Certainty would be helpful, to get you used to Wittgenstein's unusual style of writing. But if you haven't read any philosophy before reading Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, don't worry, it isn't necessary.

Wittgenstein seems to think that mathematics is a language as German, or French, or English are languages. Mathematics is a human language, he says.He discusses the way we learn mathematics and also what constitutes proofs of mathematical theorems.

This is an extremely interesting book to read, but it is not something you can sit down and read in one sitting. It will take a few sittings to get through it all. For myself, this was because I had to stop frequently and think of the implications of what Wittgenstein was saying. For example, he says that the mathematiciam creates essences. I had to re-evaluate my conception of mathematics after reading this statement.

Overall, this was a very enjoyable book to read and it changed the way I view the world of mathematics. ... Read more

Book Description

When first published in 1959, this book revolutionized contemporary thinking about science and knowledge. It remains the one of the most widely read books about science to come out of the twentieth century. ... Read more

Reviews (9)

"We do not know: we can only guess."
"We do not know: we can only guess."

For making the self-inclusion falacy, Karl Popper flunks his own book.

For better mindcleaner, I suggest Ayn Rand's "Philosphy: Who Needs it,' and "Voice Of Reason."

Challaging and deep reading
First of all, I would like to say in my behalf that I'm no logic expert, and that I had to cut Popper's book in chapter 8 just to read an introduction to Logic before I continue further in my personal experience with Popper. This book is a classical one, I had just seen references to it before, so I decided to give it a try. Boy, I was so out of my territory I felt really confused at times, but finally manage to get through the technical issues. This was a hard reading book for me, but I don't regret the month I devote to it, all the effort was worth it. So, why do I gave it four stars then? Well, just because it was hard, sorry, I don't have a better argument, but it's true, if you don't poses a solid background in Logic this would be a hard reading. I'm not going to talk much about this book content since I don't like that much, and everybody seems to do that, there's even some really good reviews in this page that make a better job that the one I could. Finally I will like to say that if you are interested in the philosophy behind scientific work, this is a wonderful book.

old but still outstanding book
This is Popper's early masterpiece, which still deserves to be thoroughly read. Thesis of the book: theories are guesses which have no secure basis and can be at any time overthrown, but which must be able to stick out their necks and face experimental tests. If they pass the tests, this does not make them any more secure or reliable than they were before.

Its first chapter explains two fundamental problems which will be grappled with in the following chapters: the problem of induction and the problem of demarcation (between science and non-science). The solution to the first problem is straightforward: there is no such thing as induction. If you want to learn more on Popper's formulation and purported solution of this problem, you should read the whole book.

The second chapter gives some methodological rules which, though presented as conventions, are set down in order to combat "conventionalism", the attempt to regard theories as irrefutable, as true by convention.

The third chapter, a bit boring, is an analysis of causality, scientific explanation, the kinds of scientific concepts and the structure of theories (these are considered interpreted axiomatic systems).

The fourth chapter deals with the notion of falsifiability, something theories must have in order to be scientific according to Popper's criterion of demarcation. Falsifiability, as here defined, is (roughly) incompatibility with at least one singular statement reporting the existence of an observable event (the distinction between occurrences and events will be found here; it was previously drawn by Bertrand Russell, I may add).

The fifth chapter deals with these last kind of statements (basic statements): their form, their content and their role in science. These statements are in no sense justified by experience, says Popper, even if their acceptance is caused by experience; they are as risky as theories, although in scientific practice there is not (usually) much trouble in agreeing to accept or to reject them. It is a pity that Popper says that basic statements are accepted by a "free choice" or convention, because it is only after observing that the popperian Forscher will agree to accept a basic statement.

The sixth chapter tries to define comparative criteria of falsifiability. Given that all scientific theories have an infinity of observable consequences, how are we to compare their boldness = refutability = their sticking out their necks?

I am running out of words. The seventh chapter deals with the notion of simplicity. Popper's thesis here is: simplicity = boldness = falsifiability; a simple thesis, and a bold one.

The eighth chapter contains a deft and clear discussion of some methodological and mathematical problems of probability. I highly recommend it. It is after reading a chapter like these that you can realize how cheap and misleading the criticisms of Stove are to which some previous reviewers refered.

Chapter 9 contains a plea for objectivism in quantum physics, although it is rather out-dated. But the attack on Heisenberg's programme is still instructive.

The last chapter deals with "corroboration" of theories and includes an important critique of justificationist probabilism. One should read it together with Reichenbach's highly negative Erkenntnis review: "Über Induktion und Wahrscheinlichkeit: Bemerkungen zu K.Popper's Logik der Forschung".

The appendices are also worth reading, even if they tackle mainly with technical problems.

I think that no one has seen with greater clarity the problems and ambiguities of Popper's methodology as displayed in this book than his coleague-rival Imre Lakatos. Even if he is not half as gifted as Popper, and makes many mistakes as regards induction, his critique of popperian demarcation and rules of science is certainly worth reading.

On this book, one can also benefit and enjoy reading Neurath's indignant review of the 1934 edition: "Pseudo-Rationalismus der Falsifikation", and Grelling's review in "Theoria", 1937 (1).

Classic work in the philosophy of science.
While much work has gone on in the philosophy of science (progressive and otherwise) since Popper wrote his magnum opus, this work still stands as a survey of central issues in the philosophy of science. It analyzes concepts central to science itself (e.g. probability) and attempts to characterize science itself. That the latter analysis is incomplete is well known by now. This does not detract much from the book's well deserved reputation - but does result in this book having a 4 star review from this reviewer. It should be noted that Popper's criterion is ultimately a sort of "negative rationalism" - and from there it is not far to irrationalisms. Be warned. Works of Bunge, Kitcher and Laudan (for example) attempt to deal with this latter problem. The student or curious individual studying this work for current (rather than historical) interest is well advised to keep these later works in mind, as well as the later works of Popper himself.

Groundbreaking work in scientific epistemology
This is the book where Popper first introduced his famous "solution" to the problem of induction.Originally publish in German in 1934, this version is Popper's own English translation undertaken in the 1950s.It should go without saying that the book is a classic in philosophic epistemology--perhaps the most important such work to appear since Hume's "An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding."Popper argues that scientific theories can never be proven, merely tested and corroborated.Scientific inquiry is distinguished from all other types of investigation by its testability, or, as Popper put, by the falsifiability of its theories.Unfalsifiable theories are unscientific precisely because they cannot be tested.

Popper has always been known for his straightforward, lucid writing style.There are no books on epistemology that are as easy to read and understand than Popper's.Nonetheless, of all Popper's books, "Logic of Scientific Discovery" is easily the most difficult.I don't know whether it is because it was his first book or because it was originally written in German or because of all the technical problems in probability and quantum theory that are dealt within its pages.Whatever the reason, this book, despite its tremendous importance, cannot be recommended to those seeking an introduction to Popper's thinking (and Popper, whether you agree with his conclusions or not, is well worth getting to know).For those who merely want a rough overview of Popper's opinions, perhaps the best book is "Popper Selections," edited by David Miller.For those eager for more depth, I would recommend "Realism and the Aim of Science."Popper no where makes a better case for his epistemological views than in this eminently readable book.Further elaborations of Popper's views can be read in "Conjectures and Refutations" and "Objective Knowledge."

Popper has been severely attacked by philosophers who are offended by his bold fallibilism and anti-dogmatism.No philosopher attacked Popper more strenuously than David Stove.Stove's criticisms are interesting, but they are not as conclusive as one disparaging critic has suggested.Stove makes three main arguments against Popper: (1) Popper theories are bad because they lead to the epistemological relativism of Kuhn, Lakatos, and Feyerabend; (2) Popper's dismissal of induction is contrary to common sense and is therefore "irrational"; and (3) Popper's argument on behalf of "conjectural knowledge" is fallacious because the phrase "conjectural knowledge" is a contradiction in terms.All three of these arguments are logically fallacious.The first commits the fallacy of "argument ad consequentiam," which tries to refute the truth of a doctrine by associating it to its (alleged) consequences.This is, in a way, a sort of guilt by association argument.The second argument simply assumes the very point at issue.No where in his book on Popper does Stove attempt to prove that induction is rational.He simply assumes it is and denounces Popper on the basis of this gratuitous assumption.The last argument is merely verbal and proves only that Popper has violated common linguistic usage.But why should we assume that linguistic usage must always be philosophically right?Stove also makes a great fuss about Popper's assertion that a "falsifiability" is preferable to "irrefutability."Stove a