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| 1. Handbook of Applied Optimization by P. M. Pardalos, Mauricio G. C. Resende, Panos M. Pardalos | |
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| 2. Games of Strategy by Avinash K. Dixit, Susan Skeath | |
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our price: $87.75 (price subject to change: see help) Asin: 0393974219 Catlog: Book (1999-06-01) Publisher: W.W. Norton & Company Sales Rank: 217713 Average Customer Review: US | Canada | United Kingdom | Germany | France | Japan |
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Book Description Reviews (6)
Although it keeps the mathematics rather minimal, you'll need to do your own workings to better understand the text. To get more from this book, you'll need to be involved in the examples the book provides... breezing through may not help you understand the theory better. While I do read other books on game theory, I find myself going back to Games of Strategy to review the basics and the examples. The example on the tennis game has provided me some starting ideas on the issues I've to face in some research areas I'm working on.
Positives: the book is written in a simple style with relatively good examples that promote conceptual understanding. Negatives: the book is very poorly laid out. Some chapters don't seem to follow any logical progression, so the reader must frequently jump from one section to another. Additionally, the book doesn't utilize some fairly standard terms, and the index doesn't facilitate the book's use as a reference manual. The reason I wrote this review was because I came online to try to find a better Game Theory textbook -- I ran into problem studying from this one.
The notation and terminology are in many cases non-standard, and tend to change from chapter to chapter. The BoS is the Battle of Cultures (though this is not the first book to mess with this game). Chicken is a Game of Assurances, except in Ch. 10. SPE are (quasi-)formally described in Ch. 6, but they are actually introduced in Ch.4, where they are called Rollback Equilibria. Many times, I would have to tell students, "this is what your book calls a..." The authors use confusing and convoluted examples to motivate concepts. For example, it takes a confusing, two-page story about advertizing in a political race to motivate study of sequential-move games. A simple entry-deterrence story gets the point across. Also on this point, sequential-move games appear before simultaneous-move ones. I reversed this, in part ot be able to show that the set of SPE is merely a subset of the set of NE (again, using the entry-deterrence story). In fact, there's no real attempt to relate many of (seemingly unrelated) concepts to one another, as equilibrium refinements, each of which conforms to some intuitive concept of the "right" way of playing a given game. The disucssion of the special case of two-person, zero-sum games, introducing pre-Nash notation and solution concepts is merely confusing for the uninitiated. I see no reason that anyone not yet in graduate school should have to know the min-max theorem. In some ways, the books seems to suffer from over- and under-reach at the same time. The subject of infinitely repeated games gets two pages on TFT and Grim strategies in a repeated Prisoners' Dilema. There's no real discussion of rationalizability, or Bayesian games; many important concepts are smooshed into a couple of chapters, like they're being swept under the rug. There IS, however, a chapter on evolutionary games, and a (math-free) chapter on auctions. Again, these are points that, I think, led to undue confusion, and required undue effort to counteract. However, I don't mean to be unduly harsh. I'm not suggesting that the authors should merely have mimeographed Fudenberg & Tirole, and whited-out the math. This is a useful book, ahead (as far as I know) of other treatments appropriate for students at this level. But it could have been much better. ... Read more | |
| 3. The Statistical Analysis of Failure Time Data (Wiley Series in Probability and Statistics) by John D.Kalbfleisch, Ross L.Prentice | |
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| 4. Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict by Roger B. Myerson | |
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Reviews (6)
The plan is well thought out and has some interesting innovations. For example, incomplete information is well integrated and permeates the text in many places, rather than one or a couple chapters. However, beacuse of this -- while the book is superb for learning and developing understanding -- it is not always the best reference. Some topics are not available in one easily indexed locations. (On the other hand, other topics like bargaining and zero sum games are treated in the usual discrete way.)
I used to do a lot of carpentry, and I always knew the good carpenters from the run of the mill. The latter talk about how to build stuff. The good ones talked about how you choose, preserve, treat, and sharpen your tools. Myerson is, for game theory, like the good carpenter, and this book is more about the nature of the tools of game theory than their deployment--although it is certainly that, too. The subtitle of this book is silly ("The Analysis of Conflict"). Game theory is the analysis of cooperation as much as conflict, and much, much else as well. So is this book. ... Read more | |
| 5. Multi-Objective Optimization Using Evolutionary Algorithms by Kalyanmoy Deb, Deb Kalyanmoy | |
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our price: $118.30 (price subject to change: see help) Asin: 047187339X Catlog: Book (2001-06-27) Publisher: John Wiley & Sons Sales Rank: 427739 Average Customer Review: US | Canada | United Kingdom | Germany | France | Japan |
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| 6. 3D Math Primer for Graphics and Game Development by Fletcher Dunn, Ian Parberry | |
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Book Description This book: * Explains basic concepts such as vectors, coordinate spaces, matrices, transformations, Euler angles, homogenous coordinates, geometric primitives, intersection tests, and triangle meshes. * Discusses orientation in 3D, including thorough coverage of quaternions and a comparison of the advantages and disadvantages of different representation techniques. * Describes working C++ classes for mathematical and geometric entities and several different matrix classes, each tailored to specific geometric tasks. * Includes complete derivations for all the primitive transformation matrices. Reviews (18)
So, what exactly does it cover? It starts off with a couple of chapters on coordinate systems, and then spends three chapters on vectors, followed by another three chapters on matrices and transformations. It then covers orientation, comparing matrix, Euler angle, and quaternion representations (including one of most clear explanations of quaternions that I've encountered), before diving into several chapters covering geometric primitives, including detailed coverage of working with triangle meshes. The book closes with a chapter applying 3D math to graphics in areas such as lighting, fog, coordinates spaces, LOD, culling and clipping, and so on, and another chapter on visibility determination, touching on things like quad- and octrees, BSP trees, PVS, and portal techniques. The explanations in these chapters are much less complete, taking more of an overview approach. Others have criticized the book for this, but I feel that an overview is appropriate, since it then sets the stage for these topics to be covered in detail in other game programming books. I'd definitely recommend this book to anyone just getting started with game and graphics programming.
A feature of this book over other books is the extent to which we have tried to develop the reader's geometric intuition, rather than just presenting numbers and equations. We show what the geometric interpretation of each mathematical operation is, why you would ever use that operation, and, in many cases, how the equation was derived in the first place. We do not gloss over "minor details" such as row vectors versus column vectors, or left- versus right-handed coordinate spaces. These "minor details" make all the difference in the world when you are trying to use an equation out of a book. For the more advanced reader, we offer some of the clearest and complete discussions of some more advanced topics such as quaternions and barycentric coordinates. The book can be used as a reference for many important vector and matrix operations and identities. It also has a toolkit of many important equations for geometric primitives and intersection tests. Our focus is on theory, so the book is not a big code dump like many books. The code we have provided consists primarily of "utility" classes for vectors, quaternions, and matrices. I think you will find that our code is simpler to read and understand than most code you will find elsewhere. We also offer some unique and thoughtful advice on good class design, specifically targetted to classes for doing 3D math and getting it right the first time, without twiddling minus signs or swapping numbers experimentally until it looks right
THANK YOU FLETCHER DUNN AND IAN PARBERRY!!!
Ahmed Saleh , Computer Graphics Programmer .
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| 7. Fundamentals of Queueing Theory (Wiley Series in Probability and Statistics) by DonaldGross, Carl M.Harris | |
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our price: $110.00 (price subject to change: see help) Asin: 0471170836 Catlog: Book (1998-02-06) Publisher: Wiley-Interscience Sales Rank: 353192 Average Customer Review: US | Canada | United Kingdom | Germany | France | Japan |
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Book Description "...this is one of the best books available for use as a textbook for a course and for an applied reference book. Its excellent organizational structure allows quick reference to specific models and its clear presentation coupled with the use of the QTS software solidifies the understanding of the concepts being presented. I highly recommend this book to educators and applied researchers."--IEE Transactions on Operations Engineering Reviews (1)
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| 8. The Compleat Strategyst: Being a Primer on the Theory of Games of Strategy by J.D. Williams | |
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our price: $8.96 (price subject to change: see help) Asin: 0486251012 Catlog: Book (1986-05-01) Publisher: Dover Publications Sales Rank: 32669 Average Customer Review: US | Canada | United Kingdom | Germany | France | Japan |
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Book Description Reviews (6)
I recommend this book unreservedly.
One of the most enjoyable facets of The Compleat Strategyst is J.D. Williams's entertaining writing style. He seems to know the kind of people reading his book (non-mathematicians who think they might be able to apply game theory to their own work - in my case anyway), and the text is taylored to that audience. In addition, while making the subject matter of game theory accessible strictly through arithmatic, the author provides fair reminders that a great deal of actual mathmatics is being swept beneath the rug.
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| 9. Game Theory: A Nontechnical Introduction by Morton D. Davis | |
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Book Description Reviews (9)
Published in the recreational mathematics e-mail newsletter, reprinted with permission.
Game Theory is a subfield not of mathematics but of economics. This despite the fact that one of the greatest mathematicians, Von Neumann, had invented this and that at the advanced level it demands a good deal of higher math. This is a reason why John Nash won the Nobel for economics - and not a Fields Medal (for mathematics). I think it's dangerous to make life-and-death decisions based on Game Theory. First, it's hardly a real science, only the application of mathematics to social questions. Second, you can easily make an error in your calculations. This brings to mind Franklin's moral algebra. He advised a friend (Priestly, I think) on how to make intelligent decisions: by dividing the pros and cons into two columns, then giving a value to each in terms of importance (1-10, for example), adding up both columns and comparing the two sums. The larger sum should be the decision. And then he cautioned that real decisions are not necessarily made in this scientific way, although the exercise really sharpens your thinking. At a minimum it forces you to think of all possible pros and cons of a problem. In the end, though, one big pro/con (or two) may decide the matter. And even then, you can't be sure you've made the right decision because maybe you've forgotten something in the arithmetic. Still this is a rational way to think something through, especially on major questions. The utility of Game Theory is likely to be much less than Franklin's scheme because PEOPLE IN THE REAL WORLD DON'T BOTHER USING IT. Would Roosevelt and Truman have done much better when dealing with Stalin if they had been acquainted with Game Theory? I doubt it, although Game Theory impressed some of the geeks in the Pentagon. (Nor vice versa. Stalin would have just laughed if somebody had tried to "sell" him this academic exercise. He relied on his own judgment.) To this day I have yet to hear that Game Theory is the secret of success of top managers like Jack Welch, Warren Buffett and Sandy Weill. This book is a good intro to the field and teaches you the basic vocab specialists use. Read it like a book on recreational brainteasers, and you'll have lots of fun. I know I did.
There seems to be a whole cottage industry of books on Game Theory. Not many of them are non-technical, and this is probably the shortest of them. (Another is written by JD Williams: "The Compleat Strategyst" - note the spellings - also from Dover.) So this is a plus to those with no background and who may not go any further. This book suffers from being slightly out of date. Game Theory is a subfield not of mathematics but of economics. This despite the fact that one of the greatest mathematicians, Von Neumann, had invented this and that at the advanced level it demands a good deal of higher math. This is a reason why John Nash won the Nobel for economics - and not a Fields Medal (for mathematics). I think it's dangerous to make life-and-death decisions based on Game Theory. First, it's hardly a real science, only the application of mathematics to social questions. Second, you can easily make an error in your calculations. This brings to mind Franklin's moral algebra. He advised a friend (Priestly, I think) on how to make intelligent decisions: by dividing the pros and cons into two columns, then giving a value to each in terms of importance (1-10, for example), adding up both columns and comparing the two sums. The larger sum should be the decision. And then he cautioned that real decisions are not necessarily made in this scientific way, although the exercise really sharpens your thinking. At a minimum it forces you to think of all possible pros and cons of a problem. In the end, though, one big pro/con (or two) may decide the matter. And even then, you can't be sure you've made the right decision because maybe you've forgotten something in the arithmetic. Still this is a rational way to think something through, especially on major questions. The utility of Game Theory is likely to much less than Franklin's scheme because PEOPLE IN THE REAL WORLD DON'T BOTHER USING IT. Would Roosevelt and Truman have done much better when dealing with Stalin if they had been acquainted with Game Theory? I doubt it, although Game Theory impressed some of the geeks in the Pentagon. (Nor vice versa. Stalin would have just laughed if somebody had tried to "sell" him this academic exercise. He relied on his own judgment.) To this day I have yet to hear that Game Theory is the secret of success of top managers like Jack Welch, Warren Buffett and Sandy Weill. Game Theorists themselves disagree on the finer points: Davis in this book points out errors by Anatol Rapoport, for example. This should be enough to give us pause about Game Theory itself. This book is a good intro to the field and teaches you the basic vocab specialists use. Read it like a book on recreational brainteasers, and you'll have lots of fun. No higher math is required (not even simple algebra) - just a little patience and the motivation to think things through. This is the only low-math intro I know of that covers both 2-person and n-person games of the zero-sum and non-zero-sum varieties in one slim volume.
The first few chapters of the book deal with relatively simple subject matter, two person zero sum games. In these chapters, the author is easily able to explain the concepts and solutions without getting technical. However, as the book progresses, the author grapples with ever more complex problems, such as two person non-zero-sum games and with n-person games. As the problems become more complex, the author's explanations become less well organized and clear. It is obvious that behind the arguments stand solid mathematical reasoning, however since the book tries to avoid mathematics as much as possible, many of the explanations and assumptions remain vague. Although I was familiar with many of the concepts in the book, this is the first book I have read on game theory. Was it worth it? Absolutely. Although I would have liked to receive more in-depth explanations in many cases, I felt that the book opened a window for me into this fascinating world. I was especially pleased with the many real world examples the author uses to illustrate the wide-ranging applications of game theory. These examples include an application of game theory to the evolution of species; and the use of game theory to determine who holds the power in a political system. More well known concepts, such as the Prisoners' Dilemma, are also comprehensively discussed. Bottom line, this is a really enjoyable book that covers a very challenging subject. If a non-technical introduction to game theory is what you want, this is the book for you. However, if you are more mathematically inclined or have already read a book or two on the subject, you will probably want to pick up a more advanced book. ... Read more | |
| 10. Queueing Networks: Customers, Signals and Product Form Solutions by XiuliChao, MasakiyoMiyazawa, MichaelPinedo | |
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our price: $176.00 (price subject to change: see help) Asin: 0471983098 Catlog: Book (1999-09-15) Publisher: John Wiley & Sons Sales Rank: 1415315 US | Canada | United Kingdom | Germany | France | Japan |
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| 11. The Mathematics of Games and Gambling (New Mathematical Library) by Edward Packel | |
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our price: $24.95 (price subject to change: see help) Asin: 088385628X Catlog: Book (1996-09-05) Publisher: The Mathematical Association of America Sales Rank: 52576 Average Customer Review: US | Canada | United Kingdom | Germany | France | Japan |
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Book Description Reviews (2)
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| 12. The Essential John Nash by John Nash | |
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Book Description From 1959 until his astonishing remission three decades later, the man behind the concepts "Nash equilibrium" and "Nash bargaining"--concepts that today pervade not only economics but nuclear strategy and contract talks in major league sports--had lived in the shadow of a condition diagnosed as paranoid schizophrenia. In the introduction to this book, Nasar recounts how Nash had, by the age of thirty, gone from being a wunderkind at Princeton and a rising mathematical star at MIT to the depths of mental illness. In his preface, Harold Kuhn offers personal insights on his longtime friend and colleague; and in introductions to several of Nash's papers, he provides scholarly context. In an afterword, Nash describes his current work, and he discusses an error in one of his papers. A photo essay chronicles Nash's career from his student days in Princeton to the present. Also included are Nash's Nobel citation and autobiography. The Essential John Nash makes it plain why one of Nash's colleagues termed his style of intellectual inquiry as "like lightning striking." All those inspired by Nash's dazzling ideas will welcome this unprecedented opportunity to trace these ideas back to the exceptional mind they came from. Reviews (12)
This book is largely a collection of Dr. Nash's own writings, each a significant contribution to mathematics or economics. Nash's papers are thoughtfully introduced and explained - thankfully so given the complexity of Nash's writings. Also included is Nash's own touching and revealing autobiography. The result is a compelling glimpse inside the thought processes of a genius - a beautiful mind indeed. Thanks to Harold Kuhn and Sylvia Nasar for pulling this wonderful collection together.
It is always easy to dismiss ideas as trivial after they have been discovered and have been put into print. This is apparently what John von Neumann did after discussing with Nash his ideas on noncooperative games, dismissing his ideas as a mere "fixed point theorem". At the time of course, the only game-theoretic ideas that had any influence were those of von Neumann and his collaborator, the Princeton economist Oskar Morgenstern. The rejection of ideas by those whose who hold different ones is not uncommon in science and mathematics, and, from von Neumann's point of view at the time, he did not have the advantage that we do of examining the impact that Nash's ideas would have on economics and many other fields of endeavor. Therefore, von Neumann was somewhat justified, although not by a large measure, in dismissing what Nash was proposing. Nash's thesis was relatively short compared to the size on the average of Phd theses, but it has been applied to many areas, a lot of these listed in this book, and others that are not, such as QoS provisioning in telecommunication and packet networks. The thesis is very readable, and employs a few ideas from algebraic topology, such as the Brouwer fixed point theorem. The paper on real algebraic manifolds though is more formidable, and will require a solid background in differential geometry and algebraic geometry. However, from a modern point of view the paper is very readable, and is far from the sheaf and scheme-theoretic points of view that now dominate algebraic geometry. It is interesting that Nash was able to prove what he did with the concepts he used. The result could be characterized loosely as a representation theory employing algebraic analytic functions. These functions are defined on a closed analytic manifold and serve as well-behaved imbedding functions for the manifold, which is itself analytic and closed. These manifolds have been called 'Nash manifolds' in the literature, and have been studied extensively by a number of mathematicians. I first heard about John Nash by taking a course in algebraic topology and characteristic classes in graduate school. The instructor was discussing the imbedding problem for Riemannian manifolds, and mentioned that Nash was responsible for one of the major results in this area. His contribution is included in this book, and is the longest chapter therein. Here again, the language and flow of Nash's proof is very understandable. This is another example of the difference in the way mathematicians wrote back then versus the way they do now. Nash and other mathematicians of his time were more 'wordy' in their presentations, and this makes the reading of their works much more palatable. This is to be contrasted with the concisness and economy of thought expressed in modern papers on mathematics. These papers frequently employ a considerable amount of technical machinery, and thus the underlying conceptual foundations are masked. Nash explains what he is going to do before he does it, and this serves to motivate the constructions that he employs. His presentation is so good that one can read it and not have to ask anyone for assistance in the understanding of it. This is the way all mathematical papers should be written, so as to alleviate any dependence on an 'oral tradition' in mathematical developments. Nash's proof illuminates nicely just what happens to the derivatives of a function when the smoothing operation is applied. The smoothing operator consists of essentially of extending a function to Euclidean n-space, applying a convolution operator to the extended function, and then restricting the result to the given manifold. Nash gives an intuitive picture of this smoothing operator as a frequency filter, passing without attenuation all frequencies below a certain parameter, omitting all frequencies above twice this parameter, and acting as a variable attenuator between these two, resulting in infinitely smooth function of frequency. The next stage of the proof of the imbedding theorem is more tedious, and consists of using the smoothing operator and what Nash calls 'feed-back' to construct a 'perturbation device' in order to study the rate of change of the metric induced by the imbedding. Nash's description of the perturbation process is excellent, again for its clarity in motivating what he is going to do. The feed-back mechanism allows him to get a handle of the error term in the infinitesimal perturbation, isolating the smoother parts first, and handling the more difficult parts later. Nash reduces the perturbation process to a collection of integral equations, and then proves the existence of solutions to these equations. A covariant symmetric tensor results from these endeavors, which is CK-smooth for k greater than or equal to 3, and which represents the change in the metric induced by the imbedding of the manifold. The imbedding problem is then solved for compact manifolds by proving that only infinitesimal changes in the metric are needed. The non-compact case is treated by reducing it to the compact case. The price paid for this strategy is a weakening of the bound on the required dimension of the Eucliden imbedding space. The last chapter concerns Nash's contribution to nonlinear partial differential equations. I did not read this chapter, so I will omit its review.
Professor Nash's story was brought to life by the movie, this book shows why. One day his manifold theory will rule! ;)
There is even something in the book for non-mathematical types: Sylvia Nasar's Introduction and the autobiographical essay (Chapter Two). But for me the greatest interest resided in the remaining chapters: 4-11. Of these, I particularly enjoyed reading the original presentation of Nash's Thesis on 'Non-Cooperative Games' (Chapter 6), and was fascinated not only with the air-tight logic of his proofs, but the use of hand written-in symbols. Of course, Chapter 7 is just the re-hashing of Ch. 6, but in proper type-set form, rather than Nash's original script. But - give me the former any day! Reading the original form and format almost made me feel like Nash's Thesis aupervisor, including the same excitement of a new discovery! Chapter 8 'Two person Cooperative Games' nicely extends the mathematical basis to cover this species of interaction.(And in many ways, people will find the cooperative game model easier to understand than the non-cooperative). Chapter 9 is important because it delves into the issue of parallel control, and logical functions such as used in high speed digital computers. This chapter was of much interest to me since particular aspects of parallel control figured in my own model of consciousness - recently presented in Chapter Five of my book, 'The Atheist's Handbook to Modern Materialism'. Astute readers who read both books will quickly see the analog between the Schematic of Logical Unit Function (p. 122) and my own Figure 5-13 ('Development of Neural Assemblies', p. 156). I enjoyed Chapter 10, 'Real Algebraic Manifolds' because of my ongoing interest in Algebraic Topology, and especially homology and homotopy theory. In his chapter, Nash presents a cornucopia of methods for representation, which I am still playing with for different manifolds. Chapter 11, 'The Imbedding Problem for Riemannian Manifolds', is a delight for anyone familiar with Einstein's General Relativity, or even differential geometry. When you read through this chapter, you also will understand why Nash is still very interested (and involved) in research to do with general relativity and cosmology. Particularly fun for me was his section on 'Smoothing of Tensors' (p. 163) and 'Derivative Size Concept for Tensors' (p. 164). Chapter 12, 'Continuity of Solutions of Parabolic and Elliptic Equations' is like 'dessert' for anyone who is intensely interested (as I am) in modular functions, which themselves are related intimately to elliptic equations. In short, I think this book has something for both mathematicians and non-math types alike. Obviously, the former are likely to get more out of it, so the question the latter group must ask is whether the purchase is worth satiating their curiosity about Nash. I know how I would answer, even if I couldn't tell a derivative from a differential. However, this book can be read on all kinds of levels, and that's the beauty of it. ... Read more | |
| 13. Numerical Optimization by Jorge Nocedal, Stephen J. Wright | |
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our price: $67.96 (price subject to change: see help) Asin: 0387987932 Catlog: Book (1999-08-27) Publisher: Springer-Verlag Sales Rank: 149937 Average Customer Review: US | Canada | United Kingdom | Germany | France | Japan |
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Book Description Drawing on their experiences in teaching, research, and consulting, the authors have produced a textbook that will be of interest to students and practitioners alike. Each chapter begins with the basic concepts and builds up gradually to the best techniques currently available. Because of the emphasis on practical methods, as well as the extensive illustrations and exercises, the book is accessible to a wide audience. It can be used as a graduate text in engineering, operations research, mathematics, computer science, and business. It also serves as a handbook for researchers and practitioners in the area. Above all, the authors have strived to produce a text that is pleasant to read, informative and rigorous--one that reveals both the beautiful nature of the discipline and its practical side. Reviews (2)
Conclusion: A little difficult, but well worth the time and money involved
All in all, a good book to own I think... ... Read more | |
| 14. On Numbers and Games by John Horton Conway | |
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our price: $45.00 (price subject to change: see help) Asin: 1568811276 Catlog: Book (2000-12-01) Publisher: AK Peters, Ltd. Sales Rank: 70684 Average Customer Review: US | Canada | United Kingdom | Germany | France | Japan |
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Book Description This new edition ends with an epilogue that sets the stage for further research on surreal numbers. Thebook is a must-have for all readers with a serious interest in the mathematical foundations of gamestrategies. Reviews (3)
John Horton Conway is probably best known as the creator/discoverer of the computer game called "Life," with which he re-founded the entire field of cellular automata. What he does in this book is the _other_ thing he's best known for: he shows how to construct the "surreal numbers" (they were actually named by Donald Knuth). Conway's method employs something like Dedekind cuts (the objects Richard Dedekind used to construct the real numbers from the rationals), but more general and much more powerful. Conway starts with the empty set and proceeds to construct the entire system of surreals, conjuring them forth from the void using a handful of recursive rules. The idea is that we imagine numbers created on successive "days". On the first day, there's 0; on the next, -1 and +1; on the next, 2, 1/2, -1/2, and -2; on the next, 3, 3/4, 1/4, -1/4, -3/4, and -3; and so on. In the first countably-infinite round, we get all the numbers that can be written as a fraction whose denominator is a power of two (including, obviously, all the whole numbers). We can get as close to any other real number as we like, but they haven't actually been created yet at this point. But we're just getting started. Once we get out past the first infinity, things really get weird. By the time we're through, which technically is "never," Conway's method has generated not only all the real numbers but way, way, way more besides (including more infinities than you've ever dreamed of). His system is so powerful that it includes the "hyperreal" numbers (infinitesimals and such) that emerge (by a very different route, of course) from Abraham Robinson's nonstandard analysis as a trivial special case. So there's a lot here to get your mind around, and it's a lot of fun for readers who like to watch numbers being created out of nothing. But wait -- there's more. See, the _full_ title of the book includes not only "numbers" but also "games". And that's the rest of the story. Conway noticed that in the board game of Go, there were certain patterns in the endgames such that each "game" looked like it could be constructed out of smaller "games". It turns out that something similar is true of all games that have certain properties, and that his surreal numbers tie into such games very nicely; "numbers" (and their generalizations) represent strategies in those games. So in the remainder of the book Conway spells this stuff out and revolutionizes the subject of game theory while he's at it. Well, there must be maybe two or three people in the world to whom this all sounds very cool and yet who haven't already heard of this book. To you I say: read it before you die, and see how God created math.
Conway defines a bunch of mathematical objects. He defines mathematical operations on these objects such as addition and multiplication. The whole work looks suspiciously like a way to define the integers and arithmetic starting from set theory. But we soon see that his construction allows for all sorts of things beyond just integers. We quickly get to fractions and irrationals and we see that he has given us a wonderful new way to construct the real line. Then we discover infinities and all sorts of weird new numbers called nimbers that have fascinating properties. It all looks a bit abstract until you get to part two (well, he actually starts at part zero so I mean part one). At this point you discover that these objects are in fact positions in games and that the ordinary everyday numbers we know so well are in fact special types of games. Ordinary operations like addition, subtraction and comparison turn out to have interpretations that are game theoretical. So in fact Conway has found a whole new way to think about numbers that is beautiful and completely different to the standard constructions. Even better, you can use this new found knowledge to find ways to win at a whole lot of games. It's not every day that someone can make a connection like this between two separate branches of mathematics so I consider this book to be nothing less than a work of genius. BTW This is the Conway who invented (the cellular automaton) the Game of Life and came up with the Monstrous Moonshine Conjectures (whose proof by Borcherds recently won the Fields Medal in mathematics). ... Read more | |
| 15. Game Theory and the Social Contract, Vol. 2: Just Playing (Economic Learning and Social Evolution) by Ken Binmore | |
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our price: $75.00 (price subject to change: see help) Asin: 0262024446 Catlog: Book (1998-07-17) Publisher: The MIT Press Sales Rank: 738211 Average Customer Review: US | Canada | United Kingdom | Germany | France | Japan |
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Book Description In Volume 1 of Game Theory and the Social Contract, Ken Binmore restated the problems of moral and political philosophy in the language of game theory. In Volume 2, Just Playing, he unveils his own controversial theory, which abandons the metaphysics of Immanuel Kant for the naturalistic approach to morality of David Hume. According to this viewpoint, a fairness norm is a convention that evolved to coordinate behavior on an equilibrium of a society's Game of Life. This approach allows Binmore to mount an evolutionary defense of Rawls's original position that escapes the utilitarian conclusions that follow when orthodox reasoning is applied with the traditional assumptions. Using ideas borrowed from the theory of bargaining and repeated games, Binmore is led instead to a form of egalitarianism that vindicates the intuitions that led Rawls to write his Theory of Justice. Written for an interdisciplinary audience, Just Playing offers a panoramic tour through a range of new and disturbing insights that game theory brings to anthropology, biology, economics, philosophy, and psychology. It is essential reading for anyone who thinks it likely that ethics evolved along with the human species. Reviews (2)
Binmore thus offers us a "coevolution of genes and culture" in which the acceptance of original position moral arguments is written into our genes, but the cultural content depends on local environmental conditions and random variation. Again drawing on the ethnographic literature, Binmore focuses on food sharing as the most important rule of justice to be decided by a foraging group. In foraging societies, high variance foodstuffs such as meat are equally shared, irrespective of who made the kill. Equal sharing is thus a moral rule justified by reasoning from the original position of hunters who do not know exactly which among them will be lucky or skilled. Binmore uses evolutionary game theory to analyze social interactions. This adds a welcome degree of clarity to ethical reasoning. Indeed, Binmore is quite clear that all of his substantive results depend on the plausibility of the game theoretic models he presents and analyzes. While fairness norms are biologically determined for Binmore, the players in Binmore's games are rational self-interested agents. Thus all of the results of two-person game theory based on the rational actor model can be deployed in analyzing social justice. It follows in particular that "[i]n a well-ordered society, each citizen honors the social contract because it is in his own self-interest to do so, provided that enough of his fellow citizens do the same." (5) There is no sense in which moral behavior is opposed to self-interested behavior. Moreover, since players do not behave ethically in bargaining, there is no sense in which the institutions resulting from their bargaining have any abstract normative standing. "Evolutionists simply seek to understand," says Binmore, "why some types of human organization survive better than others.... evolutionary ethics offers no authority whatsoever to those who wish to claim that some moral systems are somehow intrinsically superior to others.' (179) Different societies can thus embrace different institutions because comparisons in the original position depend on `empathetic preferences' that are culturally specific. It is in part for this reason that Binmore calls himself a `whig,' by which he means a moderate progressive, not seduced by the grand visions of a totally alternative society as proposed by the Left and the Right. The latter two, he claims, make social judgments in a universal, ahistorical manner that have nothing to do with the actual fairness processes in real societies. Just Playing is an important and welcome contribution to the literature. The book does, however, have some faults. The most salient is that crucial analytical material and discursive asides jumbled together. One must read the whole book, and make numerous references back and forth, to understand the basic argument. Moreover, the book is intended for a general audience interested in political philosophy, yet even professional economists will find the analytical parts difficult to follow. Another problem is that Binmore uses evolutionary game theory where it suits him, but abandons it when it does not. For instance, while Binmore uses naturalism to justify the assertion that Homo sapiens is genetical | |